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3Abstract
The argument advanced in this thesis is that analysis of international relations would
benefit from greater consideration of how material and ideational forces coexist in
foreign policy. All too often academic studies seek to assert how material or ideational
forces ‘trump’ one another, to the detriment of their analysis. In this light we test the
hypothesis that the EU’s policies towards the Middle East and North Africa are best
explained by a joint dynamic between principled beliefs (pertaining to democracy and
human rights) and materialist self-interest. As a causal mechanism to connect these
variables to EU behaviour our hypothesis points to the causal beliefs of foreign policy
elites, which influence the strategies chosen to pursue objectives. In this manner we
propose a theoretical perspective with substantive ideational and material elements,
rooted in the ‘soft rationalist’ approach advanced by Goldstein and Keohane (1993).
Our engagement with the empirical data reveals a number of challenges that point
towards future theoretical refinement, as it is shown that in light of persistent difficulties
the EU progressively yielded to short-term pressures in which it was more difficult to
trace our independent variables. Yet our main conclusion is that, as hypothesised, EU
foreign policy towards the Mediterranean was neither an example of how norms and
values lead to the transcendence of self-interests nor a case of disingenuous normative
packaging. Thus, the analysis presented in this thesis strengthens the case for a
synthesised perspective, suggesting that EU policy towards the MENA has for the most
part evinced a marriage of material and ideational drivers under the explicit causal
belief that they can be pursued in conjunction with one another. On this basis we
formulate a number of recommendations for further theorising on ideational-material
interaction in international relations scholarship.
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Ideas and Material Interests
This thesis deals with the European Union’s engagement in international affairs. More
specifically, we are interested in the role of material and ideational forces in EU foreign
policy (EFP) towards the Mediterranean region.1 Building on an extensive collection of
empirical materials, this thesis makes a contribution to the literature by investigating the
hypothesis that a dual perspective (based on a merger of key variables highlighted in
divergent streams of the EFP literature) provides a better explanation of the Union’s
Mediterranean policy than what is offered by many of the orthodox, more polarised
accounts. In this manner we are able to build upon and enrich the existing literature
through thorough empirical analysis of a theoretically ambitious hypothesis.
Why does this topic this merit our attention? To answer this question it is
necessary to refer to some of the relevant academic literature. The relationship between
ideas2 and material forces has been a recurrent theme throughout the history of
philosophy and social science (see for an inclusive overview Hall, 1993). With respect
1 Note on terminology: this thesis uses the terms MENA, Mediterranean, ‘the south’ and
Maghreb/Mashriq interchangeably. In all cases they refer to the European Union’s southern and eastern
Mediterranean non-member state partners in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
Additionally, we use the terms EU, Europe and ‘the Union’ interchangeably. These terms refer to the
European Union – its scope (i.e. the number of member states) dependent on the specific historical
context. Finally, as explained later on we take a holistic view of EFP rather than focusing exclusively on
the CFSP/CSDP.
2 Defined for now as: “actors’ beliefs, preferences, knowledge, understandings, and expectations”
(Lieberman, 2002, p. 697). We shall return to the definition of ideas in Chapter II.
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to our discipline of International Relations (IR), it is no exaggeration to say that this
theme has consistently taken a prominent position in conceptual debates. While it is
difficult to generalise when discussing a wide array of often thoughtful and nuanced
authors, it is possible to delineate certain theoretical camps or groupings of likeminded
discussants. In the early days of IR this was reflected in the so-called idealism-realism
debate. Even though an increasing degree of theoretical diversity has been added
throughout the years, today we can still identify a split, referred to by e.g. Keohane as
between ‘reflectivists’ and ‘rationalists’ (1988). Broadly speaking, whilst the former
emphasise the importance of social dynamics (ideas) in explaining international politics,
the latter utilise theories with their basis in rational choice to highlight actors’ pursuit of
(materialistic) self-interest.
Whilst acknowledging a great diversity of perspectives, if we accept that in the
abstract a distinction can be made between core approaches to IR it is possible to note
an enduring degree of polarisation between idealists (or constructivists) and materialists
(realists). There is, of course, a middle ground between the extremes in this debate, and
it is exactly here that (empirical) analysis could make a valuable contribution to
evaluating the different perspectives’ mutual complementarities (Sil & Katzenstein,
2010). As Steve Wood argues: “If constructivism or realism were to escape their own
dogmas or path-dependencies, each would accept that in a given context or instance the
other offered a more plausible interpretation, explanation or method, or that mergers
might be possible” (2011, p. 250). Remarkably, however, relatively few researchers
have taken up exploring the possibilities for strengthening our knowledge of
international politics by way of more ‘pragmatic’ usage of IR theory and a clear
positioning within the theoretical middle ground.3 Several commentators have lamented
3 On pragmatism see e.g. Barnett & Duvall (2005); Albert & Kopp-Malek (2002).
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this state of affairs: “at a time when we have two major theoretical traditions in IR that
emphasize material and social forces respectively, we have very little attempt to
examine the relationship between those forces as they play out in the real world of
international relations” (Sørensen, 2008, p. 6). In this vein others speak of the “near-
absence of inter-paradigmatic dialogue” and the fact that “IR theory and EU studies face
a situation of growing mutual insularity among authors that write in different
paradigms” (Kerremans & Orbie, 2013, p. 495; see also Hyde-Price, 2013; Meyer &
Strickmann, 2011; Walker, 2010; Glenn, 2009; Legro, 2005).
This thesis takes as its starting point the idealist-materialist debate in IR and
addresses the relationship between the different types of variables emphasised by the
two schools of thought. We thus position ourselves explicitly in the middle ground in
order to test the hypothesis that ideas and material variables are jointly responsible for
driving foreign policy. We aim to offer a way to gain broader insight into the
complexities of our case than what could be achieved by a more orthodox view by
exploring interactions between key variables from the discipline of IR. Specifically, we
build on constructivist and realist conceptualisations of EFP, united through the theory
of international relations put forward by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), to formulate
and test our hypothesis.
By its very nature this is likely to be a theoretically and methodologically
challenging enterprise, fraught with considerable uncertainty due to its inherent
complexity and the broadness of its outlook (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Yet we believe
that it is a worthwhile endeavour irrespective of these challenges, for particularly
through careful empirical analysis an inclusive approach promises to advance our
insight into the interrelated dynamics associated with two major forces highlighted in IR
theory. It is important to recognise the limitations of a single-author study focusing on a
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singular actor (if we may say this of the European Union in all its complexity). For this
reason we aim to be as open and self-reflective about our methods as possible, and we
will discuss at length what methodological tests will be undertaken to analyse our
hypothesis and what the related risks and benefits are.
At this point we have explained only in part what is behind this thesis’
orientation. For why study the European Union, of all possible actors? The answer to
this question can be found in the trajectory of studies on EU foreign policy and the
manner in which the idealist-realist dichotomy has been manifest in scholarship on the
EU.
Initial endeavours to study EFP often focused on the question of whether a
common foreign policy “worthy of the name” must wait for “a federal European state”,
thereby constantly raising existential questions for scholars in this field (Hill, 1993, p.
316). As the member states pooled more responsibilities in their common institutions,
however, and especially since the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992, a
general consensus has emerged that, for better or for worse, the EU does have a foreign
policy of sorts and that this constitutes a valid sub-field for research in IR. On this basis
works on EU foreign policy have steadily grown in number over the years, producing a
rich landscape with many different theoretical and empirical perspectives.4 Within this
broad field, one strongly prevalent theme has been that of the Union’s nature as an
international actor, as an important mission for scholars of EFP has been to shed light
on what kind of international actor or power the European Union is (or could be) given
its remarkable status as a grouping of states. Classifications of the EU have resultantly
been in no short supply, including, to give some examples, ‘civilian power’ (Duchêne,
1973; 1972; see also Bull, 1982), ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2008; 2002), ‘imperial
4 See Smith (2009) for an overview.
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power’ (Sepos, 2013; Zielonka, 2008; 2007), ‘small power’ (Toje, 2010) and even
‘metrosexual superpower’ (Khanna, 2004).
Many authors concerned with this question have tried to emphasise what is
unique about the EU’s engagement in international affairs. This has put forward actor-
specific variables such as beliefs, identity and culture in accounts of the Union’s foreign
policy, leading to a notable degree of emphasis on the ideational inputs to the EU and to
EFP. A broad variety of perspectives has adopted such a focus – examples include
studies on socialisation, institutionalisation and common European understandings
(Jørgensen, 1999); projection of an ‘EUtopia’ to the rest of the world (Nicolaïdis &
Howse, 2002); a ‘civilising’ process (Linklater, 2005), strategic culture (Meyer, 2005);
the bearing of EU identity on conflict transformation (Pace, 2008; Diez & Pace, 2007;
Diez, 2002); normative institutionalism (Thomas, 2009); and, more prescriptively, the
EU’s capacity to become “a regional engine for the world common good” (Dunne,
2008, p. 14; see also Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006; Teló, 2006). In light of this broad
convergence it has been said that “many – probably, most – analysts have come to posit
a pre-eminence of ideational dynamics as key to the EU’s distinctiveness as an
international actor” (Youngs, 2004, p. 415).5 The EU has often been viewed as a sui
generis actor, and some observers have gone so far as to argue that it can be understood
as a post-Westphalian ‘force for good’ that has relinquished zero-sum self-interest – to
cite Thomas Diez: “the representation of Europe as a force for peace and well-being is
nearly consensual” (2005, p. 620). Of course, as alluded to above, this is not to claim
that there has been insubstantial theoretical variation in studies on the EU, but if a single
5 Our argument pertains specifically to the literature on the EU’s external engagement, yet notions like
ideas and identity have also been prominent in studies focused on internal processes. See e.g. Green
(2007); McLaren (2006); Shore (2000).
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stream of influential work could be identified in the past two decades it does appear to
verge towards the ideational rather than the material side of the conceptual spectrum.
One particularly notable argument within the literature is that of the EU as a
‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002). At heart this perspective seeks to demonstrate how
the European Union engages in a value-based foreign policy rather pursuing relative
(material) gains. The source of this orientation is argued to be the EU’s deeply
embedded identity. As Ian Manners has said: “the EU exists as being different to pre-
existing political forms, and … this particular difference predisposes it to act in a
normative way” (ibid., p. 242). This approach has become a widely recognised point of
reference, and the emphasis on the importance of European values has found deep
resonance in the broader literature (Forsberg, 2011; Nunes, 2011; Whitman, 2011; De
Zutter, 2010; Laïdi, 2008; Tocci, 2008; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Lerch &
Schwellnus, 2006).
The ideational/normative strand of the literature has persuasively shown how
ideational factors such as norms and identity have played a large role in the European
Union’s foreign policy. Conversely, realists have put emphasis on the material aspects
of EFP, arguing that the EU is at its core a tool to secure the collective economic
interests of its member states (Costalli, 2009; Hyde-Price, 2008; 2006; Zimmermann,
2007). In this sense it can be argued that two relatively polarised visions of the EU exist
in the literature (see also Chapter II). Given that both have their own strengths and
weaknesses, each illuminating particular pieces of the EU puzzle, the present thesis has
as its goal to investigate whether a fusion of the two perspectives, based on the theory
iterated by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), could provide us with a more complete
picture. After all, in the abstract most authors would likely accept Lisbeth Aggestam’s
suggestion that “material interests and ethical considerations tend to be intertwined”
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(2008, p. 8; see also Barbé & Johansson-Nogués, 2008), but by what kind of
mechanisms and in what specific ways this has been the case for the European Union’s
foreign policy remains somewhat of a mystery. Whilst it is true that several authors
have been concerned with exactly this type of research question (see Kerremans &
Orbie, 2013 and Chapter II), it remains a work in progress as there is still much room
for thorough empirical investigation to test particular hypotheses regarding material-
ideational joint action as a driver of EU foreign policy (Hyde-Price, 2013). This is
especially so given that there is not yet a significant body of empirical work based on
inclusive theoretical perspectives, which is why our comprehensive empirical focus has
a strong potential to clarify and improve some of the key benefits and explanatory
capabilities of such an approach.
It is important to emphasise that we have chosen to focus on the Union’s actions
(or outputs) rather than on internal dynamics. In doing so we are inspired by authors
like Ginsberg (2001) and Tocci (2008) who argue that we need to look beyond what the
EU is and take into consideration what it does. While institutionalist,
intergovernmentalist or Europeanisation-focused studies have been highly useful to
broaden our insight into the European foreign policy making process (see e.g. Tonra,
2001; Cameron, 1999; McGoldrick, 1997; Rummel, 1997; Pfetsch, 1994; Nuttall,
1992), an outward-looking orientation can be helpful on several levels. First,
theoretically it can be said that in some of the normative literature there has been a
tendency to focus on identity and discourses – oftentimes acknowledging practical
issues and contradictions but primarily as an afterthought rather than as an integral part
of the analysis (e.g. Forsberg, 2011; Nunes, 2011; Rogers, 2009; Kelley, 2004). To
complete the picture and to understand better how the EU manifests itself in the
international arena, we believe that there is added value in looking more substantively at
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how beliefs and values (ideas) relate to actions and thus to move away from ‘EUtopian’
descriptions (we borrow here the term utilised by Nicolaïdis & Howse, 2002). The goal
of this is not to capitalise on gaps between words and deeds but rather to problematise
appraisals of the EU based on only one element of a complex set of drivers and
determinants.
Second, we believe that a focus on the Union’s actions and their external effects
provides a useful basis for building a practical understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of the EU as a foreign policy actor. After all, it allows us to understand the
barriers, limitations and intervening variables that come into play at the stage of
actualising ambitions (normative or otherwise). This will allow us to focus on concrete
policy-making issues in our analysis and thereby to attempt to make a contribution to
the clarification of important practical issues. As Cavatorta and Pace write: “What is
crucially missing is a systematic analysis of how the EU conducts its external affairs on
the ground within the larger policy frameworks that it has adopted” (2010, p. 582).
Thus, in addition to our effort to provide a theoretically-minded corrective to unduly
restrictive accounts of IR, we also hope to shed light onto some of the dilemmas that are
inherent to our case study itself. In this regard our ambitious theoretical perspective will
facilitate a novel way of understanding the main challenges.
With this in mind we will now turn to explaining our choice for examining the
EU’s relations with its neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East.
Europe and its Mediterranean Neighbours
As we have said, our focus lies with the EU’s policies towards its Mediterranean
neighbours. While no case study could ever be one hundred percent representative for
the complex totality of social, economic and political relations maintained by an actor,
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we justify our choice for the Middle East and North Africa on the basis of two
important arguments. The first of these is mostly instrumental, given that the
Mediterranean region has been an important site for common European foreign policy.
Against the backdrop of factors such as its close vicinity, colonial histories and
geopolitical interdependencies (see Dosenrode & Stukbjær, 2002; Ifestos, 1987),
Europe’s deep connection to the countries across what the Romans used to call mare
nostrum is most clearly expressed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, also
known as the Barcelona Process) of 1995 and the European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) of 2003-04 (supplemented by the Union for the Mediterranean [UfM]). These
institutionalised frameworks have served as the main avenues for European actions
towards the south, which is why they shall constitute our primary object of study in this
thesis. Comprising economic, political, security and socio-cultural policies, they serve
as a good and relatively comprehensive measure of the various faces of EFP. As the
recipient of a significant degree of European political attention and various relatively
comprehensive programmes, the Mediterranean region thus provides a fruitful case
study for coming to a deeper understanding of some important aspects of the EU’s
external relations.
The second reason for choosing Euro-Med relations is inherent to the case itself,
as it pertains to the particulars of the Union’s southern neighbours. The Mediterranean
Sea has been described as ‘Europe’s Rio Grande’ (King, 1998), and prominent authors
have identified a ‘partnership vs. hegemony’ paradox in EU policies towards the south
(Bechev & Nicolaïdis, 2010). In the terms utilised by the current thesis this could be
reconceptualised as a dynamic between ideas and material self-interest, but
notwithstanding a general recognition of this dynamic it is notable that many analysts
have tended to favour what Attinà (2003) calls the ‘socialisation/inclusion view’ of
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Euro-Med relations. This has led many authors to focus on issues such as regional
community building, socialisation, and the promotion of human rights and democracy
(e.g. Peters, 2012; Tassinari & Holm, 2010; Adler & Crawford, 2006; Attinà, 2006;
Volpi, 2004). Accordingly it can be said that despite an impressive breadth of
perspectives, the situation that we have identified in IR and the field of EFP studies is
reflected in the Euro-Med literature. As Stefano Costalli put it: “the Barcelona Process
and the European Neighbourhood Policy … have often been considered almost
‘inherently constructivist’ policies” (2009, p. 323). This is not to say that self-conscious
alternative views do not exist (e.g. Costalli, 2009; Pace, 2009; Bicchi, 2007; Youngs,
2004; Sangiovanni, 2003; we will discuss them further in this thesis), but in a wider
sense it does appear to be the case that comparatively more limited effort has been made
to define and understand the potential interplay or joint operation between ideational
and material drivers. Richard Youngs’ following remarks are therefore particularly
applicable to Euro-Med relations:
Rationalist self-interest has not been written out of the script completely; rather
analysts have judged it necessary to demonstrate that such logic does not
capture the whole story of European foreign policy. In practice, however, recent
work on EU external relations has been far better at chronicling the attenuation
of power politics than at exploring the precise nature of the co-existence
between strategic [rationalist] and ideational dynamics” (2004, p. 419, author’s
emphasis).
It is in focusing on this apparent oversight within the literature and addressing it on the
basis of an especially rich set of primary and secondary sources that this thesis aspires
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to make a contribution not only to the broad fields of IR and EFP but also to the Euro-
Mediterranean niche. By testing our theoretically-driven hypothesis with a
thoroughgoing empirical investigation it will thus be possible to assess the EU’s
behaviour towards its southern neighbours more fully than in theoretically or
empirically more limited studies.
Events over the past few years have been particularly instrumental in bringing
some of the relevant quandaries to the fore. An old quip holds that if one were asked to
prepare a political speech a year in advance it would always be a possibility to start by
mentioning the ‘latest’ crisis in the Middle East. Unrest in this region, said to be
plagued by an ‘Arab Malaise’6, thus appears as not particularly uncommon, but there
was something unprecedented about the wave of popular anger that was unchained after
Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation (17 December
2010) and his subsequent death (4 January 2011). Turbulence around the Arab world
followed; large demonstrations led to the exile and imprisonment of the leaders of
Tunisia and Egypt respectively. This was unique in the post-independence historical
trajectory of these countries, producing a sense that the Middle East as a region might
be undergoing a process similar to Eastern Europe’s opening up in the early 1990s.
However, this hope was belied when a military dimension was introduced: UN-backed
NATO intervention in support of armed Libyan rebels eventually led to the overthrow
of Muammar Qadhaffi’s regime, and Colonel Qadhaffi himself was killed shortly after;
Libya has seen much unrest since. This could also be said for Egypt, where presidential
6 To cite Samir Kassir’s Being Arab (2006, p. 1): “What’s distinctive about the Arab malaise is that it
afflicts people who one would imagine would be unaffected by such a crisis, and that it manifests itself
more in perceptions and feelings than in statistics, starting with the very widespread and deeply seated
feeling that Arabs have no future, no way of improving their condition. Faced with the protean and
apparently incurable evil eating away at their world, the only remedy would be individual flight, if such a
thing were possible.”
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elections were held only to be made undone by the military some time later. In addition,
the situation in Syria has continuously escalated and shows little signs of improvement
at the time of writing.7 It is therefore not unambiguously clear at this point in time
whether the ‘Arab Spring’ has structurally changed socio-political parameters in the
region in a favourable manner, or whether familiar dynamics will retrench over time
without fundamental alteration.
The significance of these events for the European Union, and for this thesis, is
that after about eighteen years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – which has had
as its goal the creation of an area of ‘peace, stability, and shared prosperity’ (Euro-Med
Partnership, 1995) – reality appears starkly at odds with the Union’s ambitions. Perhaps
most notably, the core objective of constructing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by
2010, thought to economically benefit the MENA, has not been achieved. As the Arab
League’s head Amr Moussa has said: “the Arab soul is broken by poverty,
unemployment and general recession” (Al Jazeera, 2011a). This is not meant as an ad
hominem criticism of the EU, and we do not wish to suggest that the European Union
should be held responsible or that it had the means to single-handedly improve the
situation. Yet the ‘Arab Spring’ did raise the question of whether Europe could not have
done more to help the region. This was indirectly admitted in a mea culpa of sorts when
enlargement and neighbourhood policy Commissioner Štefan Füle said that Europe
“must show humility about the past” (EU Observer, 2011). French scholar Gilles
Keppel put it more bluntly, saying that there was “a lot of halal chicken coming home to
roost” (cited in Pagano, 2011). The events of spring 2011 thus inspired a degree of soul-
7 This is not to mention the Israeli-Palestinian situation, where, according to a still relevant text adopted
by the European Parliament in 2012, settlement construction and expansion as well as “house
demolitions, evictions and forced displacement of Palestinians”, plus the launching of Qassam rockets
from Gaza, continue to be the order of the day (2012a, §10).
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searching, and this seems to be a good point in time to consider a broad range of
variables so that we can come to a realistic assessment of the various dimensions of
Euro-Med interaction. That is to say: was Mr. Füle right to urge for ‘humility’, and
(why) was this necessary?
In sum, the topic of Euro-Mediterranean relations provides a rich and potentially
fruitful field of analysis. It promises to serve as an excellent case study for our inquiry
into ideational-material dynamics in international affairs as it exhibits some of the core
features of the disciplinary polarisation that in our view legitimates such a research
programme. In addition, EU policy towards the south is an important and interesting
case in its own right given the extensive nature of EU involvement in the MENA region
and the very serious problems still prevalent there. In this light there exist significant
potentialities for contributing to the literature with our current theoretical perspective,
which aims to synthesise the strengths of divergent conceptual strands of thought.
Against the backdrop of these motivations we shall now proceed to define our research
question.
Research Question
As we have seen, this thesis is rooted in the idealist-materialist debate in IR and seeks to
occupy a theoretical middle ground. Whilst this will be more elaborately discussed in
the following chapter, we have indicated how Euro-Mediterranean politics promises to
be a useful case study for undertaking our analysis. Accordingly the focus of this thesis
can be summarised as an inquiry into the role of idealist and materialist dynamics in the
European Union’s policy towards its Mediterranean neighbours.
On this basis we must now posit our main research question:
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What drives the EU’s policies towards the MENA; European ideas, the EU’s
material interests, or some combination of both?
The hypothesis that we will test in response to this question is that ideas as well as
material interests drive the EU’s Mediterranean policies, operating jointly to produce
EU behaviour. In other words, our hypothesis is that neither material interests nor
European ideas alone are sufficient to explain the EU’s interactions with the
Mediterranean. However, each is necessary, so that a combined perspective provides the
best explanation (the italicised terminology is derived from van Evera, 1997). In this
hypothesis ideas and material interests are the independent variables that together cause
the dependent variable of EU policy. This outlook is based upon our reading of
constructivist and realist perspectives on EFP as well as the theory put forth by
Goldstein and Keohane (1993), to be discussed at length in Chapter II. It is there that we
will also further specify and operationalise the terms put forth in our hypothesis.
A final remark concerns the scope of our research question. As our case studies
we will consider the Union’s two overarching policy frameworks for the MENA: the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy. In addition,
we will take into account the EU’s more recent supplement to the ENP: the Union for
the Mediterranean. This delimits the main focus of our study to the period 1995-2010
(with some limited spill-overs), whilst also excluding individual member state policies
as well as EU actions towards non-EMP actors (e.g. the eastern neighbours included in
the ENP). This is still a relatively broad scope, though it could nevertheless be argued
that separating e.g. member state policies from EU actions imposes an artificial
boundary. We acknowledge this fact, but for the reasons outlined above – and on the
basis of research on the ‘actorness’ of the EU (e.g. Regelsberger, 2007; Bretherton &
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Vogler, 2006; Keukeleire, 2003; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998; Allen & Smith, 1990) – we
believe that a focus on the relatively contiguous topic of EU-Med relations is warranted
for our current purposes.
Conclusion
We have argued that a division between theoretical approaches that emphasize either
ideas or material interests is identifiable within the discipline of IR. While exceptions
can be found, a degree of polarisation has divided analysts of international affairs, who
have generally undertaken mostly limited efforts at meeting in the middle ground. This
thesis hopes to add to the debate by investigating the possibilities for a broader and
more inclusive research orientation. It thus adds to the literature in its attempt to test the
potentialities for fusing the strengths of typically separated explanatory variables. The
case study chosen for this effort is the European Union, specifically its policies towards
the Middle East and North Africa. Whilst this is instrumentally appealing owing to the
relative prevalence of ideational approaches to studying EU foreign policy, it is also
inherently valuable due to the particulars of Euro-Mediterranean politics and the various
issues that are at stake in this relationship.
In the next chapter we discuss the theoretical basis for our research, which will
enable a more precise definition of our key terms. Specifically, we identify a causal
mechanism (in the form of causal beliefs) that links our independent variables to EU
action. Chapter II also addresses the methodology that will be utilised to test our
hypothesis. As we will see, a process tracing approach has been selected in light of the
various empirical tests it facilitates. A clear understanding of our approach and these
tests will allow us to conduct our analysis with a high degree of self-awareness and a
good insight into the reliability of our findings.
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In Chapter III we commence our empirical analysis. The chapter considers the
period 1995-2003, demonstrating how our approach holds up in light of the EU’s
policies within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership during this time. We show how both
material and ideational variables are indispensible to account for the EU’s behaviour
towards the MENA, particularly given the way in which they were united in the EMP
through the EU’s ‘modernisation’ approach (in its causal beliefs). In this manner a joint
perspective provides a fuller and more satisfactory explanation of the EU’s policies than
rival approaches, but we do note that a number of challenges remain. Therefore, we
conclude Chapter III with the observation that the evidence supports the claim that our
independent variables are necessary, but more data is needed to prove that they are
sufficient.
Chapter IV aims to add to our evidential basis, and thereby to shed more light on
some of the outstanding questions, by considering the European Neighbourhood Policy
since 2003. We find strong evidence in support of our hypothesis, but the evidence also
shows that there was a certain tendency in the ENP away from the dynamics witnessed
previously. Whilst we argue that this does not falsify our hypothesis, it does require us
to critically assess future policy in order to determine whether what we observed
represented an anomaly or a genuine trend. Thus, Chapter IV underlines the continued
relevance of ideational and material variables but also points to a number of
contradictions in EFP.
Our final empirical investigation, Chapter V, follows up on these observations as
it assesses the Union for the Mediterranean. Whilst this programme represents only a
smaller element of the broad set of EU Mediterranean policies, it further underlines
some of the dynamics witnessed in Chapter IV. Specifically, the trend signalled by the
most recent EU policies is one that moves away from strategic drivers, as represented
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by our independent variables, towards a more ad-hoc, less clearly thought through
approach. In this sense we highlight that a true crisis existed in EU policy in the years
leading up to the Arab Spring, posing some challenges to theoretical approaches that
assume significant strategic action by the EU – as both idealists and realists have done.
Chapter VI concludes this thesis by bringing together our findings. We argue
that our hypothesis could be sustained in light of the evidence, given that at each stage a
joint perspective has provided a better explanation of EFP than either a material or an
ideational approach in isolation. However, we also conclude that the explanatory power
of our approach appears greater at the start of the EMP and somewhat diminishes over
time, as the EU became less determined and more confused in its policies towards the
south. In this context our independent variables prove to be ‘necessary but not
sufficient’ for explaining EU policies towards the MENA. This situation will be
explained with reference to our causal mechanism as well as the validity of some of the
assumptions made within idealist and realist approaches, as alluded to above. Finally,






This chapter provides the theoretical and methodological basis for the empirical analysis
that will be undertaken in the following chapters of this thesis. We begin with a
discussion of realism and its meaning for studies of EU foreign policy before
proceeding with an equivalent treatment of idealism. The chapter then proposes an
alternative, bifocal perspective, based on the perspective outlined by Goldstein and
Keohane (1993). We finish by detailing a methodological framework that will facilitate
thorough and reliable empirical analysis.
Let us make one important remark before we begin our theoretical explorations.
As we have stressed in Chapter I, the field of IR is marked by a great degree of diversity
of approaches, both between and within the dominant paradigms. It is therefore not our
aim in this place to provide an exhaustive treatment of the discipline’s theoretical
heterogeneity. Rather, we draw on the most important tendencies within idealism and
realism, fully aware of the fact that such an endeavour requires a degree of abstraction.
Despite significant differences between the various authors whom we draw upon, it is
our contention that underneath these differences there lies a fundamental clash between
those who privilege ideational dynamics and those who look chiefly to material interests
for explaining international political phenomena. The theorists discussed in the
following two sections are thus considered primarily insofar as they provide
authoritative illustrations of realism and idealism respectively. Whilst the clarity of our
argument is therefore inevitably gained at the expense of some interesting debates
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within the two paradigms, we believe this sacrifice justified in light of our overarching
ambition to investigate possibilities for utilising a balanced theoretical perspective.
Political Realism: Relative Power and Material Interests
Theoretical Foundations
The roots of realism as a paradigm for the study of international relations are often
traced back to several classical authors and an apparent agreement between them on the
basic contours of (international) politics. For example, in an extensive study on
Thucydides, Clausewitz and Morgenthau, Richard Ned Lebow notes that his “most
striking finding is the extent to which they share remarkably similar understandings …
These commonalities constitute the core wisdom of a philosophical tradition that
transcends time, context and place in a different sense than understood by neo-positivist
social science. Their arguments … provide access to a deeper wisdom” (2003, p. 40).
Perhaps as a consequence of this remarkably long lifespan and seemingly esoteric core,
there has been a great deal of confusion regarding the views of those authors considered
to be realists. They have been said to be morally irresponsible, obsessed with power,
unimaginative, or simply too pessimistic – as Robert Gilpin has written: “no one loves a
political realist” (1996).
Realism is, indeed, a very ‘broad church’, but to begin it is possible to identify
three quintessential assumptions.8 First and foremost, realists posit that the international
8 There are, of course, different ways of classifying realism’s assumptions. For example, Schweller
discusses seven propositions on one occasion (1997, p. 927), and four ‘key tenets’ on another (Schweller
& Priess, 1997, p. 6). Schweller’s seven comprise a comprehensive alternative to the three discussed in
this chapter: 1) humans do not face one another as individuals, but as members of a group; 2)
international politics take place in a state of anarchy; 3) power is necessary to secure any political goal; 4)
international interaction is fundamentally conflictual; 5) man cannot transcend the world of conflict
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realm is a ‘Hobbesian’ anarchical sphere with no sovereign power, or as Schuman put it
some time ago: “the law of the jungle still prevails” (1941, p. 9; see also Spykman,
1942). The precise effects of anarchy and its role in international politics have been
amongst the most widely discussed issues in realist circles, but the basic notion of
anarchy as a structural condition is shared by all.9 Second, and closely related to this, is
that realism holds that interests are related to competition for control over scarce goods.
Contrary to what is often assumed, this struggle is not necessarily limited to states; it
takes place between ‘conflict groups’, including e.g. ethnic groups, socio-economic
classes, states or alliances (Gilpin, 1996). This view draws in part on Carl Schmitt’s
well-known friend/enemy distinction: “every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or
other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human
beings effectively according to friend and enemy” (1976, p. 37; see also Pichler, 1998).
Realists do not deny that there can be shared interests and equilibria of sorts, but they do
believe that politics is often tragic in that efforts to increase security and limit suffering
under conditions of anarchy oftentimes invite more insecurity and suffering (see Lebow,
2003; Mearsheimer, 2001; Herz, 1951; 1950).10 A third core tenet of realism is that, in
light of its inherently antagonistic nature, politics must primarily be viewed through the
lens of ‘interest defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau, 1985; see also Schmidt,
2005). This certainly does not mean that ideas, identities and ethics are entirely
through reason; 6) morality is the product of power; and 7) necessity and reason of state prevail when
they conflict with morality and ethics.
9 It is important to note that “to conceive of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature means not
that warfare is constant, but only that it is always a possibility and that actors understand this” (Jervis,
1998, p. 986).
10 In this vein Kennan (1989) described the “incorrigible tragedy and vanity and futility of all human
endeavour” (p. 47) and the “built-in tragic nature of the individual human predicament which men ha[ve]
always had to face” (p. 225; see also Koskenniemi, 2002, pp. 448-449).
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unimportant, but realists believe that in the world as it is the final arbiter of all things
political is power (Gilpin, 1984; 1981). These essential terms, power and interests, have
resultantly become almost inherently associated with the realist paradigm, but as we
will argue below what is mostly important is what kind of power and interests are
implied by realism’s conceptual framework.
Realism’s founding principles have been interpreted and operationalised in many
different ways. The most notable distinction is between classical realism and neorealism
(Waltz, 1979), though recently there has also been work that has been described as
‘neoclassical realism’, fusing neorealism’s structural analysis with a focus on actor-
specific variables such as elites’ beliefs (Rose, 1998; Zakaria, 1998). This points to the
main difference between classical realism and neorealism: the latter takes as its
dependent variable international political outcomes, as opposed to the classics’ interest
in foreign policy (with neoclassical realism somewhat in the middle). Neorealism is
therefore mostly a structural theory of change rather than an avenue toward
understanding actors’ foreign policy.11 Neorealism furthermore pays no attention to
Innenpolitik as it takes an undifferentiated view of the units of international politics (see
Lobell et. al., 2009, p. 20).12 As a result it has strongly been criticised by constructivists
11 Waltz makes this point clearly in a short piece entitled International Politics is not Foreign Policy
(1996).
12 An important stream within the (neo)realist literature emphasises the overriding importance of survival
in an anarchic world. Mearsheimer’s work (2001) is perhaps the best example of this argument (see also
Labs, 1997), though it takes a strongly ‘offensive’ approach in its assumption that anarchy will lead great
powers to adopt aggressive foreign policies to accumulate power (for an overview see Snyder, 2002). In
addition, the theory specifies that two strategies can be used in the face of the rising power of an
adversary: balancing or passing the buck – ‘bandwagoning’ is argued to be a rare occurrence (ibid., pp.
161-163). Mearsheimer’s approach can be considered as a reply to ‘defensive’ realism (e.g. Posen, 2006;
Van Evera, 1999; Walt, 1991; Waltz, 2001; 1979; Jervis, 1986), which argues that the development of
defensive – rather than offensive – capabilities is a more likely outcome of anarchy. Mearsheimer
diagnoses the differences between the approaches succinctly: “For defensive realists, the international
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for assuming that all actors have the same preferences (Wendt, 1999). Especially since
the end of the Cold War realists seem to have taken to heart some of the constructivist
criticisms, seeking to move beyond neorealism’s “ultra-parsimonious, structural
formulation” which some argue now appears “more as a theoretical straightjacket than a
progressive research paradigm” (Schweller & Priess, 1997, p. 9).13 As a result of this
reorientation it can be said that classical realism is being ‘resurrected’ (Sylvest, 2008, p.
443; see also Kirshner, 2010; Scheuerman, 2009; 2008; Osborn, 2009; Cozette, 2008;
Williams, 2005; 2004). In this section we will draw on this emergent trend (which
overlaps to some degree with the rise of neoclassical realism; some distinctions are
highlighted below) as we discuss three important aspects of realist theory in order to
delineate how realism provides a theory of IR that is, at heart, concerned with material
variables.14 These three points are: human nature, the concept of power and its
relationship with ideas, and the effects of anarchy on IR.
A good starting point to come to an understanding of realism’s materialist
explanatory schema is classical realism’s grounding in individual psychology. Hans
Morgenthau considered Freudian (natural) drives for self-preservation (Erhaltungstrieb)
and self-assertion (Bewährungstrieb) to be at the basis of political action. Whereas the
will to live can be satiated within reasonable limits, the drive for self-assertion knows
fewer boundaries; it is this limitless desire for Herrschaft which “constitutes the
structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes
them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main
goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in
world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for
opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals and to take advantage of those situations when the
benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (2001, p. 21).
13 A strong earlier critique was formulated by Richard Ashley (1984).
14 Another reason for our focus on classical realism can be found in its commensurability with a
constructivist view, which will facilitate our synthesis of the perspectives (see below and Barkin, 2003).
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ubiquity of evil in human action” (Morgenthau, 1947, p. 46). However, a dualistic
tension lies at the heart of classical realism: politics is a sphere of struggle due to the
selfish proclivities of man, but he/she also possesses moral purpose. Reinhold Niebuhr
put it as follows: “politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and
power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and
work out their tentative and uneasy compromises” (2005, p. 4). It is therefore not true
that classical realism holds that international politics is entirely determined by the
immutable, ‘evil’ sociobiological characteristics of humans; ‘human nature’ could after
all also be seen as a factor that infuses politics with a degree of ‘moral purpose’
(Williams, 2004; Murray, 1996; Lovin, 1995). Nonetheless, the self-regarding aspects
of human nature are given primary emphasis by realists as they are viewed as delimiting
the degree of social progress that is realistically achievable (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10;
Lebow, 2007). In this regard the ‘brute materialism’ of human nature serves as a driver
for action and poses an important barrier to the extent to which ideas can progressively
alter the nature of social/political interaction.15 This marks an important difference
between realists and idealists: notwithstanding identity and convictions, for realists an
exclusivist or individualistic form of self-interest will always play a role in politics and
cannot be overcome through human effort. Behind this lies the conviction that self-
interest is ingrained in human nature; it is part of the biological material that makes us
what we are.
15 With regards to this limitation, E.H. Carr admits that “the impossibility of being a consistent and
thorough-going realist is one of the most certain and most curious lessons of political science” (1995, p.
84). With this he means that a ‘pure’ realism would lead to nihilism of sorts through its scepticism
regarding purposive action, whereas “[the postulate] that human affairs can be directed and modified by
human action and human thought is … so fundamental that its rejection seems scarcely compatible with
existence as a human being” (ibid., p. 87).
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If this points to a mode of explanation that is encapsulated by a materialist
outlook, as indeed we argue, we can say that the material dimension of IR is further
emphasised in the realist conceptualisation of the relationship between ideas and power.
In order to understand how this works we must first explain the concept of power. As
we will see, idealists are primarily interested in a form of power that consists of
persuading others through socialisation and dialogical processes. Even small states or
actors could have a significant degree of influence in this manner, irrespective of the
question of whether they possess the means to physically compel others. For realists, in
contrast, even though the existence of different kinds of power is acknowledged, it
ultimately has a material basis, consisting primarily of technical, economic and military
capabilities (for a discussion see Mearsheimer, 2001, Ch. 3-4; Gilpin, 1981, pp. 13-14;
see also Deutsch, 1968, Ch. 3). According to Barnett and Duvall, therefore, the realist
conception of power relates to “the ability of states to use material resources to get
others to do what they otherwise would not” (2005, p. 40, emphasis added).16 Beliefs,
then, are rooted in material capabilities, and for realists it is the force behind an idea
that is of importance rather than the contents of the idea itself (Schweller & Wohlforth,
2000). Here the influence of historical materialism on the realist approach is apparent,
as illustrated by the following citation:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so
that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental
16 For the debate on persuading vs. bargaining see also Müller (2004).
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production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material
relationships grasped as ideas. (Marx & Engels, 1846, Part I, BII.2, emphasis
added)17
This view was further developed by Antonio Gramsci (1988), who investigated the
relationship between material dominance and normative consent or ideational
hegemony.18 Realists have been able to draw on this approach in order to bolster their
view of the relationship between material power and ideas (Costalli, 2009). It must be
added that this also opens the door to a more comprehensive analysis than one that
focuses exclusively on material variables, given that ideas are not taken out of the
equation entirely (as in neorealism). Reference to Machiavelli’s centaur illustrates this
point, as it uses both coercion and consensus to achieve its goals (see Hyde-Price,
2008). But without at least the option of coercion, consensus is highly suspect for
realists, who largely follow the adage that covenants without the sword, as argued by
Thomas Hobbes, are but words; they are of no strength to secure a man at all (1996,
§17:1). The bottom line is that ideas are a product of material capabilities, and without
such capabilities it is doubtful than an actor will be able to successfully influence the
behaviour of others. The influence of ideas will therefore always have to be explained in
terms of an overarching framework of power. In the words of Mark Blyth: “Ideas in
such treatments are ultimately secondary to the mode of analysis in which they are
employed. Their definition, operationalization, and explanatory power are simply
17 Possibly drawing on these remarks, Carr discussed how beliefs were often “weapons framed for the
furtherance of interest” (1995, p. 65).
18 For the debate on hegemony see Destradi (2010; 2008); Hurrell (2004); Pedersen (2002); Ikenberry and
Kupchan (1990a; 1990b).
36
derivative of the wider theory in which they are embedded” (cited in Lieberman, 2002,
p. 699). As we will argue below, we believe that this employment of ideas could (and
should) be made more sophisticated by incorporating insights from other schools of
thought.
The above reference to Hobbes alludes to the importance of bringing anarchy (or
the lack of international sovereign power) into our discussion. Its effects are concisely
explicated by John Herz’s security dilemma (1951; 1950), in which uncertainty of what
others’ intentions are drives rational actors to prepare for conflict.19 Pacts and alliances
can be broken, and therefore it would be foolish to rest on one’s laurels when it comes
to national defence. Norms could of course be useful in overcoming the dilemma, but
since it is rather difficult to know whether others can be trusted or not the option to
enforce order should always be kept open (Williams, 2005). This is one of the most
important sites of dissent between idealism and realism: for the former anarchy has no
independent effects on the behaviour of actors, whereas the latter often uses the
rationalist language of economics and the logic of game theory to delineate how
anarchy influences behaviour in ways that are unrelated to beliefs.
The above indicates that realism does not suggest that non-material variables are
entirely insignificant, but because of the logic imposed by anarchy it regards material
force as the ultima ratio of international politics. Despite the acknowledgement of moral
impulses, therefore, the realist believes that “necessity and reason of state trump
19 This is essentially a game theoretical problem, given that it asks how under conditions of scarcity and
with given preferences but limited knowledge rational actors can maximise their gains (i.e. ensure
survival). In this case the answer is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma, where the amalgamation of
individually rational decisions leads to a collectively suboptimal outcome (Mearsheimer, 2001). For
example, realists have pointed out that it makes rational sense for Iran to desire a nuclear weapon, given
the uncertainties of its neighbourhood and the security offered by a nuclear deterrent, and some expect
nuclear balancing to have a stabilising effect (Waltz, 2012).
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morality and ethics when these values conflict” (Schweller, 1997, p. 927). This certainly
does not mean that actors are advised to always follow an aggressive or hawkish foreign
policy20, but what is certain is that the potential of physical force should always be
given due consideration. This also underscores the supremacy of instrumental
rationality within the realist paradigm. Realists focus on the use of material incentives
(sticks and carrots) and trade-offs in actors’ strategies to realise objectives; the idea that
deeper perceptions and beliefs may be altered is considered a product of power rather
than a way to attenuate its application.
In sum, when we speak of materialist self-interest in a realist fashion, reference
is made primarily to material (economic and security-related) scarce goods, which are
typically pursued relative to others rather than in concert with them. And as a result of
the fixed attributes of anarchy and human nature, driving international politics towards
‘tragedy’, realists believe that hubris and the need to satisfy short-term objectives will
often be at the expense of long-term equilibria (Frost, 2003; Lebow, 2003; Spirtas,
1996). The ultimate tragedy consists of the fact that there is fundamentally no rational
way to avoid these problems given the ‘timeless’ logic that is impelled by key material
variables. We can thus agree with Alexander Wendt that “the uniquely realist
hypothesis about national interests is that they have a material rather than social basis
…” (1999, p. 114, emphasis added).
Realism and the European Union
In what way does the realist paradigm apply to the European Union? We must stress
that realism, by virtue of its focus on ‘conflict groups’, is not inherently wedded to a
20 Many realists opposed e.g. the invasion of Iraq (Mearsheimer, 2005), and according to a study
conducted in the 1970s Hans Morgenthau was the second most influential critic in the academic
discussion on Vietnam after Noam Chomsky (himself also a realist of sorts; see Osborn, 2009; See, 2001;
Kadushin, 1974).
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‘statist’ view of IR. This is illustrated by the fact that realists like Morgenthau and
Niebuhr thought extensively about the means to overcome the dangers and injustices of
the Westphalian system. Morgenthau explicitly supported the idea of functional linkage
of interests, as expounded in David Mitrany’s theory of functionalism (1946).
According to William Scheuerman, both Morgenthau and Mitrany were alerted “to the
static contours of traditional legal and constitutional devices” that characterise “so-
called ‘top-down’ models of constitutional reform” (2009, p. 129). In this view, grand
legal and constitutional schemes to achieve some form of federalism are bound to fail
since they are unable to deal with the dynamism of international social and economic
activity.
Notwithstanding the specific shortcomings of functionalism as a theory21, the
compatibility of a realist and a functionalist outlook indicates that realism might be
more flexible than typically assumed. But contrary to liberal, institutionalist or
constructivist accounts of IR, consistent application of realism’s assumptions does not
give rise to the expectation that linkage of interests can fundamentally undermine the
conflictual nature of international politics. As Morgenthau wrote: “when the national
state will have been replaced by another mode of organization, foreign policy must then
protect the interest … of that new organization” (1952, p. 972, emphasis added). This is
clearly reminiscent of Martin Wight’s remark that far-going cooperation between states
might lead to the substitution of nation states for larger actors, but that this would not
21 Functionalism has been an influential theory of European integration, and it appears to have provided
the theoretical framework for the initial steps of European cooperation, including EURATOM and the
ECSC. However, subsequent authors, particularly neo-functionalists like Haas (1958) and Lindberg
(1963), have expressed a number of fundamental criticisms on functionalism. Especially functionalism’s
separation of high and low politics appears to be problematic, as well as the theory’s ambiguity regarding
the specific effects and outcomes of integration and spillover. Moreover, the functionalist expectation that
the development of international structures will erode and diminish the role of the state, and in this way
make world peace a more realistic possibility, has thus far proven to be incorrect.
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solve the fundamental problems of international affairs (1978).22 Put differently; shared
interests can drive a group of nations into a form of collusion that will serve their
interests vis-à-vis ‘others’ (Schweller & Priess, 1997), but realists are adamant that “no
nation will forego its freedom of action if it has no reason to expect proportionate
benefits in compensation for that loss” (Morgenthau, 1952, p. 973). The apparent
paradox here is that the historically contingent phenomenon of national interest can be
overcome only through the promotion of the interests of a number of states in concert.
Morgenthau cites Thucydides to this effect: “Identity of interest is the surest bond
whether between states or individuals” (ibid., p. 972). Costalli comes to the same
conclusion: “the eventual construction of a new regional identity does not change the
system: it can only drive the risks of conflict towards another ‘them’ situated at the
borders of the new region” (2009, p. 331). Thus, while realists admit that nation states
may engage in cooperative practices (when they have evident shared interests), they
underscore that this does not fundamentally undermine the wider struggle for relative
power.
An example of how this view could be applied to the EU can be found in
Raymond Aron’s analysis of the earlier forms of European integration. He understood
this process as an illustration of what he called ‘peace by satisfaction or consent’ (1981,
p. 161). This is a situation where, following a ‘trial by force’, a group of nations is
unwilling or unable to challenge their relative distribution of power. Peace, in this
sense, is based on rational calculations regarding a balance of power and intentions
22 Interestingly, this is precisely what allows us to treat the EU as an ‘actor’ from a realist perspective,
given that “[w]hat is essential to the logic of realist theory, is not the particular scope of the actors, but the
ability to draw a sharp distinction between anarchy among actors and hierarchy within them” (Legro &
Moravcsik, 1999, p. 13). Thus, if we accept that the Union is “beginning to assume statelike qualities”,
bringing “into question the continued existence of an anarchic international system among its members”
(Buzan, 1993, p. 349), it can legitimately be considered as an actor under the assumptions of realism.
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between more-or-less equally powerful status quo-oriented actors.23 However, it must
be said that “if, in certain areas, at certain periods in time, we divine the premises of a
peace by satisfaction, the relations of power, over a larger area and on a higher level, do
not permit us to state that the principle of peace has been satisfaction” (ibid., p. 162). In
other words; ‘peace by satisfaction’ between European nations does not eliminate
anarchy on a higher level.24 Europe is therefore not distinct from what Aron calls ‘the
world of egoism’, which is why he insists that the EU will “not modify the international
order” (ibid., p. 755). In this view the EU cannot be expected to transcend
considerations of relative power and zero-sum rationalities, as some constructivists and
liberals have predicted.
This leaves one final question open: what interests does the European Union
pursue? Realists who have investigated this question have been relatively
straightforward about what is considered to be the Union’s primary purpose: to defend
the economic interests of its member states. As Costalli writes:
In the economic realm, the EU is a real superpower, with an enormous latent
power represented by the advanced economies of its member states and its huge
internal market, as well as by the capacity to decide and implement effective
23 Some realists accordingly believe that the decline of European power – and the presence of a Soviet
threat (Rosato, 2011) – lies at the basis of European integration (Rynning, 2011). As Michael Loriaux
writes: “the commitment to European Union is an affair of realist prudence born of scepticism” (1999, p.
378). In this spirit there has been (neorealist) work on the role of balancing versus the United States
(Posen, 2006; Lieber & Alexander, 2005) and the containment of German power (Mearsheimer, 2001).
24 One rather controversial version of this argument is Robert Cooper’s insistence that “among ourselves,
we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle” (2002,
p. 3). The problem here is that Cooper turns realism’s analytical framework into a prescriptive schema
(Cooper, 2003), something which many realists have explicitly avoided.
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policies, especially concerning trade, thanks to a full range of policy instruments
and a high degree of autonomy. (2009, pp. 335-336)
In this light one analyst has described the EU as principally “an instrument for the
collective economic interests of [the member] states” (Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 31; see also
Grieco, 1997; 1995). Its function is to compete on behalf of its members vis-à-vis
external actors in the international economy, or as Zimmermann has argued, the EU is
motivated by the “interest to maximize EU wealth relative to other powers” (2007, p.
813, see also e.g. Farrell, 2005). This view is deeply rooted in the realist tradition:
[I]n a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and
to implement policies to change economic forces favourable to their own
national interests and the interests of their citizenry. These national economic
interests include receipt of a favourable share of the gains from international
economic activities and preservation of national autonomy. (Gilpin, 2001, p. 21)
It follows that, as María García writes, in a realist perspective “the EU seeks to
maximise benefits for its economic actors: e.g. milieu-shaping rule adoption, gaining
allies for multilateral talks, entering a market before competitors, and not just short-term
increases in trade” (2013, p. 524). Very clearly this view contradicts an idea-centred
conceptualisation of the EU, as it challenges the notion that Europe’s ideational
characteristics can drive a ‘different’ kind of foreign policy motivated by a ’logic of
appropriateness’ (ibid., see also below and García, 2012). For realists it is therefore
doubtful that the EU could follow a ‘post-modern’ route, which, as we will see below,
has been suggested by scholars focusing on ideational variables.
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In studies on the EU’s Mediterranean relations, the realist outlook has
underpinned what Attinà (2003) refers to as the hegemony/domination perspective. For
analysts within this approach, the EU’s goals are market dependence and the
acquirement of a better position in the world economic system, with a focus on
“protecting overseas capital investment, building alternative energy supplies, limiting
immigration and also developing military preparedness for action to face potential
security threats to the European soil and interests” (ibid., p. 6). Thus, to put it
differently, the realist approach argues that the EU is a self-interested actor focused on
material gains – ‘a realist actor in normative clothes’ (Seeberg, 2009). One example can
be found in Roberts’ argument that in the Algerian civil war the EU chose to follow
economic interests without taking heed of the significant human rights cost (Roberts,
2002; see also Zoubir, & Bouandel, 1998). In a more general sense Costalli has made
the same point: “[the EU] uses the asymmetry inherent in the relationships with the
Mediterranean partners above all to preserve and possibly increase [its] power and
wealth” (2009, p. 336). In this vein one author speaks of the possibility of a “new stage
of neo-colonial exploitation characterized by unilateral exploitation” (Kienle, 1998, p.
10). Another example is that of Kébabdjian (1995), who identified a nonreciprocal
relationship of trade concessions operating strictly in Europe’s favour (see also El-
Emam, 1999; Waloulou, 1997; Parfitt, 1997; Kébabdjian et. al., 1994).
In sum; the materialist focus of the realist perspective gives rise to a
conceptualisation of EFP towards the MENA in which particularly the economic
interests of the Union are viewed as the prevalent independent variable. Ideas are not
necessarily discounted altogether in this perspective, but they are assigned a secondary
status for explaining EU foreign policy. In advance of our in-depth discussion further in
this chapter, it can be noted that this is a somewhat reductionist perspective on EFP that
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leaves unexplained some of the more specific ways in which the EU pursues material
interests. Furthermore, it appears to underplay the extent to which the EU has adopted a
wide range of policies that are relatively distant to material gains.
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Intersubjectivity and Norms
Theoretical Foundations
We must now investigate more closely how other approaches to IR have explained EFP.
Since it is not our intention in this thesis to provide a full account of how ideas are
conceptualised across the social sciences, or even IR, we fully acknowledge that the
discussion in the present section focuses only on a relatively limited selection of
theories from the much broader collection of political/social science approaches to
ideas. In particular, we will discuss constructivism, which has most clearly and most
explicitly undertaken to put the study of ideas back on the agenda of political scientists
(Béland & Cox, 2011, p. 5; Lapid & Kratochwil, 1997). In light of the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of Communism, the global convergence towards a neoliberal
politico-economic framework in the 1990s, and a growing dissatisfaction over the
perceived static nature of material approaches and their inability to have foreseen the
aforementioned radical changes, ideas gained much ground in studies on IR since the
early 1990s (Lieberman, 2002). It is this post-Cold War ideational literature from self-
identified IR scholars that we will discuss below.
A good starting point is Alexander Wendt’s call in 1992 on liberals and
constructivists (which he called ‘communitarian liberals’) to join forces, focusing
particularly on the aspect of liberal theory which Andrew Moravcsik would later refer to
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as the “social purposes underlying state preferences” (1997, p. 516).25 Wendt’s
argument was that interests and state behaviour are the product of their socially
constituted environment, which is why he famously asserted that ‘anarchy is what states
make of it’ (1992). This underlines the core ontological distinction that is made in
constructivist thought between objective (natural or material) ‘brute facts’ and ‘social
facts’, the latter consisting of socially established conventions (Searle, 1995).26 The
contention is that the social kind of facts can provide the best explanation for the way in
which political actors behave in the international domain. Constructivism thus poses an
intersubjective theory in which actor-specific understandings are endogenous to
interaction, in explicit contradistinction to rationalist-behavioural theories that take
them as given (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). That is to say: whereas a pure ‘rationalism’
operates on the assumption of instrumental rationality that is generalised for all actors27,
25 Moravcsik provides a useful overview of liberalism, stating that “the relationship between states and
the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state
behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences” (1997, p. 516). What underpins
this view is a set of three core assumptions: 1) the fundamental actors in international affairs are rational,
risk-averse individuals and private groups engaging in collective action to promote differentiated
interests; 2) state interests are shaped according to the preferences of influential subsets of domestic
society; 3) state behaviour is determined by the configuration of interdependent state preferences. In this
vein, Moravcsik asserts that the aim of IR theory is to “generalize about the social conditions under which
the behavior of self-interested actors converges toward cooperation or conflict” (ibid., p. 517). We may
note that this ambition is very similar to the aims of Waltz’ neorealist project (1979), but it has in
common with constructivism its emphasis on the dynamic between internal and external forces in the
formation of preferences.
26 In spite of this distinction, it can be said that constructivism has remained ontologically ‘agnostic’ in
that it does not necessarily exclude any particular variables from its analysis (Hopf, 1998, p. 194). As we
will see, this is a crucial aspect for examining the paradigm’s relationship with a realist outlook (see also
Price & Reus-Smit, 1998).
27 In this approach, “given preferences, probabilities, and choice points, it is possible to derive a complete
set of strategies, choices that [actors] will make at every node in the game, and equilibrium outcomes, of
which there may be many” (Katzenstein et. al., 1998, p. 679).
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constructivism posits that rationality (regarded in terms of ‘appropriateness’
[Finnemore, 1996]) is actor and context specific. For this reason we need to know what
an actor is in order to understand what it does. Instrumentalism still exists – for this
reason a hard distinction between rationalism and constructivism is somewhat
misleading; e.g. Adler (1997) described constructivism as a ‘middle way’ approach
between rationalism and relativism – but it operates only in the context of ‘common
knowledge’. The latter consists of identity-driven preferences and intersubjectively
shared cognitions in the form of norms, epistemic knowledge and culture (Katzenstein
et. al., 1998, pp. 679-680).
This clarifies how constructivists are inspired by liberalism’s earlier account of
the dynamics of interest formation (returning in some respects to some of the
interbellum liberal ideas28), but also that they are critical of what they would regard as
the confusion of social and brute facts in assumptions pertaining to the effects of
anarchy and rationalist benefit optimisation (as practiced by e.g. neoliberals and
neoliberal institutionalists29). On the basis of this ontology we can identify three distinct
28 See Long and Wilson (1995). It can be said that these ideas returned to the forefront around the time of
the end of the Cold War in the form of the democratic peace thesis (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993). Jack
Levy wrote in 1989 that this thesis was the closest thing to an empirical law in political science (p. 88), a
claim supported by Francis Fukuyama, who maintained that no liberal democracy has ever fought against
another of its kind (1992).
29 Liberalism represents a rationalist approach towards international interaction, in which the theory’s key
defining characteristic resides in its understanding of how state preferences are constituted. This is echoed
in the (neoliberal) intuitionalist account of IR, which focuses especially on the ‘complex interdependence’
that is believed to constrain state behaviour (Keohane & Nye, 1972). Though institutionalists differ with
liberals on the exact degree of overlap between different states’ interests – institutionalism, after all,
“takes the existence of mutual interests as given and examines the conditions under which they will lead
to cooperation” (Keohane, 1984, p. 6, emphasis added) – they share a belief that the creation of norms,
regimes and institutions can generate situations where it is rational for actors to collectively pursue
mutually advantageous arrangements (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). The emphasis lies with absolute rather
than relative gains: it does not matter much whether profits are equitably shared, what is more important
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elements that are characteristic of the constructivist approach (Copeland, 2006, p. 3).
First, constructivists hold that ideational structures shape and constrain behaviour:
intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and values (i.e. social facts) are regarded as the
primary drivers of foreign policy. As Hopf argues (1998, p. 173): “Meaningful
behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context. Actors
develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms
and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid
of meaning” (see also Weldes, 1996). Second, constructivist theory focuses on
‘socialisation’, assuming that the ideational structure of interaction between ‘agents’ has
a continuous constitutive effect on their self-understanding and thus on their evolving
definitions of self-interest (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Zürn & Checkel, 2005;
Checkel, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996). Contrary to neorealist and neoliberal accounts of IR,
which take an essentially static view on identity and interests, constructivists thus focus
on processes of change and self-perception that take place on “a social level where the
agent’s identity is related to groups” (Guzzini, 2000, p. 166; see also Neumann, 2002).
This leads us to the third and final point, which is that structures and actors are seen as
co-deterministic and mutually constitutive. For constructivists it is not the case that
there is a ‘one way street’ where structure shapes identity, as for example in Marxist
accounts of interest formation, but instead there is a deeply symbiotic relationship
between the two: “structures only exist through the reciprocal interaction of actors”
(Copeland, 2006, p. 3).
is the question of how corrosive activities like free-riding and the temptation to cheat in order to achieve
short-term gains can be dealt with.
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As with any theoretical school, there are various interpretations of these core
assumptions.30 Yet at the basis of all constructivist thought lies the notion of ‘identity’.
To cite one author: “the identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent
actions” (Hopf, 1998, p. 175). Closely related, as mentioned above, are the concepts of
‘norms’, ‘epistemic knowledge’ and ‘culture’. But how can these terms be defined? To
start with identity, a range of different options is available (for an overview see Fearon,
1999). Wendt, for example, calls identities “relatively stable, role-specific
understandings and expectations about self” (1992, p. 397; for an intra-constructivist
critique see Zehfuss, 2006).31 Another definition is suggested by Herrigel, who speaks
of collective identity in terms of “the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place
within historically specific discourses (or frames of understanding) about the character,
structure, and boundaries of the polity and the economy” (1993, p. 371). A common
denominator amongst the various definitions on offer is an emphasis on recognition and
distinction; identity marks the recognisable difference between one agent and another. It
thus serves to make sense of one’s conduct and to prescribe appropriate courses of
action under given circumstances. This is where norms and epistemic knowledge come
to the fore, as they “typically describe collective expectations with ‘regulative’ effects
on the proper behavior of actors with a given identity” and help to give meaning to the
30 Accordingly a variety of research programmes has been pursued, including e.g. Foucauldian power
analyses (now a burgeoning field, see for discussions e.g. Shani & Chandler, 2010; Kiersey & Stokes,
2010; Dillon & Neal, 2008 – an application to the EU can be found in Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2006),
Habermasian communicative action theory (Checkel, 2001), and work on ‘security communities’ (Adler
& Barnett, 1998).
31 The idea of a ‘role’ in international affairs is therefore closely related to identity, as evident in Hill’s
definition of the term as a “distinctive, high-profile and coherent identity” (1993, p. 307). In this vein it
can be said that both ‘identity’ and ‘role’ refer to a relatively consistent (though not fixed),
distinguishable set of actions in resonance with an actor’s self-understanding, or a stable pattern of
behaviour, in interactions with others.
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material world (Katzenstein et. al., 1998, pp. 679-680). Norms can also work the other
way around, specifying ‘appropriate’ rules to which actors must adhere in order for a
specific identity to be recognised (March & Olsen, 1998). Norms and identity are thus
closely intertwined, and the specifics of one will usually tell us much about the nature
of the other (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Finally, culture is a broader concept that “refers to
both evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and cognitive standards (such as
rules and models) that define the social actors that exist in a system, how they operate,
and how they relate to one another” (Katzenstein et. al., 1998, p. 670). In this sense
culture operates as a master signifier of sorts, within which norms, epistemic knowledge
and identity are located as meaning-givers for action amongst agents (Copeland, 2006;
Tannenwald, 2005; Adler, 2002; Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Searle, 1995).
In sum, if we wish to understand why actors do what they do from a
constructivist perspective, we must first understand who they are. What kind of ideas lie
at the basis of their actions? Or to put it differently: what are the culturally specific
norms and epistemic assumptions through which they perceive both themselves and
their external environment? These factors constitute the ‘schemas’ that are believed by
constructivists to enable and give meaning to interest formation and resultantly to
action.32 Instrumental rationality is not entirely relinquished, but the assumption that it
means the same thing to all actors in all circumstances is questioned, thus subsuming
instrumentalism within a broader ideational frame of understanding. Evidently there is
32 See Wendt, 1999, p. 124 & p. 230. Claudia Strauss describes such schemas as “learned, internalised
patterns of thought-feeling that mediate both the interpretation of on-going experience and the
reconstruction of memories” (1992, p. 3). Ultimately this is the psychological/philosophical basis of
constructivist thought, and it constitutes the core prism through which we must explain the formulation of
an actor’s interests and resultantly its behaviour towards others. As we have said, for the purposes of IR it
can be broken down into identity, norms, epistemic knowledge, and culture, which together fulfil the
abovementioned meaning-giving functions.
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little room for independent material forces here, though constructivists have differed on
this question. Some believe it is ideas ‘all the way down’, but more moderate authors
have been somewhat open to allowing for a slight degree of ‘rump materialism’ to
account for certain kinds of actions (e.g. Wendt, 1999; Ruggie, 1998).33 Yet if we
accept the suggestion of ‘ontological agnosticism’ (Hopf, 1998) it seems that there is
some room for cooperation with different schools of thought. We will return to this
question after our discussion of the application of constructivism/idealism to the EU.
Constructivism applied to the European Union
How can the constructivist perspective and its theorisation of the constitutive function
of identity, norms, epistemic knowledge and culture to shape the preferences and
behaviour of actors be applied to the European Union? Just as there are many different
kinds of constructivism, this question could be answered in a myriad of different ways.
For this reason we do not aspire to be exhaustive, but we will rather explain the
theoretical links between constructivism’s core explanatory framework and a particular
conceptualisation of the EU that has provided one of the most influential explanations
of Europe’s external engagements: the normative power approach. The idea that the EU
is a normative foreign policy actor has gained widespread currency in the literature, and
it has often been posited in contradistinction to self-interested zero-sum behaviour. This
makes it a useful perspective for our purposes, and though not all who have used the
term have been self-identified constructivists we will utilise constructivism to draw out
some of the underlying logics and assumptions.
33 Wendt outlines three ways in which material factors may affect IR: 1) through the “distribution of
actors’ material capabilities”; 2) through the technological composition of material capabilities; and 3)
through “geography and natural resources” (1999, p. 110). And for Ruggie, “the building blocks of
international reality are ideational as well as material” (1998, p. 33).
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Conceptual and historical precedent to the ‘normative power’ hypothesis can be
found in the notion of ‘civilian power’. One of the earliest and most notable efforts can
be ascribed to François Duchêne, who has written that: “The EC will only make the
most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. They are primarily:
civilian ends and means and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express,
however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance” (1972, p. 20).
Thus, for Duchêne shared social values constitute the ‘inner characteristics’ of European
cooperation, and he was positive about the central role that this might grant the
collective of member states in the future (see e.g. 1973, p. 19; a modern version of this
argument is Leonard, 2005).34
‘Civilian power’ refers primarily to the means with which the EU could
influence international affairs – i.e.: how can Europe make its voice heard in IR? The
emphasis is explicitly placed on what makes Europe ‘different’ from other actors.
Hanns Maull defined the means related to such ‘political civilisation’ as follows: 1)
acceptance of the need to cooperate with others in the pursuit of international
objectives; 2) focus on non-military and primarily economic means to secure goals; and
3) willingness to develop supranational structures to address international issues (1990,
pp. 92-93).35 Given the Union’s historical trajectory as a vehicle for collective action
based on shared social values and an eschewal of compulsion through force, the
argument runs, Europe should not adopt means or goals that are contradictory to these
34 More recently, the civilian (non-military) nature of the EU has been called into question in view of
emerging military capabilities (Treacher, 2004), and others have critically assessed the separation of
military and civilian means in international affairs (Whitman, 2006).
35 In a similar vein some authors have applied Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ (2004) as an
alternative to civilian power to describe the EU’s modality of interaction with external actors (Hill, 1990).
For some the concept is deeply intertwined with civilian power: “civilian powers rely on soft power, on
persuasion and attraction, not on coercion or carrots and sticks” (Smith, 2005, p. 68).
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values. What is more, as some authors have speculated, its ideational basis could lead
the EU to “seek to reproduce itself by encouraging regional integration around the
world” and to “act collectively as a ‘civilian power’ and export [a] liberal vision of
peace through democracy, and democratization through trade” (Nicolaïdis & Howse,
2002, p. 768).36 Very clearly we can recognise in this formulation the fundamentally
constructivist assumption of an integral chain of ideas-interests-behaviour (Wendt,
1999; Hopf, 1998), driven by a shared vision of the EU as constituted by a set of
common (liberal) values. In this light, one author speaks of the European Union’s
“postnationalist, liberal collective identity” as the basis for e.g. enlargement and foreign
engagement (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 184; see also Sedelmeier, 2000; Fierke &
Wiener, 1999; Luif, 1997).
The concept of civilian power was given new life through Ian Manners’ notion
of ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE) (2008; 2006a; 2002; see also e.g. Wood, 2009;
Sjursen, 2006; Diez, 2005).37 Manners argued that the EU has the potential to change
the ‘normality’ of international relations: “it changes the norms, standards and
prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity”
(Manners, 2008, p. 45). In a narrow interpretation of this view the European Union does
not even need to have an active foreign policy in order to be normative, given that its
existence as an example of how to transcend Westphalian strife in itself already fulfils a
norm-changing function. In the present thesis we are more interested in what Europe
does, and in this regard the normative argument points us towards the links between
36 Nicolaïdis and Howse did contend, however, that such a representation of Europe relied more upon a
discursive ‘utopia’ than on what it truly is. See also Bicchi (2006) for ‘civilising power’, defined by her in
terms of Eurocentric institutional isomorphism. Finally, we must take note of Hettne and Söderbaum’s
useful distinction between civilian power and what they call ‘soft imperialism’ (2005).
37 For critical accounts see e.g. Pace (2009; 2007); Hyde-Price (2006); Sjursen (2006).
52
identity, internally held norms and engagement with external actors (as was also the
case with the civilian power approach). As we have seen, norms regulate what is
deemed as appropriate behaviour, and in the case of the EU the distinctive norms that
are linked to Europe’s identity have been defined as sustainable peace, freedom,
democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable
development, and good governance (ibid., p. 46; see also Mayer & Vogt, 2006). If this
is an accurate description of the EU’s core beliefs, then, following constructivist logic,
these norms are expected to influence the way in which the European Union defines its
interests and how it interacts with external actors. In this vein it has been argued that
“the will to engage in foreign policy activities that are not means/ends oriented but
rather a statement of values is a trait that distinguishes the EU from other foreign policy
actors” (Toje, 2008, p. 127, emphasis added).
In elaborating this argument reference is often made to major European treaties,
such as that of Lisbon (European Council 2007a), which indicates goals such as the
consolidation and support of “democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the
principles of international law” (§10a-2b) as well as the promotion of “an international
system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (§10a-
2h). Or as Javier Solana has said: “I see Europe as a new form of power … A promoter
of effective multilateralism, international law and justice” (2006, p. 3). Accordingly, the
NPE thesis holds that the European Union is predisposed to act on the basis of a set of
particular norms that are constitutive of Europe’s identity, thereby leading to the
external promotion of European values (such as democracy, human rights and the rule
of law) (see Forsberg, 2011; De Zutter, 2010; Cerutti & Lucarelli, 2008). Even in works
that do not explicitly use the term ‘normative power’ this appears to have struck a
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resonant chord – as Robert Kagan put it: ‘Americans are from Mars, Europeans are
from Venus’ (2003; for a reply see Menon et. al., 2004).
The primary tool to promote European norms, Manners argues (2008; 2002), is
persuasion (rather than force), which entails setting the right example, engagement and
dialogue with external actors, and thinking reflexively about the consequences of one’s
actions (see for the importance of reflexivity also Bicchi, 2006).38 And if we follow a
constructivist approach to IR, persuasion is most successful if it changes the deeper
preferences of actors through dialogical appeals to identities and standards of behaviour,
i.e. through socialisation. Another way to accomplish this aim is to engage with actors
via cooperative institutional structures within which they may be socialised towards
adoption of the European Union’s liberal norms (Lucarelli & Manners, 2006; Adler &
Barnett, 1998). Evidently, therefore, a constructivist rather than a rationalist kind of
social interaction (which would be based on e.g. material incentives) is the privileged
modus operandi for a normative foreign policy. As we have seen, such a policy is
presumed to eschew a means/ends orientation (Toje, 2008) and it is important to
emphasise what this excludes. As Tocci characterises the argument:
After centuries of warfare, members of the European family appreciate that
cooperation and integration are the only route to shared security, peace and
prosperity. This internal Kantian logic is then extended to the realm of foreign
policy, engendering a normative European foreign policy. Hence, the EU is
conceived as a ‘post-modern’ actor, which unlike the modern state, does not
38 However, NPE does not necessarily exclude military capabilities as long as they are developed in such
a way that they do not aspire to ‘great power’ (e.g. beyond the European Security Strategy of 2003 [see
Chapter IV]) and are applied reflexively in the service of normative objectives (Manners, 2008; 2006). In
this light it is best to consider civilian power as a particular form of normative power.
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base its foreign policy on balance of power and zero-sum logic. (2008, p. 3,
emphasis added)
Normativity can accordingly be seen in explicit contradistinction to the zero-sum
behaviour that is normally associated with nation states. This does not mean that only
non-state actors like the EU are capable of normative actions, but a degree of
exceptionalism is nevertheless connoted by the focus on how the EU’s connate
liberalism steers it away from pursuing particular materialist goals in a self-interested
fashion.39 To cite one author: “the EU has normative interests, behaves (usually) in a
normative way, uses normative means of power and achieves normative ends when it
does so” (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1199).
In applying the normative argument to Euro-Med relations, reference is often
made to socialisation and inclusion of the southern partners (Attinà, 2003). “What
matters”, writes Attinà, “is the distance of each partner and the two groups of partners
from … standards and values … with regard to respect of human rights, fundamental
freedoms, diversity and pluralism in society, settlement of disputes by peaceful means,
the market economy, promotion of the private sector, dialogue and respect between
cultures and religions” (ibid., p. 8). In a similar vein, Thomas Diez has argued that the
EMP was “infused with normative power” (2005, p. 630). A similar drive was also
stressed by officials involved in the process, such as then Spanish Foreign Minister
Javier Solana, who spoke of “a spirit of openness and generosity enabling a climate of
39 We wish to draw a clear distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘ethical’ policy (and the attendant idea of
the EU as a ‘force for good’), given that application of the latter term necessarily involves a value
judgement of sorts – in the case of the EU this involves the risk of obfuscating a constructivist ontology
with a liberal political outlook. (See the special volume of International Affairs edited by Aggestam
[2008] for more on ‘ethical power Europe’.)
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trust to be created in the region” (cited in Barbé, 1996, p. 37). Others still have
underlined the aspects of the EMP in which they saw the construction of a Euro-
Mediterranean ‘security community’ (a term originally introduced by Deutsch et. al.,
1957), characterised by pluralism and cooperation between sovereign entities rather
than competition and strife (Adler & Crawford, 2004). Whilst there is significant
variation between these analyses, what they have in common is a fundamentally
constructivist theoretical outlook in which ideational variables –pertaining especially to
principles such as democracy and human rights – are the key determinants of EFP
towards the south.
Combining Material Interests and Ideas
Thus far we have seen some important examples of how realist and idealist approaches
have been applied to the European Union’s foreign policy. It is particularly the idealist
approach which has been influential, or as Cavatorta and Pace write: “Most of the
literature still conceives of EU external policy making as representative of the liberal-
democratic values upon which the Union was founded and therefore presents the EU as
a uniquely normative actor” (2010, p. 581). Both approaches provide compelling
arguments and open the door towards important research agendas, but it is also true that
each has its own particular deficiencies. In the case of the constructivist-inspired
normative power approach there has been little evidence of successful normative
engagement, which raises questions about the plausibility of a normative theory. This is
further underlined by the fact that the EU sometimes acts in ways that appear to violate
some of its own normative principles (Hill, 2007), thus shedding doubt on the analytical
benefits of NPE (Johansson-Nogués, 2007). For its part, the realist approach seems
overly reductionist, as it has difficulty accounting for the increasingly broadening scope
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of EFP and the vast range of policies undertaken that do not appear to relate directly to
narrow self-interests.
As this thesis argues, some of these problems may be resolved with a nuanced
theoretical approach which accounts for key aspects of both schools of thought (known
as a synthesis-approach [Moravcsik, 2003]). Accordingly, the problem addressed here is
that despite the general acknowledgement by both realists and idealists/constructivists
that both material dynamics and ideas are relevant for explaining international affairs,
neither substantively include both variables in their explanatory frameworks, involving
‘the other’ mostly in an ad-hoc fashion to account for unexplained phenomena.40 A
consequence of such separation lies in the following problem diagnosed by Nye in The
Washington Post (2009):
Scholars are paying less attention about how their work relates to the policy
world, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one’s career.
Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new
methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to
policymakers.
Beyond the negative repercussions for the practical relevance of academic debates
(which may not necessarily be seen as a problem by all), there are some scientific
detriments related to paradigmatic cloistering. As Kerremans and Orbie argue:
“Scholarly curiosity and creativity may be undermined by the fact that paradigmatic
insularity increases the chance that analyses will suffer from the blackboxing of causal
40 As Sørensen writes, realism and constructivism “do conduct their analyses in ways that tend to one-
sidedly privilege either material forces or ideas, but they also principally agree about the presence of both
elements in IR” (2008, pp. 12-13).
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mechanisms, the resulting endurance of blind spots in explanations, and the failure to
see possible connections between analyses across different paradigms as a way to
eliminate such blind spots” (2013, p. 662; see also Jørgensen and Valbjørn, 2012; Sil &
Katzenstein, 2010; Walker, 2010; Rosamond, 2006). This highlights the importance of
seeking interconnections between theories, which promises to bring both practical and
scientific benefits for analysts in the field of IR. In this light it is the aim of this thesis to
craft a more integrative approach that can account for the development of the EU’s
policy towards the Mediterranean area.
We will now discuss some existing efforts at paradigmatic interaction, which in
turn will enable the presentation of this thesis’ theoretical approach, based on the work
of Goldstein and Keohane (1993).
A ‘Pragmatic’ Approach: Some Examples
Before discussing concrete examples, we can say with regards to the ontological
question of whether material and ideational explanations can be (partially) fused that it
might be tempting to refer to a Kuhnian incommensurability of scientific paradigms
(Kuhn, 1962; see also Kerremans & Orbie, 2013). Specifically, it might appear that an
ontological division over the ‘objective’ vs. ‘relative’ nature of politics irrevocably
divides theorists, as this seems to be a key distinction between realism and
constructivism (Walker, 2010). However, we argue that a significant degree of
ontological commensurability can be found between the paradigms (notable in e.g. the
‘moderate constructivism’ of Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001), and the way forward that
we would like to suggest in this thesis is one of pragmatism (see Sil & Katzenstein,
2010; Cornut, 2009). As Albert and Kopp-Malek argue: “a continuous movement of
docking at and then leaving the harbours of established epistemological and ontological
groundings is required in order to allow for the more or less skilful development of
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plausible analytical pictures” (2002, p. 457). In other words, rather than being restricted
by dogmatism one must focus on the plausibility and usefulness of an approach. No
theory of social science – no matter how advanced – suffices to account for all the
variations and exceptions that we encounter in the real world. If we accept this fact, and
accordingly view our theories as analytical tools rather than metaphysical descriptions
of the world (see Fearon & Wendt, 2003), it becomes possible to draw on insights from
differing schools of thought to enhance our understanding of the empirical
manifestations of international politics (see also Lebow, 2004; Navon, 2001).41
However, this does not mean that ‘anything goes’, and pluralism should not be
pursued for its own sake (Jupille, 2006). For this reason it is important to be clear about
the various theoretical sources and assumptions utilised as well as the degree of
commensurability between them (possibly without striving to achieve total fusion
[Moravcsik, 2003]). As we have seen, the roots of realism’s materialism can be found in
the presumed biological factors that determine the contours of human interaction, which
stands in contrast to the social variables privileged by idealists. It is exactly at this
ontological site that we might take a pragmatic approach. In the words of Sterling-
Folker, such an approach would reject “a strictly either-or perspective on the biological
and the social in favour of one that recognizes the interrelationship between them as
historically pertinent to both the biological composition of human beings and the
production of human social reality” (Sterling-Folker, 2002, p. 96; 2000; this view is also
held by Wendt, 1999 and elaborated by Moravcsik, 2003).42
41 To cite Barnett and Duvall: “we strongly encourage scholars to imagine how different forms [of power]
interact to sharpen empirical analysis” (2005, p. 68).
42 It is useful to keep in mind here that, to cite one author, “many of the theoretical arguments about the
fundamental contours of our discipline are really debates about optimism and pessimism, our very general
outlooks toward the world in which we live” (Holsti, 1986, p. 356). In this regard it can be said that the
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It is on this very basis that we proceed in the following paragraphs (and indeed
the remainder of this thesis). Yet beyond the abovementioned risk of ‘anything goes’
inherent to such synthesis (referred to as “glib superficial poaching” by Bernstein, cited
in Johnson, 2002, p. 245), there is also the exact opposite pitfall. As Kerremans and
Orbie warn: “An expressed intention to engage in multi-theoretical synthesis is easily
seen as a hidden attempt by some to establish a new hegemonic paradigm” (2013, p.
662). The problem here is that an integrative endeavour would imply a form of
positivism which assumes that there is only one objective reality, favouring one
ontological/epistemological view over others (empiricism over relativism). One way to
deal with this problem would be to engage in what has been referred to as ‘engaged
pluralism’, which aims to promote empathy between different paradigms by facilitating
debates without necessarily seeking agreement (ibid.). This is an excellent way to create
a rich debate between various authors, but since this thesis is primarily interested in
exploring the real-world interactions between differing variables the synthesis-approach
offers some advantages in that it explicitly draws on the coexistence between various
logics (Moravcsik, 2003). This makes it possible to analyse both the strengths and
weaknesses of the relevant perspectives without necessarily seeking total convergence
(ibid.). Nevertheless, it could be argued from a relativist perspective that we are taking a
position in favour of empiricism through our synthesis-approach, strengthened all the
more by hypothesis-testing and soft rationalism (see below). We acknowledge that our
approach in this thesis will probably appeal less to relativists, but we would like to
underline our ambition to explore potentialities, commensurabilities and joint dynamics
rather than to provide the final word on said matters. It is our strong belief that this will
ambition to incorporate flexibility, non-conformism and pragmatism in the current research project serves
as an accurate reflection of this researcher’s personality.
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help analysts to better deal with the complexities of real-world policymaking (see also
Hyde-Price, 2013; Kerremans & Orbie, 2013; Walker, 2010; Jupille, 2006).
As we argue below, Goldstein and Keohane’s approach (1993) provides an
elegant and useful way to structure our theoretical framework. Yet we may note that in
the last several years a number of efforts have been undertaken to accomplish a similar
task along the lines of the synthesis-approach. One example of a strategy which aims to
infuse constructivism with material variables is Meyer and Strickmann’s article on
‘solidifying constructivism’, where they claim to “pick and choose, rather than merge”
(2011, p. 67). While this is a welcome effort at extending constructivism and
reconciling it with some formerly ignored variables, it falls short of providing an
integrative account of IR and verges towards the ‘anything goes’ pitfall outlined above.
Barkin (2003) has made a similar effort to delineate the options for a ‘realist
constructivism’, thereby sparking a lively debate on the potentialities for integration
(Jackson & Nexon, 2004; Lebow, 2004; Sterling-Folker, 2004). Significantly, Barkin
demonstrates the complementarity between classical realist and constructivist
epistemologies:
Constructivists who claim their methodology is incompatible with realism focus
on the association between realism and both materialism and rationalism.
Realists who claim their paradigm is incompatible with constructivism focus for
the most part not on the methodology per se but on a perceived tendency for
constructivists to be idealists or utopians. […] Neither argument, however,
holds up to careful scrutiny. (pp. 338-339)
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Barkin’s perspective sketches out the scope for realist-constructivist collaboration, but
he does not specify in detail how such work could be undertaken.43 In this vein
neoclassical realism (Rose, 1998) has made sustained efforts at fundamentally
integrating the perceptions (and thereby the beliefs and values) of decision makers in its
analysis. In this manner it has taken a step in the direction of acknowledging more
substantially the influence of ideational factors, but it remains primarily a continuation
of neorealism and retains the latter’s focus on strategic balancing (Rathbun, 2008). As a
result neoclassical realism realises a degree of fusion between realism and
constructivism, but its focus on typically more abstract or distant structural variables
means that it is not especially well-suited for an in-depth analysis of specific policies.
Recently, the debate over the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has
brought forward some interesting theoretical developments. Whilst authors such as
Cladi and Locatelli (2013) have made the case for a neorealist explanation vis-à-vis
liberals such as Pohl (2014), Hyde-Price suggests a fusion of sorts: “a complex
international outcome like European security cooperation cannot be attributed either to
balancing or bandwagoning, or to the simple aggregation of domestic political
preferences in individual member states” (2013, p. 397). Hyde-Price’s work thus makes
an argument in favour of theoretical synthesis to theoretically account for real-world
complexity, similar to the position taken in this thesis. Whilst his position is essentially
43 Another effort from the constructivist corner to incorporate material variables that we may mention
here comes from John Owen, who has focused on what he describes as the “entanglement of US power
with justice and freedom” (2012, p. 20). He draws attention to the ways in which the exercise of soft
power facilitates the increase of US global influence and vice versa. What these approaches have in
common is that even though they provide useful ways of thinking about ideas and material variables, due
a certain amount of theoretical opacity it is difficult to utilise them to generate hypotheses for a diversity
of cases.
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neo-Gramscian and specifically designed for the analysis of security issues, future work
should investigate further avenues of utility for Hyde-Price’s liberal-realist model.
In a different vein, a middle way between neorealism and constructivism was
suggested by Sørensen (2008), who argues in favour of ‘analytical eclecticism’ in order
to address the fact that “more analysis of material change and the interplay with
ideational change is sorely needed” (p. 26; see also Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Again, we
view this as a welcome effort, but its eclecticism makes replication and hypothesis-
testing a difficult enterprise, as once again the pitfall of an ‘anything goes’ approach
seems to loom near. A slightly different situation exists for an approach advocated by
Richard Youngs (2004). Relying on Adler (2002) and Katzenstein et. al. (1998), he
argues that the most fruitful way to combine elements of realism and constructivism is
to take the former’s rationalist interpretation of strategic action (with a view to self-
interests) and to place it within the context of the latter’s socially constructed common
knowledge and understandings.44 In Youngs’ analysis of EU democracy/human rights
promotion (2004) this produces some important results, but he provides little deeper
theorisation of his approach and methodology. Finally, we may refer to a somewhat
older approach that was suggested by Arnold Wolfers, who focused on what he called
milieu and possession goals (1991, pp. 73-74). This has been influential as a general
outlook and has found support in studies on the EU (see e.g. Smith, 2005, p. 77; 2003,
pp. 107-108), but as a theory of IR it remains underdeveloped as it provides no leads on
how the two types of foreign policy interact or by what mechanisms change occurs.
That is to say: Wolfers’ concepts are highly useful, but their operationalisation remains
44 As Katzenstein and his collaborators write (1998, p. 682): “The core of the constructivist project is to
explicate variations in preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and
time. The core of the rationalist project is to explain strategies, given preferences, information, and
common knowledge. Neither project can be complete without the other.”
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an open project (examples include Tocci, 2008; Bulmer & Paterson, 2010; Bulmer et.
al., 2000).
In sum, despite a recent increase in attention for material-ideational interaction
there is still much room for more precisely theorised efforts at accomplishing an
integrative approach, particularly when this can be undertaken in light of substantive
empirical research. This is where the present thesis aims to make a contribution to the
field, taking Goldstein and Keohane’s theory (1993) as our point of departure.
Goldstein and Keohane’s ‘soft rationalism’
What makes Goldstein and Keohane’s approach (1993) useful for our purposes is the
fact that it was, first of all, designed to facilitate empirical hypothesis-testing, which
means that it is consistent with our interest in providing a comprehensive empirical
analysis of Euro-Med relations. This feature is discussed by the authors explicitly as a
critique of the “antiempiricist bias” of some of the work that is done by constructivists
(ibid., p. 6). At the core of Goldstein and Keohane’s work lies the idea that “ideas as
well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action” (ibid., p. 4,
authors’ emphasis). Similar to Richard Youngs (2004) they do not seek to combat the
idea of rationalist, self-interested behaviour, but rather aim to demonstrate that ideas
exert a certain kind of influence alongside materialist self-interest – leading them to an
approach that could be characterised as one of ‘soft rationalism’ (see also Goldstein,
1986). In order to facilitate the testing of hypotheses, their ideas are structured along the
lines of causal logics between independent and dependent variables. This reveals how
the fundamentals of Goldstein and Keohane’s work fit very well with the ambitions and
assumptions underpinning our current effort.
The mentioning of causal logics raises the question of what variables and causal
chains precisely are stipulated in Goldstein and Keohane’s approach. To answer this
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question it is important to understand their definition of ‘ideas’. Three types of ideas are
defined: world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. To begin with the first of
these, world views, the authors argue that they operate on the most fundamental level,
indicating “the universe of possibilities for action” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 8).
What this means is that world views relate to people’s basic conceptions of the universe
and (their place in) the world, the most significant example being religion. Given the
broad nature of world views, the significant influence of Western modernist world
views upon most contemporary IR scholars, and the difficulty of measuring the impact
of something like an ontological perspective upon foreign policy, this thesis follows
Goldstein and Keohane in focusing primarily on the other two types of ideas.
The second type of ideas is that of principled beliefs. As the authors argue, these
relate to “criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust” (ibid., p. 9).
Even though world views often contain the seeds for making these types of judgements,
the difference lies in the fact that world views are usually broad enough to contain
conflicting ideas on right and wrong whereas principled beliefs imply a more direct
application. For example, whilst a Jewish, Christian or Islamic worldview could be
utilised to justify differential treatment between men and women, it could just as well
give rise to the argument that the sexes should be treated equally. The resultant
principled belief that men and women deserve equal treatment is therefore much more
specific and policy-relevant than the world view that underpins it. Many of the values
associated with the EU by scholars working in the normative power paradigm, e.g. the
Union’s dedication to human rights, rule of law and democracy (Manners, 2002), can be
considered as principled beliefs. They are basic ideas about how particular things should
be and make up an important part of an actor’s identity.
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Finally, we can identify causal beliefs. These are ideas pertaining to cause-effect
relationships which derive their authority from “the shared consensus of recognized
elites” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 10). By explicating the relationships between
particular variables, causal beliefs enable purposive action undertaken in light of the
desire to realise particular interests or principled beliefs. For example, if one has as a
principled belief that factory workers have a right to health insurance coverage from
their employer, the causal belief by union leaders that a general strike will force a
factory owner to recognise this right might lead workers to act accordingly. To cite
Goldstein and Keohane: “causal beliefs imply strategies for the attainment of goals,
themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within
the context of broader world views” (ibid., p. 10).
Having defined the three principal categories of ideas, we must ask how they
have an impact on political outcomes. Echoing realist concerns, Goldstein and Keohane
argue that the worst mistake to be made with regards to the study of ideas is to assume
that simply due to their intrinsic properties they are relevant for policy. This is a vital
point for combining a material and an ideational perspective, given that we must avoid
the pitfall of assuming causality on the basis of correlation between ideas and outcomes
without considering whether there was true causation: cum hoc ergo propter hoc. As
realists like Carr (1995) have argued – and as the work of e.g. John M. Owen IV (2012)
has shown more recently – material interests might run analogous to such dynamics,
thus muddying the waters for a purely ideational argumentation. Therefore we must be
extremely careful in attributing causal significance to ideas simply because of some
observed correlation with outcomes. As an alternative point of view, Goldstein and
Keohane subscribe to Max Weber’s perspective that ideas “determined the tracks along
which action has been pushed by the dynamic of [material] interest” (Weber, 1991, p.
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280). In other words: given material interests, ideas can have a concurrent impact upon
foreign policy. Three causal pathways are suggested.
The first causal pathway holds that ideas provide road maps. This is to say that
under conditions of uncertainty, which most analysts will agree is relevant for the
murky domain of IR, ideas suggest what strategies to follow. Indeed, an important
question with which rational choice approaches struggle is where preferences come
from (Katzenstein et. al., 1998; Wendt, 1992; Keohane, 1984). Goldstein and Keohane
suggest that a look at the principled and causal beliefs held by an actor will significantly
help us understand this process: “To understand the formation of preferences, we need
to understand what ideas are available and how people choose among them” (1993, p.
13). Even within a purely rationalistic model of self-interested decision making this
assumption holds some weight, given that with uncertain outcomes it will be the
expected gains, based upon an actor’s causal beliefs, that will be decisive in
adjudicating strategies. Moreover, whilst causal beliefs limit uncertainty by providing a
theory for action, principled ideas enable purpose action even in cases where there is
uncertainty regarding cause-effect chains. In summary: ideas serve as a compass or
roadmap for action by prescribing causal logics and highlighting what is valued. This
implies that material variables cannot automatically be translated into action: ideas
determine which ones are privileged and how they will be pursued.
The second causal pathway is explained with reference to a rationalist, game
theoretic outlook. After all, many games have multiple equilibria, which is why
strategic self-interest (in terms of payoffs) alone is not sufficient to explain a chosen
strategy. When there is a choice between different outcomes, i.e. when there is no
unique equilibrium; ideas can serve as focal points and glue. As Goldstein and Keohane
argue: “When political actors must choose between sets of outcomes that would
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represent Pareto improvements for all, and when there are no ‘objective’ criteria on
which to base choice, ideas focus expectations and strategies” (ibid., p. 18). A very
simple example can be found in deciding which side of the road to drive on. Both left
and right represent equilibria as long as everyone follows the same strategy. Pure
maximisation of payoffs does not therefore explain how a strategy is chosen, but if we
factor in the role of ideas as a focal point it is possible to understand how a cooperative
equilibrium could be achieved.
The third and final way in which ideas can have an impact on policy is via
institutionalisation. What this means is that the incorporation of particular ideas within
an organisational structure, irrespective of how this originally transpired, will have an
influence upon the incentives for action provided within this setting. This can be most
evidently observed over time, when material interests have evolved and a degree of
incongruence has arisen between the ideas embedded within a political institution and
the interests of powerful actors. In this sense, even though the ideas and accordant
procedures might have originally reflected the power and interests of influential actors,
their embedding within an organisational structure can give them an independent status
that could come to light with shifts in interest configurations.
It must be stated at this point that Goldstein and Keohane’s theory does not
resolve all outstanding issues, nor does it provide a fully-fledged theory on material-
ideational interaction. In fact, it could be argued that the authors do not sufficiently
address the potential role of material interests: they are involved primarily as
determinants of cost-benefit analytics without further theorisation. To account for
material variables the theory assumes a baseline of sorts in which actors maximise
material payoffs (their null-hypothesis), and in this sense the material side is perhaps
best represented by Wolfers’ concept of possession goals as “values of limited supply”
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(Wolfers, 1991, p. 73). In Goldstein and Keohane’s approach, though they do not
discuss the issue explicitly, the focus is primarily on absolute gains in the material realm
(i.e. maximisation of the totality of gains, independent of the gains/losses of other
actors). This is important to note given the significant theoretical debate surrounding
this topic.45
In sum, within Goldstein and Keohane’s approach the rationalist logics of
material self-interest are embedded within an ideational universe, but the emphasis is
placed more on proving the relevance of ideas than on demonstrating interplay.
Furthermore, by choosing the drive to maximise material payoffs as the material causal
pathway Goldstein and Keohane have relatively little to say about the debate regarding
absolute vs. relative. It is expected that through our research we will be able to say more
about this topic and thus to further clarify the theoretical possibilities for idealist-
materialist interaction.
Defining our Hypothesis
For the purposes of this thesis Goldstein and Keohane’s outlook presents an excellent
theoretical starting point. By enabling a soft rationalist approach it constitutes a
perspective in which instrumentalism is enriched by social variables, precisely as
desired by constructivist scholars. Yet it keeps the option open for incorporating
material drivers and acknowledges the importance of causal (benefit) expectations in IR.
In this manner it provides an excellent basis for research into the dual role of ideas and
material variables.
45 Generally speaking, realists have emphasised relative gains whilst liberals prefer to focus on absolute
gains (see Powell, 1991). However, though it will be useful to remain aware of the two different kinds of
gains in our research, it must be noted that the theoretical debate on this topic can be “empirically
meaningless” due to its high degree of abstraction (ibid., p. 1316).
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In particular, we can utilise the theory, in combination with some of the
previously discussed literature, to substantiate our hypothesis and thereby to enable our
empirical research. The causal pathway that we focus on is that of ‘ideas as roadmaps’,
given that the ‘focal points and glue’ mechanism is best investigated in the case of
cooperative or multiple equilibria (mostly absent in the EU-Med case) whilst the
‘institutionalisation’ pathway comes to the fore primarily in light of an observed gap
between interests and actions. The roadmaps mechanism, conversely, provides a more
immediately apparent fit with our topic of inquiry. It suggests that the EU’s principled
beliefs and its material interests (independent variables) are mediated through causal
beliefs (defined as a shared consensus amongst recognised elites on cause-effect
relationships), leading to policy behaviour. In its most basic formulation this can be
represented as follows:
Table 1: Basic Hypothetical Model for Drivers of EFP
To further substantiate this hypothesis it is possible to draw on the existing literature on
EU foreign policy. As our analysis of the literature has indicated, the major material
interest associated with the EU is that of collective economic gains (Costalli, 2009;
Hyde-Price, 2008; Zimmermann, 2007). Thus, the purely realist hypothesis would be





hypothesis posits that economic gains are a necessary but not sufficient variable, since
we must also consider the EU’s principled beliefs as a causal factor. For this reason we
draw on the normative power literature to define our understanding of the EU’s
principled beliefs. Thus, in the vein of the NPE thesis outlined by Manners (2008;
2002), the primary beliefs considered in this research are democracy and human rights,
as these have the potential to feature prominently in foreign policy and have made up a
substantial focal point within the literature on Euro-Med relations. As Steve Wood
argues: “The EU’s influence or potential as a global actor can, to a large extent, be
appraised by [its] capacity and commitment, and resulting success or otherwise, in
achieving declared aims of democratization and improvements in human rights” (2009,
p. 114). However, whereas a constructivist might hypothesise a significant degree of
sufficiency for the EU’s principled beliefs to explain its foreign policy, we propose that
this variable is not sufficient but necessary. It follows that a better understanding of the
EU can be reached only if we combine the two necessary variables, economic gains and
principled beliefs, which together might constitute a sufficient explanation.
To further substantiate and operationalise our hypothesis we must specify our
understanding of causal beliefs. As we have seen, this type of beliefs links means and
ends in foreign policy. The concept is intimately related to the emphasis placed by
constructivists on ‘common knowledge’ (Adler, 2002). In this vein it is key to look at
the problem definitions and predictions made by policy makers, as they give access to
what can be called ‘institutionalised knowledge’ (ibid.; see also Kelley, 2006).
According to Weldes (1996, p. 277), the world is understood through shared meanings,
and these meanings are represented in the “situation descriptions and problem
definitions … through which state officials and others make sense of the world around
them” (ibid., p. 280). This fits well with Goldstein and Keohane’s usage of the concept;
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on this basis we propose to view causal beliefs in terms of the problem definitions,
suggested policy methods/instruments and expected outcomes evinced within consensus
amongst key European individuals and institutions. As illustrated in the table below,
this operationalisation of causal beliefs also draws on what has been called the
‘textbook approach’ (Nakamura, 1987) to the policy process (important authors are
Easton, 1965 and Lasswell, 1951; see also Sabatier, 2007), particularly as applied to the
EU by Ginsberg (2001). Yet we are cognisant of the various criticisms expressed vis-à-
vis this approach (see Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 2003, pp. 136-138)46, and this is why it
is important to stress that we envision our model as explicating the various
interconnected elements of EU foreign policymaking rather than positing strictly
separated stages. It is further worth reiterating that our model is to an extent heuristic
and was created to operationalise and empirically test the causal mechanism and
independent variables highlighted in this study – not to provide a full theory of all
stages and stakeholders involved in EU foreign policymaking.
A significant added advantage of our approach is that it allows us to appreciate
the sources of policy change, given that either our independent variables or the causal
mechanism that links them to policy could shift over time, leading to policy changes. In
the case of the former, material and ideational variables are considered as relatively
stable given how deeply embedded they tend to be, but it is possible that changes occur
due to e.g. material shifts or the gradual evolution of norms.
For the second source of change, pertaining to causal beliefs, we can point to
processes of ‘collective learning’ (see Adler, 2002), in which past experiences (in terms
46 See also Sabatier, 2007. The ‘textbook approach’ could be criticised for failing to identify causal
drivers between the stages of the process; inaccuracy regarding the separation between different stages;
exhibiting a legalistic, top-down bias; and finally for oversimplifying the fact that multiple overlapping
cycles often take place simultaneously (ibid., p. 7).
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of outcomes as well as the challenges experienced at the stage of implementation) give
rise to reformulated sets of causal beliefs amongst elites, driving a new consensus for
future action. In addition, a potentially significant concept is that of critical junctures,
which represent moments in time at which the non-incremental adoption of notably
different or novel causal beliefs becomes possible due to significant (contextual) shifts.
As Ikenberry writes: “dissatisfaction with past policy creates a new willingness by
political leaders to reevaluate their interests, goal, and doctrines; disruptions and
breakdown of rules and institutions create a need for nonincremental decision making;
and the collapse of old political coalitions requires a search for new coalitions. At these
moments, the removal of obstacles to change occurs simultaneously with the presence
of impulses to change” (1993, p. 83). The upshot is that attention for past outcomes as
well as the context to EU policy will allow us to appreciate the sources of change in
European causal beliefs.
At this point we must underline that, since our hypothesis was formulated on the
basis of the existing literature on EU material interests and principled beliefs (leading to
the assumption of relatively stable independent variables), more room exists in our
model to consider variation in causal beliefs. That said, as explained below our
methodology has been designed specifically to rigorously test each constitutive element
of our hypothesis and thus to keep open the possibility that other sources of change
were at play.
Put together, our hypothesised model for EU policy towards the MENA looks as
follows:
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Table 2: Extended Hypothetical Model for Drivers of EFP
In sum, our reply to this thesis’ research question – ‘What drives the EU’s policies
towards the MENA; European ideas, the EU’s material interests, or some combination
of both?’ – is that the EU’s belief in democracy and human rights and its interest in
economic gains operate jointly through causal beliefs, thus driving the EU’s policies
towards the MENA. Our research aims to test this hypothesis and to provide further
insight into the significance of our variables as well as the conditions under which joint
dynamics occur. In this manner we hope to provide a fuller and more comprehensive
explanation of EU-Med relations than more limited approaches are able to and to add
further depth and substance to balanced theorising in IR.
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Methodology
The above clarification of our hypothesis leads us to the methodological steps required
to test it. Unfortunately, it can be argued that a key limitation of Goldstein and
Keohane’s approach lies with their methodology. As is not uncommon in qualitative
research they rely on induction to prove causation, yet their discussion of evidentiary,
descriptive and causal induction leaves some room for improvement. Not enough
information is provided as to the criteria used for adjudging the reliability of
conclusions, nor is a clear indication given of what tests are used to falsify hypotheses.
For this reason, one of the ways in which this thesis aims to contribute to our
understanding of how ideas and material interests relate to foreign policy is by
providing a more explicitly elaborated methodological plan for evaluating causal
hypotheses regarding ideas and material variables. This is the main topic of the current
section.
Epistemological Basics
Before beginning our discussion of hypothesis-testing, it is important to settle a
particular epistemological concern. This is the potential (constructivist) argument that
ideas could not be viewed apart from interests. Constitutive as they are, the argument
runs, ideas are part of the very DNA of interests, making their separation futile (see
Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 26). Yet as the authors argue, if we were to accept this
view we would have to a priori reject materialist arguments without significant
empirical analysis. In fact, it is arguable that the epistemological differences between a
materialist and an ideational outlook are minimal. Constructivism opposes the notion
that phenomena can be understood independently of discursive practices (Guzzini,
2000, p. 159); the factual world cannot simply speak for itself. Significantly, most
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realists would agree with this, though they often do pay greater attention to the
‘objective’ aspects of IR. For this reason we seek to occupy a middle ground, similar to
the scientific realism of Alexander Wendt (1999). In this vein it has been argued that a
shared interest in ‘policy’ “often leads [realists and constructivists] to similar
methodological tasks” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 395). In addition, Glenn (2009,
p. 524) points out that a shared interest in “detailed foreign policy analysis” enables
realist-constructivist collaboration. On this basis we hold that it is certainly possible to
utilise a single theory and methodology for the investigation of material and ideational
variables.
At a very basic level, as we have said, our analysis relies on inference or
Verstehen, defined as: “the interpretation of meaning through empathetic understanding
and pattern recognition” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 27). This is often relevant for
case studies (Johnson et. al., 2001, p. 143).47 In the current thesis this is all the more so
because ideas cannot be objectively measured or observed; a degree of interpretation is
always needed. In order to ameliorate bias and transcend mere personal opinion,
therefore, insofar as possible interpretations must be subjected to systematic quality-
standards. But how can a reliance on inference be reconciled with the demands of
systematically testing hypotheses?
In light of the above question, Goldstein and Keohane describe three
methodological steps. The first consists of evidentiary inference, which addresses the
fact that empirical sources might be contradictory, biased and/or incomplete. For this
reason we must infer what actually happened from a wide range of sources and connect
probabilities to our inferences. Secondly, Goldstein and Keohane posit the importance
47 According to Robert Yin, a case study can be defined as an empirical inquiry into a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, where the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context
are difficult to determine and a multiplicity of evidentiary sources is used (1989).
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of descriptive inference, which consists of: 1) making sure whether observed behaviour
is systematic or random, and; 2) assessing to what extent observed behaviour represents
beliefs. The final step consists of causal inference. It is here that we must establish
covariation between independent and dependent variables and ask whether it is possible
to identify causal connections between them.
While we do not take issue with Goldstein and Keohane’s basic argumentation
here, we do believe that more clarity is needed in order to draw valid conclusions
regarding the status of our hypothesis (particularly pertaining to the basis upon which
causal inferences can be made as well as the criteria for adjudging the reliability of our
conclusions). How this can be done relates closely to the format of our research, which
can be described as one of process tracing. For this reason we will now proceed to
define and explain our approach and elaborate upon its utility for hypothesis-testing.
Process Tracing and Hypotheses
Our research question and theoretical framework call for thick empirical analysis of EU
policy over a specific period of time, with a focus on hypothesis-testing. With this in
mind, what appears as a particularly useful method is ‘process tracing’ (see Falleti,
2006). Importantly, it is the favoured method of Goldstein and Keohane‘s edited
volume (1993), as exemplified by John Ikenberry’s contribution, which mentions it
explicitly (1993, see p. 62). Process tracing is commonly defined as “theoretically
informed historical research to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to an
outcome” (Farrell, 2002, pp. 61-62). As King et. al. write (1994, pp. 224-228): “A
theory … will often imply a particular set of motivations or perceptions … Process
tracing will then involve searching for evidence – evidence consistent with the overall
causal theory – about the decisional process by which the outcome was produced.”
Therefore, simply put, what is necessary is to analyse our data chronologically and to
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search in it for evidence of the variables and causal relationships that are posited by our
theory. Ronald Aminzade’s definition of process tracing describes the approach well, as
he argues that researchers need to provide “theoretically explicit narratives that
carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process” (1993, p.
108). The purpose of such narratives, he continues, is to “capture the unfolding of social
action over time in a manner sensitive to the order in which events occur” (ibid., p.
108).
A major advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to take into
consideration multifarious social processes, thus enabling a deeper insight into complex
configurations of social phenomena As Glenn argues: “such a method can deal with
complex forms of causality” (2009, p. 542; see also Bates et. al., 1998). However, there
is a potential pitfall here, and Büthe warns that “narratives must not revert to
untheorized historical accounts, invoking extraneous factors in an ad-hoc fashion”
(ibid., p. 487). The way to resolve this problem lies with the theory that underpins one’s
research, as this is what can be used to provide structure: “by making the theories that
underpin our narratives more explicit, we avoid the danger of burying our explanatory
principles in engaging stories” (Aminzade, 1993, p. 108).
This hints at the importance of distinguishing our approach from ‘storytelling’.
Whilst the latter is rooted in postmodernist critiques of positivist research methods (see
e.g. Allison Brown & Stega, 2005), our current utilization of hypothesis-testing as well
as our theory’s soft-rational approach point towards a balanced positivist methodology.
It can be said that this resonates with the propositions of ‘critical realism’, according to
which it is now “feasible to read positivist methodology as incorporating a vision of
science as a human construction, outlining techniques for persuading particular
audiences of truth claims, though often with an openness to falsifiability that resonates
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with late modern research sensibilities” (Seale, 1999, p. 34; see also Patomäki & Wight,
2000). This is indeed the path that seems most appropriate for this thesis, rather than
one of sense-making or storytelling, rooted as they are in the postmodernist emphasis on
the inseparability of values and facts and the parallel validity of multiple perspectives
(Franzosi, 1998; Boyce, 1996; Polkinghorne, 1988). Thus, if we envision an
epistemological continuum with a ‘pure’ positivist approach on the one hand (typically
quantitative research) and an exclusively hermeneutic approach on the other (fully
interpretational), this thesis stands in the centre by combining qualitative inference with
hypothesis-testing through rigorous methods of falsification.
This raises what is perhaps the most important question regarding our
methodology: how can process tracing be utilised to test hypotheses? We have seen how
Goldstein and Keohane have identified three inferential steps, each of which is
important in the research process. To add to their argument, we argue that a more
explicit definition of the tests to be performed could lead to more reliable and
convincing results. Process tracing is widely regarded as a major qualitative method to
test hypotheses (George & Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2003; van Evera, 1997).48 By
generating diagnostic evidence in the form of a temporal sequence of events (Mahoney,
2012), process tracing produces what Collier et. al. (2010) call causal-process
observations. Used in conjunction with theoretical understandings of the case under
analysis, this can be utilised to establish: 1) that particular variables were present; 2) the
sequence in which these variables manifested; 3) that variable A was the cause of
variable B (Mahoney, 2012). In order to do so, and thus to test a hypothesis, several
steps must be undertaken.
48 We may note that there has been some debate on this issue (see Büthe, p. 488).
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The first step in establishing that a causal relationship exists is to verify the
particulars of the hypothesised variables. This pertains to Goldstein and Keohane’s
evidentiary and descriptive inference stages, at which point it is necessary to provide a
careful description of the outcome that is to be explained. After all, without a detailed
understanding of what the EU’s causal beliefs and its policy towards the Mediterranean
actually were it would be impossible to assess out hypothesis.
With regards to investigating variables and their interrelations, process tracing
enables three different kinds of tests: smoking gun tests, hoop tests, and straw in the
wind tests (van Evera, 1997, pp. 31-32). Assuming that we cannot directly observe our
variables, they are unobserved phenomena, and so we must find evidence that
implicates their existence. A smoking gun test confirms; proposing that the existence of
particular indicators (auxiliary traces) for an unobserved hypothesised phenomenon
confirms its existence, typically on the basis of generalisations regarding the kind of
evidence particular phenomena leave behind. As Mahoney states: “Analysts know that
certain events occurred in the past because these events leave behind traces that
otherwise could not possibly exist” (2012, p. 577, emphasis added). Thus, a smoking
gun test verifies the existence of ‘traces’ for which the variable under investigation is
assumed to be necessary. Alternatively it is possible to identify circumstances that are
held to constitute the sufficient conditions for the existence of a variable, although this
is a less common strategy due to the difficulty with identifying general theories of this
order (ibid.).
Whereas ‘smoking guns’ are often used for historical research, such as with our
dependent variable, there is sometimes difficulty with formulating strict smoking gun
tests when there are few traces that could be identified ‘that could not possibly exist’
without the variable under consideration. Here we can make use of hoop tests. In this
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format a hypothesis must “jump through the hoop” (ibid., p. 574) so as to retain its
credibility, which means that we must eliminate (counterfactual) scenarios that if true
would falsify our hypothesis. What this means is that we must seek to falsify either that
necessary conditions for a variable to exist were present (e.g. all life needs water, so the
hypothesis that life exists on Mars can be challenged by the absence of water) or that
there are observable traces for which the variable itself provides sufficient explanation
(e.g. heating a pizza will inevitably bake it, therefore if a pizza is found unbaked we can
rule out the hypothesis that it was sufficiently heated). Failing a hoop test, therefore, can
falsify a hypothesis, but passing one does not necessarily confirm it: “passing a hoop
test will lend positive support for a hypothesis in proportion to the degree that it is a
difficult test” (ibid., p. 576). The more rigorous the hoop tests that are passed (how
unique are the circumstances tested for?), the higher the probability that an unobserved
phenomenon actually exists.
However, in many cases it is difficult to perform a conclusive smoking gun test
or to pass a series of strict hoop tests, in which case they can become what van Evera
has called straw in the wind tests (1997, p. 32). Such a test does not confirm or
eliminate a hypothesis, but it does lend some support by providing a degree of
probabilistic evidence in favour of what has been hypothesised. It does so by noting the
existence of indicators typically associated with a particular phenomenon. In this
manner passing an ‘easy’ hoop test or smoking gun test can lend ‘straw in the wind’
support for a hypothesis on the basis of generalized connections between a variable and
antecedent conditions or auxiliary traces. The strength of the test then depends on
whether the traces found are relatively unusual or more common.
After the various available tests have been employed to verify the particulars of
the variables incorporated in the hypothesis, the next step is to infer a causal connection
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between independent and dependent variables. Here it is important to define a causal
mechanism, understood as an intervening step between a cause and its outcome
(Mayntz, 2004). In the case of this research the causal mechanism or intervening step
between our dependent and independent variables is that of causal beliefs. We must
therefore show what causal beliefs were relevant and ask whether they provide a
sufficient explanation for EU policies. Given our hypothesis that material interests and
principled beliefs each are necessary components of the EU’s Mediterranean policies,
the challenge then lies in testing whether each of the two independent variables was a
necessary element in the EU’s causal beliefs. The hoop test logic behind this is that “X
cannot be necessary for Y unless it is necessary for all intervening conditions that are
sufficient for Y” (Mahoney, 2012, p. 579).
Finally, in this research the hypothesis is not only that principled beliefs and
economic interests were each necessary; we also imply that they are jointly sufficient to
provide an explanation for EU policies. Thus, our final test consists of verifying the
sufficiency of a combined perspective with regards to EU causal beliefs and foreign
policy behaviour.
What this amounts to is the following series of questions that we must address to
be able to support or reject our main hypothesis:
1. What were the EU’s causal beliefs? (smoking gun)
2. What were the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean; did causal beliefs
provide a roadmap for action? (hoop)
3. Were economic gains and principled beliefs necessary variables for the EU’s
roadmap/actions? (hoop)
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4. Do economic gains and principled beliefs jointly provide sufficient explanation
for the EU’s policies? (straw in wind)
In our assessment of these four essential questions/tests, there is a certain hierarchy in
that failing one test will prevent progression to the next. In this manner we aim to break
down our hypothesis as much as possible into each of its constitutive elements. What is
more, our awareness of the kind of evidence available (smoking gun, hoop, straw in the
wind) will allow us to appreciate the strength of our argument and thus to remain
sensitive to potential limitations and rival explanations. In this light the goal is to
undertake our analysis in an open and honest manner with a high degree of theoretical
and methodological self-awareness.
Evidential Basis
What remains to be answered now is the question of on what evidential basis our
research will be based. As we have already indicated, three frameworks relevant to
Euro-Mediterranean relations will be investigated: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean. As these
frameworks have been the main avenue for common European policy towards the
Maghreb and Mashriq, they provide the best avenue for our empirical inquiry into this
topic. Accordingly, all our evidence will pertain directly to the three programmes. The
best fit with our strategy and aims is provided by written evidence. As Johnson et. al.
argue: “political scientists turn to the written record when the political phenomena that
interest them cannot be measured through personal interviews, with questionnaires, or
by direct observation” (2001, p. 237). This applies to many of the phenomena we are
interested in.
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Written sources consist of episodic and running records. Whilst the former
include personal diaries and memoirs, the latter include (official) records maintained by
organisations rather than individuals (ibid.). For this reason the running record has a
higher degree of reliability, as it is a primary source, and it constitutes our main source
of evidence in this thesis (hereby we follow the suggestion of King et. al. in their
discussion of process tracing [1994, p. 227]). The evidences contained in the running
record can be considered as ‘facts in themselves’ – as opposed to ‘literature’, which
indirectly represents facts (Webb & Webb, 1932). In terms of reliability and
replicability, primary documents typically provide the most objective source of
information and they are of a lasting nature (Robson, 2002). While process tracing may
also make use of other sources, we agree with Falleti that “it would be hard to
compensate for the many insights we get through … the analysis of primary documents
and archives” (2006, p. 6). It must be admitted here that the main challenge lies is
verifying that, despite the relatively high degree of reliability of primary sources, what
is reported is not politically biased or otherwise altered to give an untrue or unclear
picture. The main safeguard against this is “confirming important pieces of information
through several dissimilar sources” (Johnson et. al., 2001, p. 266).
Given that we focus on EU foreign policy, it is important to define what range of
actions we must consider. According to Ginsberg (2001), the possibilities include:
Strategies/Positions/Actions; Enlargement and Conditionality; Diplomatic Recognition;
Association Accords; Development/Humanitarian Aid; Sanctions; Summits; or
Inaction.49 In light of these options, what needs to be considered first and foremost are
49 We apply the exclusive definition of EFP that “when an EU member state or a group of EU member
states takes a foreign policy action outside of the EU context (outside the contexts of the treaties, outside
areas where the EC and member governments share competence, and outside acquis communautaire,
acquis politique, and CFSP), such action is not a EFP action” (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 49).
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official (publicly available) EU treaties and agreements, official statements/positions
from the European Commission, the Council and Parliament, Communications and
reports by the European Commission, funding/aid decisions, EU programmes of
relevance to the Mediterranean, and the proceedings/conclusions of bi- and multilateral
meetings and summits. Many of these documents provide smoking gun evidence for the
occurrence of particular phenomena, as it would be impossible for e.g. a report on a
particular Euro-Mediterranean summit to exist if that summit had not actually occurred.
What is more, they contain evidence that could be used to conduct hoop tests for some
of our variables for which no smoking gun tests could be devised.
However, investigation of primary sources alone would be insufficient,
especially given the aforementioned importance of triangulation of findings with
potential alternative interpretations derived from other sources (Stake, 2005; Johnson et.
al., 2001, Ch. 9). We therefore also need to take into account secondary sources,
including in our case reports by e.g. the Court of Auditors and the Committee of the
Regions, relevant UN and NGO investigations, (national) parliamentary questions and
debates, newspaper articles, economic surveys (e.g. from Eurostat, the World Bank and
the IMF), and statements of EU officials and national leaders in the press. In many cases
these, too, can provide smoking gun or strong hoop evidence for the existence of
particular phenomena. They provide a vital source of additional information where
primary sources may be inconclusive, and they are important for generating a wider
understanding of the subject matter, which may be useful in adjudging the importance
of certain primary sources and preliminary conclusions.
In addition, where primary or secondary written evidence is hard to obtain or
incomplete we may consult tertiary sources (primarily academic books and articles
[Burnham et. al., 2008]). In providing support of this kind these could lead the way to
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alternative resources and explanations that would be difficult to pinpoint otherwise, and
they add another dimension for the triangulation of our initial findings. However, in
terms of establishing ‘facts’ tertiary sources are the least important, given that they are
the furthest removed from the ‘objective reality’ of Euro-Med politics.
We rely on a wide variety of written sources, as these contain much of the
evidence needed to conduct the empirical tests incorporated in our research design.
However, since our causal mechanism is made up of “the shared consensus of
recognized elites” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 10), it will also be useful to conduct
personal interviews with such elites (or other individuals with a close understanding of
their thinking) in order to gain a deeper understanding of their causal beliefs. The
function of such interviews will be twofold: 1) to triangulate with our findings from
written sources; 2) to shed further light on aspects which the documentary evidence
leaves (partially) unexplained. For this reason we include in our research approximately
ten in-depth (45 minutes to 1.5 hours) elite interviews with practitioners (policy makers
and civil servants). In addition, we interview a similar number of observers from
organisations that are closely involved with the EU-Mediterranean affairs, such as
humanitarian NGOs. The choice for such a relatively small number is driven by our
choice for depth rather than breadth, the fact that interviews primarily play a supportive
role in this thesis, and also more pragmatically by the fact that obtaining access to elites
is a resource-intensive process. Given that work on this thesis was initiated in London
(UK) but finished in San Francisco (USA), the interviews initially conducted are face-
to-face whereas those completed in the latter stages of the research will have been done
via telephone. All our interviewees requested confidentiality, which is why no specific
quotes are attributed to particular individuals. (Full details of the type of questions
asked are included in Appendix A).
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Best suited for elite-interviewing of this kind are semi-structured interviews, in
which the researcher “has predetermined questions, but the order can be modified based
upon the interviewer’s perception of what seems appropriate. Question wording can be
changed and explanations given; particular questions which seem inappropriate with a
particular interviewee can be omitted, or additional ones included” (Robson, 2002. p.
270). In this manner we aim to obtain a better understanding of the causal assumptions
that guide EU behaviour, but it is important to be aware of the danger that an interview
yields unreliable or incorrect results. This is because people might not always be willing
to share the truth, or they may be unaware of certain implicit assumptions in their own
thinking.  With this in mind, it can be said that the validity of an interviewee’s
statements “may be determined by examining their plausibility, checking for internal
consistency, and corroborating them with other interviewees” (Johnson et. al., 2001, p.
275). In sum, as with the other sources of evidence there is a high degree of reliance on
informed judgement based on triangulation within a wide evidential basis.
Conclusion
This chapter has explicated the rationale for our research by providing a broad overview
of some of the major currents in the relevant academic literature. We have suggested
that greater explanatory ability could be achieved by fusing key elements of two
particularly influential perspectives on EFP, namely the realist focus on economic gains
and the constructivist emphasis on principled beliefs. Based on the theory that was
devised by Goldstein and Keohane we have identified causal beliefs as the causal
mechanism that links our independent variables together. In aggregate this underpins
our hypothesis that principled beliefs and economic interests jointly provide the best
explanation of EU foreign policy towards the MENA region.
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Our methodology relies on process tracing. This is a suitable for our purposes,
given that it is a relatively widely accepted method for hypothesis-testing. In addition,
we have discussed the different kinds of evidence that could be used to support a
hypothesis (smoking gun), falsify it (hoop), or add probabilistic support (straw in the
wind). Our awareness of these kinds of evidence will greatly enhance our ability to
understand the reliability and wider significance of our evidence and thus to undertake
our analysis with a high degree of methodological self-awareness.
In the following chapters we commence our empirical research. As clarified in
this chapter, the goal is to test our hypothesis on the basis of a comprehensive, original
empirical dataset. In this manner our contribution to the literature consists not only of an
enhanced empirical understanding of the EU’s actions towards its southern neighbours,
but also of offering a different theoretical perspective on EU foreign policy and IR more
generally. This will enable us to gain a better understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of existing influential theories and thereby to advance the field towards a





In Chapter II we have seen how we assess our hypothesis – which posits that principled
beliefs regarding democracy and human rights have worked in tandem with economic
interests through causal beliefs in driving the EU’s Mediterranean policies – by
undertaking four essential tests. These tests can be formulated as questions; the answer
to each will bring us closer to understanding the status of our hypothesis. To reiterate,
the four questions are:
1. What were the EU’s causal beliefs?
2. What were the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean; did causal beliefs
provide a roadmap for action?
3. Were economic gains and principled beliefs necessary variables for the EU’s
roadmap/actions?
4. Do economic gains and principled beliefs jointly provide sufficient explanation
for the EU’s policies?
This chapter has as its goal to provide an answer to these questions through rigorous
empirical research for the period 1995-2003. We begin our analysis with a discussion of
how the Euro-Mediterranean partnership of 1995 emerged. This allows us to
contextualise our topic, but more importantly it reveals some of the causal beliefs
underlying subsequent European foreign policy towards the MENA. As we will see, the
European Union adopted then popular theories regarding shared economic prosperity,
which shaped its beliefs regarding cause-effect relationships.
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What follows is an analysis of the Barcelona Process for each of its three
‘baskets’, which will allow us to explore the contents of EU policy and to assess
whether the previously identified causal beliefs did indeed provide a roadmap for
European policies. Throughout the three sections we trace the role played by material
interests and principled beliefs, enabling us to also undertake the third test as listed
above. Our main finding is that EU policy was formulated within the context of a broad
economic interest in European market expansion, with the specifics being shaped in
some important ways by principled beliefs. This adds support for our hypothesis, in that
both material interests and principled beliefs are found to be necessary variables.
The chapter concludes with an overview of our findings as well as a discussion
of the fourth question. Here we also compare our approach with the findings of other
scholars. As we will see, our hypothesis passes the tests, providing tentative support for
our conceptualisation of the drivers of EFP. Several areas are highlighted where our
approach offers comparative advantage to alternative theorisations, but we also discuss
some of the challenges to our perspective that are thrown up by the evidence, leading us
to call for further analysis to clarify the outstanding issues. In this manner we aim to
have an honest discussion of our hypothesis in light of the evidence presented, serving
as a key building block for our research in the subsequent chapters.
The Emergence of the Euro-Med Partnership
In this section we investigate the trajectory that led to the formulation of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. By carefully tracing the process of formulating the EU’s
goals for its relations with the south we are able to gain an understanding of what causal
beliefs regarding Euro-Mediterranean relations were prevalent within the EU. On this
basis it will then be possible, in subsequent sections of this chapter, to undertake the
tests that will allow us to say more about whether causal beliefs did indeed provide a
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roadmap for European policy, as theorised in Chapter II. As we have said, this will be a
vital stepping stone towards testing our main hypothesis, which is why the present
section plays an important role within our overall effort.
As we will see below, the most important causal beliefs held within the EU drew
upon the Washington Consensus of the early 1990s, concretised in the structural
adjustment processes undertaken in many of the MENA states. Through statements and
initiatives from before 1995 we are able to infer how it was believed in the EU that
instability in the south was also a European problem, positing a degree of
interconnectedness between north and south. It was believed that the best way to resolve
the problem could be found in domestic reforms in the MENA states in the context of
‘anchoring’ with the EU, focusing primarily on the economy but also containing a
political element. In this manner a comprehensive theory of cause and effect emerged
within European thinking.
Structural Reform and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy
Since 1972 – before which European relations with the MENA were mostly “random,
unsystematic and on a case-by-case basis” (Jawad, 1992, p. 7) – common European
policy towards the MENA was undertaken in the context of the Global Mediterranean
Policy (GMP), consisting of a series of bilateral financial protocols. In this framework
the EC negotiated several preferential trade agreements, starting with Israel in 1975, to
be followed by Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in 1976; and by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon
and Syria one year later. The agreements addressed three topics: commercial,
financial/economic, and social cooperation, yet their main feature was the waiving of
tariffs on a range of industrial products imported into Europe. However, the GMP was
often criticised for being limited, ineffective, and ultimately primarily reflective of what
we could describe as European material interests. As Tsoukalis wrote at the time: “The
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economic relationship between the two sides is a typical case of a centre-periphery
relationship. The centre provides technology, sophisticated industrial goods and capital.
The periphery offers markets and raw materials, including unskilled labour” (1977, p.
426). In this unbalanced context it could be said that “the [GMP] accords merely
perpetuated economic dependence” (Gomez, 2003, p. 34), with “echoes of colonialism
and protectionist blocs” (Kahler, 1982, p. 199). There had been, in addition, the so-
called ‘Euro-Arab Dialogue’ on the political level, but altogether this was regarded by
many as a “complete failure” as it often fell victim to tensions between the southern
countries (Salamé, 1994, p. 247). In this regard it could not be said that the EC had a
comprehensive policy towards the MENA. This exemplified the still limited foreign
policy role of ‘Europe’ as whole (see Nuttall, 1992; Pijpers et. al., 1988; Greilsammer &
Weiler, 1987; Ifestos, 1987). Early initiatives thus contained little evidence of
substantive common efforts in the MENA region.
Against this backdrop there is evidence of a growing belief in Europe that the
gap between the two sides could pose a threat to European security “in its broadest
sense” (European Commission, 1990a, p. 2). The initiatives and statements put forward
since the early 1990s are thus important for helping us understand Europe’s emergent
causal beliefs regarding its relations with the south. Two core assumptions regarding
cause-effect relationships in Euro-Med politics can be distilled from the empirical
evidence: 1) widening disparities between north and south would have a negative effect
on Europe; 2) ‘modernisation’ of politico-economic structures across the MENA would
improve the latter’s stability and prosperity.
The first point is evident in various proposed initiatives for broader multilateral
cooperation between Europe and the states of the Maghreb and Mashriq. Examples
include the Italian-Spanish idea for a ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in the
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Mediterranean’50 as well as the ‘5+5 Dialogue’ (see Dosenrode & Stukbjær, 2002).51
Taken together, they provide relatively strong evidence for the emergent assumption of
a causal link between socio-economic conditions in the southern Mediterranean and
Europe. Below we will see how subsequent European statements and initiatives
corroborate this reading.
Regarding the second causal belief that we have mentioned, which addresses the
relationship between politico-economic conditions and domestic stability/prosperity, the
best way to begin to gain an understanding of the EU’s thinking can be found by
placing developments during this period in the context of the economic crisis in the
south and the various related IMF and World Bank-led structural reform programmes
that had been adopted by several countries in the region since 1983:
50 Then Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernandez Ordóñez, proposed a comprehensive structure
focused on politics/security, economics and social/cultural matters, driven by a desire to “avoid a possible
collision course between Islam and the West, and to set up a system of good-neighbourly relations” (The
Independent, 1990; see also The Guardian, 1991).
51 Since the Rome and Algiers declarations of respectively 1990 and 1991, the 5+5 Dialogue has
consisted of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta on the European side; and Algeria, Libya,
Mauretania, Morocco and Tunisia on the other side of the formula. Its stated purpose has been the
promotion of stability and security in the Mediterranean by serving as what was later described as “a
regional forum for consultation, cooperation and comprehensive thinking” (5+5 Dialogue, 2003).
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Table 3: Mediterranean States and the IMF, Selected Arrangements52
Standby Arrangement Extended Fund Facility
Algeria 31 May 1989 22 May 1995
Egypt 15 May 1987 20 September 1993
Jordan 14 July 1989 25 May 1994
Morocco 16 September 1983 -
Tunisia 4 November 1986 25 July 1988
Turkey 4 April 1984 -
In general terms the need for reform was driven by the large macroeconomic
imbalances that had come to light in many of the MENA states. Overall these states
were marked by low private investment, relatively closed trade regimes, large public
sectors and a low level of integration with the world economy (see Page, 2003;
Camdessus, 1996). In the Maghreb there was an average debt burden of 74.9 per cent of
GDP in 1989; a number that stood at 102.7% for the Mashriq (Gomez, 2003, p. 45).
Given the growing belief that conditions in the Mediterranean were of relevance
for Europe, it is possible to find increasingly clear iterations of what kind of change was
needed in Europe’s view to improve the Mediterranean states’ disposition. In large part
the reform programmes to which many of the southern states were committed were
based on the so-called Washington Consensus. The assumptions of this wide-ranging
consensus, which had emerged as the answer to the 1970s crisis of capital accumulation,
stagflation, unemployment and the falling into disarray of the Bretton Woods system,
were summarised by John Williamson (1990): 1) fiscal discipline and the importance of
fighting budget deficits; 2) redirection of expenditure towards productive areas; 3) a
52 Source: compiled from [http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm], accessed 17 June 2011.
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broad tax base and moderate marginal tax rates; 4) market-determined, positive real
interest rates; 5) market-determined exchange rates; 6) import liberalisation; 7)
promotion of inward FDI; 8) the superior efficiency of the private sector and
privatisation of state enterprises; 9) deregulation; and 10) the importance of property
rights (see also Harvey, 2005; Adelman, 1999). The Washington consensus could thus
be regarded as a relatively extensive theory of cause and effect, describing the causes of
economic weakness and inefficiency and suggesting solutions for these problems.53
How do we know whether these ideas were widespread amongst European elites
in the sense of our definition of ‘causal beliefs’? Here it is possible to say that strong
evidence is present in a large number of European statements and other documents from
the first half of the 1990s. First of all, the European Community explicitly endorsed the
reform process, making it an objective to “see that the discipline necessary for
adjustment is made more socially palatable” (Matutes, 1989). A reshaping of Euro-
Mediterranean relations was undertaken in this light (see European Council, 1990, §15),
leading to the adoption of the so-called Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in
December 1990. It was explicitly designed to serve three goals: 1) aid the process of
structural adjustment in the Mediterranean; 2) coordinate multilateral aid; 3) finance the
third and fourth generations of Euro-Mediterranean financial protocols. Accordingly the
new protocols saw an increase in funding with a strong emphasis on supporting
economic reform (the total amount set aside for the region was around €1,300 million).
Morocco, for example, was promised €438m for the period 1992-1996, consisting of
EIB loans (€220m) and grants from the Community budget – which was an increase
from its previous protocol, in which Morocco had been allocated €324m (European
Council, 1992; 1988). One of the express aims of this augmentation of aid was “to
53 For the influence of this perspective on reforms inside the Union see Storey (2006).
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alleviate any negative effects which the structural adjustment process may have in social
terms and with regard to employment” (Council Regulation 1762/92, §3.1). A special
fund with a budget of €300 million was set up to further succour reform with as its main
beneficiaries Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan (see European Commission, 1996).
Much of the evidence, as expressed in European statements and budget allocations, thus
suggests that the assumptions underlying the structural adjustment programmes, as
expressed in the Washington Consensus, significantly informed Europe’s collective
thinking during this period.
While the shift towards the RMP was not particularly comprehensive – in fact, it
was widely regarded as merely ‘old wine in a new bottle’ (Gomez, 2003; see also Court
of Auditors, 1995, §11.76) – it was illustrative for the Community’s causal beliefs. As
argued by the Commission in 1992:
Most Mediterranean countries are facing political instability, rapid population
growth, large movements of population and high unemployment. These
problems, especially in the case of the Maghreb countries, are also our
problems – such is their influence on the region’s security and the potential
migratory pressure on the Community. For this reason it is vitally important that
we continue to support the economic reforms being implemented there and
promote the emergence of democratic values and practices. (European
Commission, 1992a, p. 17)54
54 As regards democracy, a deficit of sorts existed due to the region’s apparent defiance of the widely
hailed ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington, 1991). Though each country has its own particular
determinants, a number of common characteristics have been pointed out in the literature to explain this
region-wide resilience to pressures for democratisation (Niblock, 1998). First of all, though economic
problems have been widespread throughout the region, total economic collapse did not occur, allowing
most of the Maghreb and Mashriq states to maintain large coercive apparatuses which could be mobilised
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This statement provides further evidence for the growing sense of interconnection
between north and south as well as the belief in the benefits of economic reform. The
Commission’s statement can be read as an espousal of the causal beliefs underpinning
European thinking. Furthermore, it allows us to specify with more detail how the
assumption of a connection between north and south was framed. It was argued that
there was a need for action on a multilateral level to prevent extraordinary migratory
pressures, echoing previous warnings of “disastrous consequences” if European
countries did not converge their national policies (European Commission, 1990b).  The
Club of Rome also made a foreboding prediction: “At the extreme it is not difficult to
imagine innumerable immigrants landing on the Northern shores of the Mediterranean
and consisting of the hungry and the desperate” (cited in King & Schneider, 1991, pp.
62-63). In this manner a direct causal relationship between instability in the south and
migratory pressure upon the north was explicitly posited. An additional clue as to the
EU’s thinking, derived from the Commission’s statement, pertains to the role of
democracy. In addition to supporting economic reform, the promotion of democratic
values and practices was put forward as beneficial for the Mediterranean region. As we
will see below, over time this theme was to become more significant in the EU’s set of
against internal dissidents. This was largely facilitated by access to foreign loans: “many Middle Eastern
and North African states are richly supplied with rental income. It gives them access to substantial
discretionary resources so that, even if the country is overall in poor economic health, the state is still able
to hew to conventional economic wisdom and pay itself first, that is, give first priority to paying the
military and security forces” (Bellin, 2004, p. 148). As Luciani argues (1990), access to loans furthermore
decreased dependency on domestic inputs such as taxation and therefore provided a disincentive for
advancement towards democracy. Additional protection from public pressure was provided by highly
active secret police or mukhabarat services, which formed a strong barrier to popular activism. A
patrimonial system (Bellin, 2004; Brownlee, 2002), manipulation of political processes (Kassem, 2004)
and heavy dependence on the state for essential services further kept the MENA regimes in place, though,
as we have said, the system worked in different ways in each country.
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causal beliefs. In this sense the twofold emphasis on the relevance of the south to the
north and the importance of reform was broadened beyond the purely economic
orientation of the structural adjustment programmes, providing a comprehensive set of
causal beliefs that could serve as a future roadmap.
In the evidence considered thus far we can find the seeds of an interrelated set of
beliefs amongst European institutions. But how reliable is our reading? In this case,
consistency across a variety of sources as well as over time – and a high degree of
resonance with wider popular assumptions at the time – delimits the potential margin of
error. In our judgement, therefore, we can infer with a high degree of reliability what
causal beliefs were relatively widespread amongst EU policymakers. Consideration of
subsequent evidence enables us to strengthen this conclusion.
‘An Area of Peace, Stability and Well-Being’
Against the backdrop of the RMP’s still limited purview it is possible to note a
continuing move towards a reformative European stance. Bolstered by the Treaty on
European Union (see Smith 2008, Ch. 2), which furthered European integration and
common foreign policy, this enabled an increasingly comprehensive approach which
ultimately posited the creation of ‘an area of peace, stability and well-being’ in the
MENA as its goal. By taking a closer look at the formulation of this goal we will be
able to further our understanding of the causal beliefs held by the EU during this time.
An important contribution to the development of the EU’s approach was made
by the proposed (but never realised) ‘Euro-Maghreb Partnership’ of 1992. Reflecting
the growing emphasis on the proactive pursuit of reform in the MENA region, the
Commission argued that the time had come to move away from development
cooperation to the idea of ‘partnership’ in order to promote stability and prosperity in
North Africa (European Commission, 1992b). One of the main aims was said to be to
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support economic development in the south; the proposed means to do so consisted of
an open economic area to be implemented via bilateral agreements with the respective
Maghreb partners on the basis of continued economic reform and trade liberalisation.
Following talks with Tunisia, the Commission concluded that “only the economic and
political anchoring of Tunisia to Europe and the opening-up of Maghreb markets to
each other could ensure success in dealing with the social and economic changes now
under way” (European Commission, 1993). Importantly, this statement provides us with
a candid look into the causal beliefs held within the EU, particularly by the
Commission. Similar to Europe’s support for structural adjustment, ‘anchoring’ was
explained in terms of the virtues of free market capitalism and trade as motors of
regional and domestic stability. The belief that ‘modernisation’ in the south was needed
in order to ward off unwanted consequences for Europe was thus further substantiated
by positing that politico-economic modernisation could be facilitated through ‘linkage’
with Europe. One justification of such linkage contained the following statement: “all
Member States would benefit from greater stability and prosperity in the region. This
would multiply trade and investment opportunities and reinforce the base for
cooperation in political and economic fields” (European Commission, 1994). Once
again this illustrates the set of causal beliefs held within the EU regarding the need for
stability in the MENA region, but it also hints at the influence of certain European
material interests, as we will see further in this chapter.
In 1994, the Council meeting in Corfu promulgated Europe’s desire for the
Mediterranean to be “an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and
well-being” (European Council, 1994a). The ideas on Euro-Mediterranean relations that
had emerged since the early 1990s could be observed in the Commission’s proposal in
1994, following the Corfu meeting, for a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’. To be
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specific, the Commission defined the following priorities for Europe’s Mediterranean
policy: 1) supporting economic transition (in order to “make it possible to move rapidly
to anchor the southern and eastern Mediterranean to the Community economically”); 2)
achieving better social and economic balance (in light of “problems that transcend the
economic sphere”); and 3) supporting regional integration (by “[following] up the
association agreements concluded between the Community and the countries concerned
with free trade and cooperation agreements”) (ibid.). When viewed in light of the causal
beliefs that we have identified previously, the Commission’s proposal appears as a
consistent follow-up to the idea that the Mediterranean states’ disposition was of
relevance to Europe and that a modernisation of politico-economic structures, in line
with the principles of the Washington Consensus, would beneficially affect the
situation. Significantly, this hints at a ‘win-win’ relationship between various northern
and southern interests. It can be remarked that this strongly resonates with popular
liberal theories of the 1990s and the generally optimistic political mood following the
end of the Cold War (see Long and Wilson, 1995; Fukuyama, 1992).
The comprehensive approach formulated by the Commission was welcomed by
the European Council in Essen (1994b), held while the upcoming Spanish Presidency
was preparing to organise a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on the basis of
the Commission’s proposal. The Council stated that “all relevant political, economic,
social and cultural issues” should be addressed (ibid.), which was approved by the
European Parliament as it argued that there were “numerous factors creating political,
religious, economic, social and military instability” indicating an “urgent task to
influence this dangerous development in a positive way” (European Parliament,
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1995).55 The necessity to act was widely stressed: then Spanish foreign minister Javier
Solana, for example, said that widespread disparities of income and population growth
had put together all the “ingredients for the conflict between Islam and Europe that has
made up so much of the unhappy history of the Mediterranean”, while a senior advisor
to Morocco’s King Hassan told his European colleagues that “we don't have the time”,
adding that “you don't have the time either” (The Independent, 1995). Against this
backdrop the budget for the Union’s new approach was finally set in Cannes (June
1995) at €4.7 billion for 1996-2000; a substantial increase from the RMP’s €1.3b
(though less than the €5.5b that the Commission originally wanted). This enabled the
inauguration of the new ‘partnership’ at the Barcelona conference of November 1995. It
was here that the European Union’s causal beliefs regarding the Mediterranean would
come to full fruition.
The Barcelona Declaration: Solidifying the European Approach
Until now we have considered the emergence of the European Union’s most important
and widely shared causal beliefs regarding the Mediterranean region prior to the launch
of the Euro-Med Partnership. On 27 and 28 November 1995 they were synthesised in a
single forum at the Barcelona ministerial conference between the 15 EU member states
55 Furthermore, there was agreement within NATO regarding the EU’s role in the Mediterranean to
prevent future (potentially military) crises ahead of time: “The best means for preventing many future
crises in the Mediterranean is to address their root causes – which are primarily economic and social –
ahead of time. The EU is the actor which is best placed to deal with these problems and ensure that they
do not escalate into major crises requiring military action” (Asmus et. al., 1996). After sustained pressure
from France and Spain, NATO did also open a dialogue with Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and
Mauretania in 1995. This was, according to the organisation, because of “a growing realisation that the
security of Europe cannot be divorced from countries of the southern Mediterranean” (NATO, 1995).
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and 12 Mediterranean neighbours.56 As has been pointed out in the literature, an
important condition of possibility for the conference was the progress heralded by the
Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO (Peters, 1998).57 To quote Egypt’s
ambassador to the EU: “No [peace process], no Barcelona” (cited in Selim, 2001, p. 14).
The Barcelona conference could therefore be regarded as a critical juncture, as
discussed in Chapter II – it was referred to as a ‘ground breaking moment’ by one of our
interviewees (Interview with EEAS Official, 3 June 2014, telephone). It came at a
moment in time when a major impediment to change was removed, while an impulse to
act was provided through the causal beliefs that were iterated by EU. In this manner
there was space for a relatively novel set of ideas to be put forward, and these ideas
were voiced in the Barcelona Declaration. In the words of Manuel Marin, the
Declaration provided a “clear geopolitical and economic scenario for a priority region in
the Union’s foreign policy” (European Commission, 1998a).58 In the terms of our
56 These were: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey
and the Palestinian Authority (Mauretania, the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union were
invited as observers).
57 The Oslo discussions marked a pivotal moment in the history of the conflict. They were a secret spin-
off of the bilateral talks initiated in Madrid (1991), ultimately giving birth to the Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), signed on the lawn of the White House on 13
September 1993. In the Declaration, the PLO and Israel formally recognised each other as legitimate
negotiating partners and a plan was laid out for the formation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA or
PA) to administer parts of the West Bank and Gaza following the withdrawal of Israeli forces. ‘Oslo’ thus
set out a framework for future relations between Israel and the Palestinians, sparking enthusiastic
reactions from Europe: “The European Community and its member States pay tribute to the vision and
courage of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders who signed this historic agreement [and] offer their
continuing political support” (European Political Cooperation, 1993). A package of immediate aid was
offered to the Palestinians, while it was reemphasised that the Community was the largest net contributor
to the Occupied Territories. The Oslo Accords were followed by the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of
1994 and the Taba Agreement one year later.
58 This bears some resemblance to a ‘grand strategy’, which can be defined as a “collection of plans and
policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic
102
theoretical framework, this ‘scenario’ could be regarded as a roadmap based on a clear
set of causal assumptions.
Support for our explanation of the EU’s causal beliefs could be gained through a
counterfactual thought-experiment of sorts. Assuming that all actors act on the basis of
expected results and are thus informed by causal beliefs (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993),
is it imaginable that the EU could have held a different set of causal beliefs than what
we have described? Given the explicit nature of European statements on the matter
(acknowledging e.g. migration and economic opportunities) and the prevalence of the
cause-effect ideas described above amongst other actors and institutions with which the
EU was closely connected (e.g. the IMF), the likelihood of the EU having ‘secret’
causal beliefs beyond what we have analysed appears as relatively small – particularly
given the broadly inclusive nature of the beliefs described. That said, at this point we do
not yet have the evidence to reliably accept or reject hypotheses. What we do have is a
relatively strong understanding of the core causal beliefs held by the relevant actors
within the EU. If we consider the Barcelona Declaration as an expression of these
beliefs and thus as a potential roadmap for future policy, it is possible to further test our
hypothesis.
Drawing on the Commission’s previous language, the overarching goal was
described in the Barcelona Declaration as turning the Mediterranean basin “into an area
of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity”
(Euro-Med Partnership, 1995). To this purpose three baskets were created, focusing on
tools together to advance that state's national interest” (Feaver, 2009). In this light the Declaration’s
adoption was described as “a clear attempt by the EU to enhance its profile as an international actor in its
own right” (Dosenrode & Stukbjær, 2002, p. 131), while according to Fred Halliday the aim was “at least
partly to demonstrate that the European Union could act in a united and effective manner around the sea
… that nurtured the historic cultures that shaped modern Europe” (2005).
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political, economic and human issues. In the first basket there was talk of a host of
principles, including most notably the importance of developing democracy and rule of
law as well as respecting human rights. In addition, reflecting the mostly economic
nature of the EU’s thinking on the best way towards achieving progress and stability in
the south, the second basket was the most elaborate and specific. It put forward the goal
of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone (FTZ) by 2010; an idea in which
we can clearly identify the influence of earlier statements regarding ‘anchoring’. It
furthermore emphasised e.g. free market principles, inward FDI, the regulation-trade
nexus, intellectual property rights and structural adjustment, demonstrating, as we have
said previously, an underlying set of causal beliefs with its roots in the assumptions of
the Washington Consensus. Finally, there was the ‘human affairs’ basket. From a
distance this appears to be a topic that had hitherto not been extensively debated.
However, upon closer examination we find that the issue of migratory pressure was
included here, which has been shown to have played a key role in the EU’s chain of
causal assumptions. Yet it is also true that various other issues were included, such as
cultural exchange, which had not previously been a significant part of the EU’s
statements. This indicates a potential broadening of thinking on the areas where reform
and intensified contact could play a beneficial role, the nature of which we will discuss
in more detail below.
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Table 4: Causal Beliefs in the Barcelona Declaration
Economic Political






Action Needed Structural adjustment
(‘modernisation’), closer
economic proximity
Support democracy and human
rights initiatives, though primary





First basket: slightly ambiguous,




Prosperity gains in MENA,
stabilisation of region,
increased trade between
Europe and MENA: shared
gains
More stability in MENA
In conclusion, the Barcelona Declaration reaffirms how the European Union believed
that continued instability in the south was likely to have negative repercussions for the
north and how a ‘modernisation’ of the MENA region in close association with the EU
was required to remedy the situation, generating a scenario of mutual gains for the
parties involved. In our analysis these are the main causal beliefs that can be distilled
from the evidence, hypothesised as providing a roadmap for foreign policy. Yet it must
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be said that the Barcelona Declaration contained a remarkably broad list of issues,
which raises the question of whether EU policy really was driven by the roadmap
suggested here or whether it was rather the result of a more random or politically driven
selective process from a large ‘shopping list’. The hoop test required to assert with more
confidence whether or not this was the case necessitates a look into the actions
undertaken by the EU. If these actions show a significant degree of covariance with the
prescriptions and areas of emphasis of the identified causal beliefs, and if alternative
explanations can be accounted for, our hypothesis retains its credibility. Simultaneously,
tracing the relevant processes will enable us to investigate the role of material and
ideational variables within the EU’s roadmap/policies so as to be able to further test our
main hypothesis. To this purpose the following sections trace the EU’s actions within
each of the three baskets, with a focus on testing the notions that the identified causal
beliefs served as a roadmap for action and that within this dynamic ideational and
material variables coexisted as drivers of EU policy.
The Partnership in Politics and Security
We proceed by looking at the first area of cooperation: the partnership in politics and
security. Thus far we have found that the EU’s causal beliefs focused on stabilising the
Mediterannean states through reform, with primary emphasis on economic
modernisation but with some attention for e.g. democracy, as expressed in the
Barcelona Declaration. We must therefore verify to what extent the roadmap that was
elaborated by the EU informed concrete policy action as well as whether it is possible to
find within its application evidence of material and/or ideational drivers.
The first basket’s purpose and remit were described in terms of achieving
“peace, stability and security” (Euro-Med Partnership, 1995). Reference was made to
‘common objectives’ such as observance of international law; rule of law, democracy,
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and human rights; respect for the rights inherent to sovereignty; and action in favour of
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a rather broad set of quite
general objectives, which is why it raised some eyebrows. For example, the political
and security dimension was described by The Economist (1995) as ‘waffle’, while one
official asked after the conference: “Do we start a big discussion on human rights in the
Mediterranean? I don’t know” (cited in Gomez, 2003, p. 78). As we will see, the most
substantive, sustained action within the first basket focused on the promotion of stability
within the MENA through domestic political reform. The Union’s efforts were
relatively limited when compared to other areas of the EMP, but it can be said that this
was consistent with the roadmap provided by the EU’s causal beliefs, putting economic
‘modernisation’ at the centre of attention. On this basis we argue that our hypothesis
passes a hoop test. Our argument is further solidified through our consideration of the
necessary role of ideational variables in sustaining and enacting EU causal beliefs in the
first basket.
Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law
To begin, let us consider the key characteristics of the Union’s approach to democracy
and human rights in the MENA since 1995. As we have seen, an important causal belief
held throughout the EU was that the spread of democracy and human rights would
promote stability and undermine domestic tensions and pressures (see also Feliu, 2001).
As the Committee of the Regions had advised (1996, §3.2):
The growth and the reinforcement of democracy are essential conditions for
development itself and are also essential if fresh hopes are to be raised and new
dialogues opened in the Mediterranean. Such objectives can only be achieved
within this framework by strengthening a system of democratically elected local
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and national authorities that are able to take practical steps towards the social
and economic development of their communities.
It is notable that the Barcelona Declaration strove to avoid the impression of the
imposition of European values, stressing “the right of each [state] to choose and freely
develop its own political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system” (Euro-Med
Partnership, 1995). A potentially more robust legal basis for conditionality (e.g. the
suspension of European aid) was incorporated in the Euro-Med Association Agreements
– the binding bilateral agreements that served to implement the EMP. They included a
reference to “respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights” as well as
a clause that stated that “if either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil
an obligation … it may take appropriate measures” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2004a, §2;
§86.2). The issue was further enshrined by the Council in article 3 of the MEDA
financial regulation (the EU’s funding mechanism for the EMP; see European
Commission 2000e), which stated that the programme was “based on respect for
democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental
freedoms … the violation of which element will justify the adoption of appropriate
measures” (Council Regulation 1488/96). Together these clauses made it theoretically
possible for the EU to suspend bilateral relations in case of violations of human rights or
democratic principles (see also Fierro, 2001).59 On this basis it could be said that the
causal belief regarding the need for democratic reform and respect for human rights was
reflected within EU policymaking on a formal or contractual level. Furthermore, we can
identify a high degree of consistency with the Union’s principled beliefs regarding
59 It must be added that in principle this kind of mechanism is generally more suited to allow an actor to
keep its hands ‘clean’ in case of serious problems than to induce third parties to adopt a particular course
of action (Forsythe, 2009, p. 244).
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democracy and human rights, as characterised in Chapter II. Without these principled
beliefs, rooted in the EU’s existence as a grouping of democratic states, the Union is
unlikely to have put forward a theory of democratic change and stability. This implies
that as hypothesised they might have been a necessary part of the equation, providing
hoop evidence for the existence of a causal link between principled beliefs, causal
beliefs and foreign policy.
However, a caveat must be added. It is notable that neither the Council nor the
Commission proved willing to attach political consequences to violations of human
rights in the south (see Schmid, 2003). For example, when in late 2000 the Tunisian
Human Rights League was put under judicial administration after it had agreed on a
policy of autonomy from the authorities, the Commission argued that “the EU should at
this stage use the positive partnership instruments to support all those working to
improve human rights in Tunisia” with the aim of promoting “the EU’s point of view,
and thereby to intensify political dialogue” (Written Question E3973/00).60 Another
example was the arrest of 52 homosexuals in Cairo in 2001. In response to a query by
MEPs van der Laan and van den Bos (ELDR) regarding the possible consequences for
Egypt, the Commission refrained from giving a clear answer, arguing that “the new
Association Agreement with Egypt will significantly bolster these causes by providing a
new framework within which they can be discussed and promoted” (Written Question
E2613/01). In addition, no measures were taken in the famous case of professor Sa’ad
Eddin Ibrahim, who was accused by the Egyptian authorities of embezzling EU funds
(which was denied by the EU) and besmirching his country’s reputation (Weaver,
2001).
60 Tunisia’s sabotaging of the League’s work did, ultimately, lead to a blockage of some EU funding, but
Tunisia remained the second highest recipient of European aid (Youngs, 2006a, p. 128).
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Whilst raising some questions about the EU’s seriousness on human rights, these
examples do not necessarily undermine our hypothesis regarding principled and causal
beliefs. Had the EU acted in the abovementioned cases, this might have given us
smoking gun evidence for the relevant aspects of our hypothesis, proving in a strong
manner the causal role played by principled beliefs. Yet failing a smoking gun test,
particularly a strict one constituted by extraordinary cases such as the above, does not
mean that a hypothesis is invalid. This situation does, however, urge us to take an even
closer look at the ‘nuts and bolts’ of EU democracy and human rights promotion in
order to be able to make further statements about our hypothesis.
In light of the above we can consider the so-called MEDA Democracy
Programme (MDP). This was part of the European Parliament’s proposal of 1994 –
entitled ‘The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’  (EIDHR) – to
bring efforts in the sphere of democracy and human rights together under their own
budget heading (i.e. B7-70). In line with the Commission’s communication to the
Council and Parliament of November 1995, as well as its publication The European
Union and Human Rights in the World (European Commission, 1995a; 1995b, p. 29),
the MDP’s objectives were defined as promoting and providing support for e.g.
democracy, the rule of law, free media and the protection of vulnerable groups (see
European Commission, 2000a).
Altogether this appears to follow a view of supporting democratisation by
promoting democratic practices and sets of associated rights, as envisioned in
Huntington’s Third Wave (1991) and discussed in accounts of the spread of democracy
in post-Soviet states (Pridham & Vanhanen, 1994). The assumption of such a ‘transition
approach’ is that external actors can stimulate ‘contagion’ and ‘transmission
mechanisms’ and use sticks and carrots to promote democracy (Whitehead, 2001;
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O’Donnell et. al., 1986; Rustow, 1970) – a potentially forceful approach that arguably
influenced the views of American neoconservatives (Berger, 2011). However, as we
have said above, the wider evidence points to causal beliefs following a ‘modernisation’
logic in which democracy was more closely linked to economic development
(Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Lipset, 1959). Supporting evidence for this perspective
can be found in the following statement by Manuel Marin: “The only way to quell
extremism is by offering people real hope of prosperity” (The Guardian, 1995). Or as
Britain’s Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind put it: “the most important way that we
can achieve stability is through economic growth” (The Times, 1995; see also European
Parliament, 1997, §30).61 This reiterates how a hierarchy of sorts existed in European
thinking on the role of economic and political factors in achieving stability in the
MENA.
Reflective of this hierarchy was the fact that in terms of funding the MDP was
far from a prominent programme. The budget was decided annually: for 1996 it was set
at €9 million; €8 million for 1997; and €10 million for 1998, with regional projects, the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel as the primary beneficiaries (27%, 20% and
16% respectively) (Karkutli & Bützler, 1999). For the period 1995-1999 the total
amount devoted to the MDP was €36 million; a rather small amount within the overall
61 The assumption was that increasing prosperity would lead to an enlarged Mediterranean middle class
that would gradually demand greater political participation (Schumacher, 2004). This would then give
rise to a political liberalisation process throughout the MENA region, bringing about the ‘bourgeois
revolution’ that had thus far eluded the Maghreb and Mashriq. As Charles Issawi had already written in
the 1950s: “a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for the establishment of genuine democracy” was to
be found in “a great economic and social transformation which will strengthen society and make it
capable of bearing the weight of the modern State” (1956, p. 41). It is worth noting that already before the
EMP was initiated this theory was deemed ‘curiously unsatisfying’ by scholars on democratisation in the
Middle East (Allison & Beschel, 1992, p. 85).
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budget of almost €5 billion (European Commission, 2000a).62 In this sense – and
consistent with the modernisation theory of democratic change – it can be said that the
MDP’s function was to promote ‘socio-economic equilibrium’ in support of economic
and political reform rather than to be a primary motor of change in itself (European
Commission, 2000b). The programme operated mainly in a bottom-up manner; eligible
beneficiaries included non-profit private sector organizations or associations as well as
quasi-public or public bodies (or combinations thereof); in practice it was targeted
mainly at NGOs. As in the other fields of the MEDA programme there were no fixed
country budgets, though, notably, in the case of the MDP applicants dealt directly with
the Commission (rather than through their own governments). A final characteristic of
the programme was that (in the interest of local ownership) it was demand-driven,
meaning that funding was granted based on the Commission’s reviewing of proposals
from (organisations in) the partner states.
A number of remarks can be made based on the above. First, the fact that the
emphasis on economic reform within the identified causal beliefs, with a secondary role
for political reform, was reflected in the EU’s efforts within the first basket adds support
for our reading of the substance of EU causal beliefs as well as the notion that they
served as a roadmap for policy. What is more, within the observed dynamic there is
evidence in support of a causal role being played by principled beliefs, as without a
belief in the desirability of democracy and respect for human rights it would be highly
unlikely that the EU would have undertaken the aforementioned programmes. While
this adds support for vital elements of our hypothesis, it must be added that we have
mostly hoop evidence for these assertions, meaning that we could not go as far as some
62 It must be added that it is difficult to establish definitive figures on democracy and human rights
promotion given the broad definitions used by the EU and the overlap between different budgetary
external aid chapters.
112
of the aforementioned authors in the normative power school have (see Chapter II) in
making claims regarding the decisive role played by ideational variables. What we can
say is that on the basis of the empirical data, we have not been able to rule out that
principled beliefs form a necessary component of the EU’s Mediterranean policies.
Given our evidence, it is plausible that EU principled beliefs informed the causal beliefs
that provided the roadmap for Euro-Med relations. This was further confirmed through
interviews with EU officials: when asked each identified human rights and democracy
as an indispensible element of the EMP (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 3 & 6 June
2014, telephone). Even more critical MEPs have recognised this dimension as vital in
the Barcelona Process from the very start, though they have been in favour of further
strengthening (Interview with assistant to Chairwoman of the EP Human Rights Sub-
Committee, November 2011, Berlin).
Though limited in resources and mostly of instrumental utility (playing a
supporting role for economic reform), the MDP had some potential to be a useful
grassroots-focused instrument. Yet a strong downside of the EU’s approach was its
dependency on pre-existing civil society dynamics, which made it difficult to effectuate
change in authoritarian contexts. Resultantly, precisely the most problematic states –
e.g. Syria and Algeria – received a minimum of funding due to a lack of proposals. In
addition the programme was plagued by a number of bureaucratic problems.
(Prospective) recipients often complained about cumbersome procedures and severe
delays in the disbursement of payments, which posed a limitation to the potential impact
and appeal of the Commission’s funding.63 What is more, there were no country-
63 As one audit of the Union’s democracy assistance concluded: “the administrative guidelines (budgetary
and reporting requirements) and procedures (decisions, payments) specified by the Commission
department more often put an extra burden on the partners rather than helping to strengthen them” (Court
of Auditors, 2000, §30).
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specific predefined priority areas, which obscured the Commission’s selection criteria
and allowed the Mediterranean regimes to hinder the submission of proposals from non-
government sanctioned actors. Finally, conspicuously and consistently absent amongst
the recipients of funding were politically more sensitive organisations, primarily those
with a religious basis, in spite of the MDP’s potential to operate without the direct
involvement of the partner states (Bicchi & Martin, 2006; Youngs, 2006a).64 In light of
these factors the European approach was relatively widely criticised for lacking in
robustness (see Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2002).
Against this backdrop it is perhaps not surprising that little success could be
registered as regards the political circumstances in the MENA. As the European
Parliament glumly concluded: “the human rights situation not only has not improved
but in some states has deteriorated even further” (1999). The problem was recognised
by the European Commission (2000a), which advised a strengthened and more
prominent policy on human rights, democracy and good governance. However, the
shifts in European policy after 2000 did not wholly resolve the fundamental aporiae.
The failure of what the Commission had called the ‘traditional’ or cooperative approach
(ibid.) contributed to a comprehensive recalibration (decentralisation) of activities in the
sphere of human rights/democracy in 2001. It was decided to abandon the geographical
distinctions within the EIDHR in favour of a thematic categorisation, leading to the
dismantlement of the MEDA Democracy Programme (see Council Regulation
2698/2000).65 In the terms of our theoretical framework, this could be regarded as a
64 An additional problem that might be mentioned was that there did not appear to exist a clear legal basis
for the Commission’s activities; this issue was only resolved in 1999 (see Council Regulation 976/1999).
65 This coincided with the move towards deconcentration of project management since the creation of
‘EuropeAid’ on 1 January 2001 (European Commission, 2001a). The four themes that were identified for
2002-2004 were: 1) strengthening democratisation, good governance and the rule of law; 2) abolition of
the death penalty; 3) combating torture and impunity and support for international tribunals and criminal
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potential evolution within the EU’s causal beliefs regarding its strategy with respect to
human rights and democracy. Yet due to organisational issues the new programme was
rather slow to take off in the Maghreb and Mashriq: until 2003 the initiative could not
be fully operationalised because of organisational changes and a lack of human
resources. For this reason, further examination of the relevant initiatives falls outside of
the timeframe considered in this chapter, which is why they will be considered in more
detail in Chapter IV.
Table 5: Principled Beliefs in the EMP
EU problem
definition
Insufficient respect for human rights and little adoption of
democratic practices across MENA region
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Declarative diplomacy, conditionality, support existing
(grassroots) initiatives
Expected outcomes Gradual improvement of situation, but hopes primarily pinned
on spill-overs of economic modernisation
Evidence in support
of hypothesis
Emphasis on human rights/democracy in EU declarations and
statements, MEDA financial regulation, MEDA Democracy
Programme (hoop test passed)
Challenges Limited budget, lack of action on notable cases, economic
dimension prioritised (smoking gun test failed)
Actual outcomes No progress, in some cases even regression
Conclusion Hoop evidence suggests necessary but not sufficient role of
principled beliefs, but significant challenges remain
courts; 4) combating racism and xenophobia, and promoting minority and indigenous peoples’ rights (see:
European Commission, 2001f; 2003a).
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To conclude the present section, we can say that our hypothesis has passed two tests on
the basis of the evidence presented. First, we have seen how the Union’s enactment of
the first basket reflected key elements of its causal beliefs as represented by the
‘modernisation’ thesis, the assumptions of which we have explored in this chapter’s first
section. Close convergence between causal beliefs and actions, with the former
providing a roadmap for the latter, means that we could assess the role of our
independent variables. In this respect we have been able to find broad evidence that
supports the hypothesis that principled beliefs regarding democracy and human rights
were necessary for explaining the outcomes considered. What the evidence does not
give us, however, is a strong basis from which to assert that principled beliefs were
sufficient for explaining EU policy.
Euro-Mediterranean Economics
As we have seen, the EU’s approach was underpinned by a modernisation logic in
which economic progress was regarded as a sine qua non for further improvement of the
regional situation. It was explicitly stated on numerous occasions that the best way to
achieve such economic progress was through the process of structural adjustment.
Furthermore, the EU’s roadmap posited that ‘anchoring’ the MENA states to Europe,
through the construction of a FTZ, would facilitate economic growth favourable to both
sides. The Commission voiced this belief as follows: “The creation of a free trade area
by the target date of 2010, agreed at Barcelona, is an essential instrument to further
approximation and to raise the prosperity level of the Partners” (1997, p. 6). The
Barcelona Declaration thus listed “acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-
economic development” and “reduction in the development gap” as important
objectives for the second basket (Euro-Med Partnership, 1995). This reflected the
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previously identified causal beliefs that the growing gap between north and south was
harmful for Europe and that a programme of reform-driven approximation could fix the
situation. On this basis the nexus of reform/free trade constituted the ‘bread and butter’
of the roadmap put forth by the EU in the Barcelona Declaration.
In the present section we further investigate this vital dimension of the EMP by
tracing developments pertaining to the FTZ, seeking to determine whether the relevant
evidence lends support for our hypothesis regarding the role of causal beliefs as well as
the notion that material interests played a necessary role in driving the EU’s policies.
With regards to the former, we demonstrate that the evidence provides strong hoop
support for the argument that the previously identified causal beliefs constituted a
roadmap for action. In particular, the EU focused on structural adjustment and foreign
investment as drivers of economic progress, which resonates with the causal beliefs that
were expressly stated by European elites. Regarding the role of our independent
variables, we will see that within the European focus on foreign direct investment (FDI)
the evidence points towards an important role being played by economic self-interests,
thus further supporting vital elements of our main hypothesis. In the second part of this
section will discuss some of the limitations of the EU’s approach as well as the policy
reformulations inspired thereby, which sheds further light on the validity/feasibility of
our hypothesis and indicates some important shifts in European policy.
The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone
The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean FTZ was, according to the Commission, “not
only an ambitious objective, but also a necessity for the Mediterranean partners”
(2000b, §I.4; 2000c). This statement can be explained with reference to the belief that
only through economic modernisation and anchoring with Europe the MENA states
would be able to grow economically. The target date for the FTZ was 2010, with a
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primary focus on manufactured (industrial) products. The industrial sphere was, as the
many critiques of the second basket have pointed out, an area in which Europe had a
clear competitive advantage, and the Med states already enjoyed preferential treatment
for industrial goods imported into the EU (see Kébabdjian, 1995; Kébabdjian et. al.,
1994). As a result, ‘shallow’ economic integration (removal of tariff barriers) was not
sufficient to raise standards of living in the south, for the low level of competitiveness
and the already existing system of market access did not permit the Mediterranean
partners to benefit from such an arrangement. The immediate expected consequences of
removal of tariffs and increased competition with European producers included a loss of
fiscal revenue, increased unemployment, and (partial) closure of enterprises. Empirical
research on Egypt, for example, confirmed that liberalisation without correspondent
elimination of regulatory barriers and red tape would lead to a direct welfare loss over
benchmark 1994 levels (Hoekman & Konan, 1999).66
The European Union appears to have been at least partially aware of these
dynamics, for rather than a boost in Mediterranean exports one of the most important
mechanisms through which free trade was assumed to lead to prosperity was foreign
direct investment.67 For example, at the Euro-Med conference for the Ministers of
66 In one IMF report the Med countries’ strategy was accordingly described as a ‘gamble’: “the benefits
… could be substantial, but they are uncertain [and] will come relatively late” (Ghesquiere, 1998, p. 22).
Given the generally penurious situation prevalent amongst the southern states, however, this ‘gamble’
appeared as their only option – as one southern official said: “We are being practical and realistic … At
least at this point we would like to increase our exports to the EU and have some privileges” (cited in
Gomez, 2003, p. 60).
67 FDI represents an important aspect of economic globalisation as it indicates a lasting commitment to a
foreign market. It signifies the act of an investor in one country to gain an interest of at least 10% in an
enterprise located in another country (Eurostat, 2002a, p. 17). This includes ‘vertical’ FDI, where a
company allocates part of its business to a different country, ‘horizontal’ FDI, where production is moved
closer to foreign markets, and the complete or partial purchase of a company through merger or
acquisition.
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Industry (4 October 1998) it was argued that “one of the main vehicles for economic
and social development and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean area of prosperity is
private investment” (Euro-Med Partnership, 1998b). As the EU Presidency put it,
private investment played “a leading role in ensuring the success of the Partnership”
(Euro-Med Partnership, 1998c, §12). Thus, the EU’s modernisation roadmap was
operationalised with a focus on foreign investment; not coincidentally a key element of
the structural adjustment programmes led by the IMF as well as the wider Washington
Consensus.
On the basis of these assumptions there was strong emphasis on eliminating
‘policy induced barriers’ to FDI in the Mediterranean region (see European
Commission, 2000b, §I.4). In this vein it is not surprising to read in one IMF paper that
perhaps the most important contribution of the Euro-Med Association Agreements was
that they helped promote “a business environment that stimulates domestic and foreign
investment” (Ghesquiere, 1998, p. 5).68 In this manner free trade and structural
adjustment were fundamentally intertwined, for ceteris paribus removal of tariffs would
not directly lead to greater investments and therefore not to enhanced prosperity.69 The
68 To square the circle, we can say that the European Parliament agreed with the need to promote FDI, as
illustrated by its later remarks that “it is absolutely vital to carry through all the economic, legal and
administrative reforms needed to create a favourable framework for private investment in all the
Mediterranean partner countries” (European Parliament, 2002, emphasis added).
69 According to one paper published by the IMF it was necessary for the Med partners to meet a wide
range of preconditions to benefit from liberalisation, including macro-economic stability, low reliance on
trade taxes, a low level of external debt, a high initial level of openness to trade and investment, a liberal
regulatory framework and a comprehensive social safety net (Nsouli et. al., 1996). It is difficult to
quantify conclusively the costs of these complex requirements, yet an indication can be found in the case
of Tunisia. Here, the FTZ-related adjustment costs for the labour market were estimated at 4% of GDP
annually, while the upgrading of the Tunisian industry was reported to cost approximately 2% of GDP
(Al-Ahram, 1999). For illustrative purposes: with a GDP of 20.8 billion US dollar (current) in 1999, this
amounted to $1.2 billion, or approximately $132 per inhabitant per year. (This calculation is based on
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ESC thus discussed the “inextricable link” between a free trade area and
“implementation of a concurrent structural reform programme” (Economic and Social
Committee, 1995, §0.5), while according to EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy free
trade without adjustment would be like “a top range Ferrari without engine oil” (Euro-
Med Partnership, 2003a). As the Council said: “The elimination of barriers will foster
economies of scale and greater market opportunities thus encouraging investment”
(Council Decision 96/706/EC, §9, emphasis added). These statements provide strong
evidence regarding the interlocking of EU causal beliefs with then prevalent
assumptions on economic modernisation, giving a candid look into the causal beliefs
that lay at the heart of European thinking on the MENA.
To what extent were these principles and the roadmap they provided reflected in
EU policy? Council Regulation 1488/96 provides a good place to start:
[T]he ultimate establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area is likely
to foster stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. [This] may
involve profound structural reforms, [making it] necessary to support the efforts
that have been or will be undertaken by the Mediterranean partners to reform
their economic, social and administrative structures.
If the EU really acted on the basis of the Barcelona roadmap, it must be possible to find
evidence of support being given for structural adjustment. It is no exaggeration to say
that such evidence is plentiful. In the 1995-1999 period, total EU support for structural
adjustment and economic reform accounted for about 45% of the MEDA budget, with
World Databank information, available at: [http://databank.worldbank.org], accessed 12 November
2011.)
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an additional 29% devoted to ‘socio-economic balance’, including sectoral reform in
health and education (European Commission, 2000b). Special ‘Structural Adjustment
Facilities’ (SAFs) were set up and implemented in five countries (Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, Jordan and Lebanon) with a total budget of €520 million. The European
Investment Bank (EIB) was also strongly involved by providing loans to supplement
MEDA aid (see European Commission, 2001d). These loans were generally focused on
issues such as infrastructure, the private sector (SMEs and the industrial sector), and the
provision of risk capital, i.e.: areas which in the Union’s view offered “the greatest
leverage in order to encourage structural reform and promote private initiatives”
(European Investment Bank, 2005a, p. 4). In interviews with EU officials, reference was
also made to the EIB as one of the key instruments in the Union’s toolbox (Interviews
with EEAS Officials, 3 & 16 June 2014, telephone).
Further to succour this agenda and to prepare the Med partners for free trade,
since 1996 there were biennial meetings between the European and Mediterranean
Ministers of Industry, culminating in their endorsement of a working programme in
Limassol (Cyprus) in June 2000.70 Another policy tool was the Euro-Mediterranean
working group on industrial cooperation, chaired by the DG Enterprise (European
Commission, 2002c; 2002d; 2002e). A number of meetings took place in the period
1995-2000, which mostly led to ‘soft’ initiatives such as exchanges of information,
workshops and awareness-raising. A somewhat tougher approach was allowed by the
fact that the Union’s SAFs did contain some provisions for conditionality, enabling the
70 This plan was focused on issues such as the legal and administrative frameworks, industrial zones and
regional cooperation of economic operators (European Commission, 2000d).
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EU to connect the disbursement of funds to the acceptance and/or achievement of
specific goals of relevance for the FTZ.71
More specifically still, within the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements
we can find concrete evidence of the vital role played by structural adjustment. For
Morocco the AA held that bilateral aid served to “buttress structural adjustment
programmes in the Mediterranean countries” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2000b, §76), and
the first meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council concluded that EU aid was
pursued in the context of “reform of [Morocco’s] structures and the modernisation of its
economy” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2000c). In the case of Jordan it was stated that
“promoting reforms designed to modernise the economy” and addressing “the economic
repercussions” of structural adjustment formed the focus of financial cooperation (Euro-
Med Partnership, 2002c, §86; see also European Commission, 2001c), while Algeria’s
Association Agreement stressed that the parties would work “in particular [with] the
international financial institutions” to shape policy instruments “intended to accompany
development and liberalisation policies for the Algerian economy” (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2005a, §80).
In aggregate, it is our belief that the empirical data considered here could be
considered as strong evidence in support of the hypothesised link between causal beliefs
and foreign policy. In this regard a key part of our hypothesis passes a relatively strong
hoop test – which could perhaps even be considered a smoking gun test. The overlap
between EU and IMF policies was so significant that the Court of Auditors asserted that
71 An important example was the demand that the Jordanian Cabinet accept a European rule on
competition. Yet despite the Cabinet’s acceptance of the requirements regarding competition, the
Jordanian Parliament rejected the law in question in April 2001. Formally, therefore, Jordan had complied
with the conditions laid down by the EU, but the non-implementation of the law rendered conditionality
largely symbolic and mostly focused on “intentions rather than actual results to be obtained” (Court of
Auditors, 2002, III).
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it was unclear what assumptions were “shared with the Bretton Woods Institutions, and
which [were] the Commission’s alone” (2002, III). But what was the role of material
interests and/or principled beliefs in the observed dynamic? Throughout this section, it
has been evident that the Union’s emphasis has been on structural adjustment, with
special attention for foreign investment. It is this aspect of the EMP that has been
highlighted most widely by those asserting that the EU was fundamentally driven by its
economic interests (see Chapter II). After all, the argument that free trade would benefit
the MENA lines up almost perfectly with the European Union’s economic interest in
increased market access. Furthermore, this outlook resonates with wider critiques of
neoliberal economics and the policies promoted by the IMF, which argue that
‘modernisation’ favours foreign investors at the expense of local interests (Klein, 2007;
Harvey, 2005; Duménil & Lévy, 2000). Where does this leave our analysis? Three
points can be made.
Firstly, given the evidence, it is definitely possible to trace a connection between
shared European economic interests, causal beliefs regarding economic modernisation,
and EU foreign policy. Given that this is a requirement for our hypothesis to be valid,
we believe that our notion of material interests playing a necessary role in the EU’s
MENA policy passes the test. After all, it is unlikely that the EU would have formulated
and enacted its roadmap as it did, particularly the focus on FDI, without the presence of
a collective interest in economic gains. In this regard it seems plausible to say that
without an appreciation of the EU’s economic interests it would be difficult to fully
account for the nature of its Mediterranean policy. This was well-understood in the
MENA, or in the words of Egypt’s former representative to the EU, Gamal Bayoumi:
“We are a huge market of 60 million people, and if you want to defend your place in it
then you have to help us” (Financial Times, 1997a).
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Secondly, we must note that the evidence does not wholly support the idea that
economic interests fully account for the EU’s behaviour. No smoking gun evidence is
present in what we have investigated until now that would suggest a deliberate form of
economic exploitation, particularly not given how the EU has defined negative socio-
economic conditions in the south as an area of particular concern. This strengthens our
hypothesis that economic interests are necessary but not sufficient for explaining EU
policy towards the MENA.
Thirdly, despite the valuable insights gained thus far, in order to be able to say
more about the feasibility and validity of our hypothesis it is necessary to consider more
evidence. This is so because, as we will see, over time a number of problems emerged
with the EU’s approach within the second basket. Particularly in its response to these
issues – i.e. within the policy changes engendered by the dynamics of the situation – is
it possible to find further evidence that is of relevance to our hypothesis.
Material Limitations: Where is the Gravy?
As we have seen, the European Union spent a great deal of attention on structural
adjustment. That said, it is also evident that the onus lay primarily on the Mediterranean
partners. As an example, consider the indicative figure of $1.2 billion adjustment costs
per year in Tunisia vs. the bilateral MEDA sum of €593.7m for 1995-2001. It is true
that a further €1.1 billion was given to Tunisia in loans (European Commission, 2002a),
but a gap still persists. In another example, a study on the situation in Morocco found
that 60% of the industrial sector was likely to disappear if free trade was implemented
unless the EU would cover $5.4 billion transition costs (Al-Ahram, 1999). Aid to
Morocco amounted to €916.6m for ’95-2001 with €1.5b in loans (European
Commission, 2002a). Another way to look at the situation is to consider the north-south
deficit of trade, which stood at €18.5 billion in 1995 alone (Eurostat, 2003; see also
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Eurostat 2002b). Finally, it can be said that import duties represented an important
source of income for the partner states (especially Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and
Algeria), which meant that their elimination would bring about a significant loss of
revenue (Schumacher; 2004, p. 14). “In general”, said the Court of Auditors,
highlighting the overall problem, “the amount of [European] support is not based on the
specific cost of the associated reform programme” (2002, III). Lebanon’s Minister of
the Economy, Yassin Jaber, diagnosed the problem early on:
I don’t see a single European company coming here. All I see are delegation
after delegation wanting to sell us their products. Going into a free trade
agreement with the EU means we lose customs revenues, we get little aid and …
the European private sector won’t come here. Europe is very protective on
agriculture and they are superior in industry. So where is the gravy? (Financial
Times, 1997b)
This statement hints at the suspicion that the EU was merely pursuing its economic
interests, sending trade delegations and utilising relative strengths without sufficiently
aiding the MENA states’ reform efforts. The vital question is therefore whether it was
genuinely believed that the EMP could help the Mediterranean partners or whether the
EMP had been a foil for achieving economic gains all along. In resonance with our
hypothesis, the evidence suggests that the answer lies somewhere in the middle.
First of all, we must note that the positive estimations that had underpinned the
Barcelona Declaration did not align with reality as it unfolded over time. As one
Jordanian official said in 1999: “we need two things: money, and economic programs.
We have neither of these in abundance. In fact, we have neither of them at all” (Haaretz,
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1999). Altogether the case of Jordan is useful to further illustrate trends in the region,
given the Hashemite Kingdom’s status as a ‘model reformer’. Commissioner Chris
Patten, for example, described it as “one of our most committed and exceptionally
active Barcelona partners” (Patten, 2002). However, despite the fact that the country’s
SAP had been credited with “alleviating poverty in the second half of the 1990s”
(Zakharova, 2004, p. 102) – and the Kingdom had been called “another success story in
the making” (Jordan Times, 2003) – the positive link between structural adjustment and
wider national prosperity did not bear out (see Harrigan & El-Said, 2010; Harrigan et.
al., 2006). In 1999 unemployment still stood at 14.4% officially – with a reported 27%
as the actual rate (Haaretz, 1999) – and upon concluding a new agreement with the
Kingdom in 2002 even the IMF could not deny that the rate of unemployment remained
stubbornly high (IMF, 2003). While there was some controversy over the exact
incidence and intensity of poverty and unemployment in the country, it was clear that
both had gone up significantly since the late 1980s: according to a dual World Bank-
Islamic Development Bank evaluation the poverty headcount had risen from 3% of the
population in 1987 to around 12% in 2000 (Hassan & Al-Saci, 2004, p. 2). The 2002
‘Poverty Alleviation Strategy’ of the Jordanian government took an even more glum
view, estimating poverty to be between 15 and 30% and rising, but adding that it was
unknown “exactly how many Jordanians are poor today, where they live, or what their
demographic characteristics are” (Jordan Ministry of Social Development, 2002, p. 14).
The apparent crisis was further compounded by riots in the city of Maan from the end of
2002 (International Crisis Group, 2003; Center for Strategic Studies, 2007; 2003), while
an open letter to the Prime Minister called the SAP “an international conspiracy … by
foreigners in the IMF” (cited in Nazzal, 2005, p. 10). 72
72 The Jordanian parliament was suspended between June 2001 and June 2003, and during this period
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It can be said that the Jordanian example was characteristic for the wider
regional situation. The Arab Human Development report of 2003 mentioned the
persistence of “grossly unequal distributions of income, wealth and power”, estimating
that both poverty and income inequality were on the rise throughout the region (UNDP,
2003, p. 139). In addition, it was said that despite a lack of reliable data (as illustrated
by the various accounts of Jordan’s poverty level) there was evidence that “poverty in
Arab countries is more widespread than is usually reported in international data bases,
particularly those compiled by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund”
(ibid., p. 139). On the political level, it was argued that “market-oriented reforms …
have reinforced clientelism, corporatism, and authoritarianism, as well as bringing a
heavy dose of repression” (King, 2003, p. 6). For example, in the case of Egypt –
another vanguard actor as regards reform – there was strong suppression of organised
labour, public services were languishing, and around 20% of the population lived on
less than $2 a day while elites made large profits by buying up state-owned assets far
below their market value (Mitchell, 2002, Ch. 9).
What is the significance of these developments for our argument? Importantly,
what they reveal is how the EU’s causal beliefs regarding the beneficial effects of
economic modernisation were factually inaccurate. Contrary to what had been expected
– yet in resonance with some of the aforementioned critiques of neoliberal economics
(Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Duménil & Lévy, 2000) – reforms had done little to
improve national prosperity (see Schlumberger, 2002; Pfeifer, 2000; Kienle, 1998,
King Abdullah decreed approximately 211 provisional laws and amendments, some of which adversely
affected civil liberties (Amnesty International, 2002), but many of which were supportive of the structural
adjustment process (Choucair, 2006).
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Martinez & Hibou, 1998).73 The associated ambition of raising FDI also remained
unfulfilled: in 2001 the region attracted merely 1.2% of European foreign investment,
while candidate-members and Mercosur accounted for 7 and 8% respectively (Quefelec,
2003).74 From this perspective it could be said that the reality looked more like a ‘lose-
lose’ situation than the win-win scenario that had originally been predicted: neither
European economic interests nor stability in the MENA were significantly boosted by
the EMP.
Under these circumstances the Commission acknowledged the persistent
difficulties in the region:
Today the economic situation of the Mediterranean partners can be summarised
as follows: (i) progress in macroeconomic stabilisation and market
liberalisation has been considerable, though unequal across the region; but (ii)
real GDP growth – mostly in the range of 2 % per annum – has been insufficient
to raise living standards, given the rapid population growth, and has proven
quite volatile since most economies are still agricultural; and (iii)
73 Tacitly, the problem was acknowledged in the World Bank’s shifting orientation towards public
investment in infrastructure, health and education (see e.g. Hassan & Al-Saci, 2004).
74 Investment in the Mediterranean partners amounted to less than 2% of total extra-EU FDI flows over
the period 1994-2001 (which was, however, equivalent to about twice the United States’ investment in the
Maghreb and the Mashriq). This situation prompted FEMISE to state in one of its reports that that “the
1990s will remain a decade of missed opportunities for the [Mediterranean partners], despite the huge
growth in long-term investment toward developing or emerging countries” (2004, p. 10). Major problems
were encountered in exactly those aspects which the SAPs aimed to address – as Joffé has argued, there
were “problems of comparative advantage and returns, besides issues of corruption and governance”
(2005, pp. 41-42).  In addition it could be said that the uncertain political situation made investment
unattractive (FEMISE, 2004, p. 10).
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unemployment, ranging from 15 to 20 %, is especially acute among the young
and educated, and in urban areas. (2001d, p. 10)
Our analysis is further corroborated by some of the conclusions that were reached by the
ESC, which said that the weaknesses of the EMP were largely due to “overestimating
the part which the Euromed partnership could play in the social development of the
MPCs” (Economic and Social Committee, 2002, §3.5). It thus became increasingly
clear that the assumptions upon which EU policy was based needed rethinking. As the
European Parliament argued: “[I]n view of the considerable international debate
concerning the nature of IMF and World Bank conditionality, [reference] to
arrangements with the IMF should not be understood to prejudice or preclude the
adoption by the EU of its own view on the structural reforms to be undertaken by the
recipient country” (European Parliament, 2004a, §8d). Furthermore, in a Q&A with
Marc Otte, former EU special representative to the Middle-East Peace Process (3
December 2010, London), as well as in some of our interviews with officials now
working for the EEAS (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 3 & 16 June 2014, telephone),
it was admitted that the EU had relied too much on the views of especially the IMF in
the second basket. However, none of the persons interviewed for this thesis would go so
far as to say that the EU’s approach had been wrong: rather it was described as not
broad enough and insufficiently supported. This suggests that the core set of beliefs that
lay at the basis of the EU’s approach – emphasising liberalisation and private market
mechanisms – has retained its significance, with some important evolutions in its scope
and operationalisation (see below and the following chapters).
In the light of the above the EU’s efforts to respond to the challenge are
instructive. First of all, as the problem of funding became increasingly apparent over the
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course of MEDA I, the sum was raised to €5.35 billion in MEDA II – representing a
14% increase (Council Regulation 2698/2000). Obviously this did not fundamentally
resolve the deeper financial issues or the lack of FDI in the region, which is why it was
also decided to increase lending to the south. This led to the creation of the Facility for
Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), managed by the European
Investment Bank. It was described by the European Parliament as an “effective
instrument with limited cost to the general budget of the Community” (2004a, D). The
creation of the FEMIP instrument, however, had been a particularly difficult process,
symbolising an important locus of tension within the European Union. While, similar to
the way in which transition in eastern Europe was financed with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, certain member states and the Commission supported
the creation of a full EIB subsidiary for the Mediterranean (including Spain, France,
Italy and Portugal), others (Germany, Netherlands, UK) were opposed to this idea
because it would require them to allocate more resources to the MENA. The FEMIP,
which relied on voluntary contributions from the member states, emerged as a
compromise between these camps. It was launched at the Euro-Med conference in
Valencia on 22-23 April 2002 (Knio, 2010).75
The FEMIP exposed fissures within the European Union, primarily with regards
to the question of what the EU’s economic interests were. Initially, the focus of the
EMP on FDI sidestepped some of the difficult areas. In response to the shortcomings of
75 Special priority was awarded to projects which were seen as contributing to a favourable climate for
private investment; e.g. infrastructure, transport and energy, but also healthcare, education and the
environment (European Investment Bank, 2005b; 2004). On balance, the financial sector, energy and
infrastructure received the most funding in the first years of the programme’s operations, with Turkey,
Tunisia and Egypt as the main beneficiaries (European Investment Bank, 2005b, pp 22-23). The overall
aim, it was said, was to double the volume of foreign investment in the region (European Investment
Bank, 2005c, p. 4).
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the first five years of the EMP, there were signs pointing to a mild revision of certain
causal beliefs on the basis of what had proven to be in need of support and what was
politically feasible, while funding was increased in order to better support reform. But
rather than seeking market penetration in a forceful manner by investing in the region,
as a sophisticated realist conceptualisation of the EU might expect (e.g. García, 2013),
shared economic interests seem to have been quite narrow. As a result, change was
more incremental than it could have been had there been strong agreement between the
EU member states. Whilst this does not falsify our hypothesis regarding the role of
economic interests, it does urge us to place a caveat as there appeared to be a lack of
consensus on how exactly EU economic interests were best served. In part the influence
of economic interests thus appears as ‘negative’, inhibiting change rather than
instigating it. This finding serves as an important addendum to our hypothesis, and it
was strongly emphasised by one of our high-level interviewees (Interview with EEAS
Official, 3 June 2014, telephone).
Another important example of the dynamic described above could be observed
in the sphere of agricultural liberalisation. This had not been a focus area initially, but
liberalisation of the EU market – as referred to in the Barcelona Declaration – was
expected to have notable ameliorating effects on the incidence of poverty in the
Mediterranean (Belhaj Hassine & Kandil, 2009; Tsakiridou et. al., 2009). However, a
range of ongoing protectionist practices and market distortions could be identified, and
they were most strongly supported by the southern European states whose products
competed directly with MENA exports (see EU-MED AGPOL, 2007).76 This rather
76 Generally speaking, protections consisted of market access restrictions (tariffs and tariff rate quotas,
entry prices, and seasonal windows applicable to entry prices or tariffs), export subsidies (used to regulate
supply on the European market), and domestic support (direct payments to EU farmers, often unrelated to
production volume) (Kee et. al. 2009; 2006). It is also notable that the EU’s MFN tariffs on agriculture
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exclusivist stance resonates with a ‘defensive’ realist logic of protecting extant wealth
and interests vis-à-vis non-European competitors, suggesting a status quo orientation
rather than one of ‘imperialism’. In this manner it points towards the significance of
material interests, but mostly as a negative ‘driver’ rather than one instigating action.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in this light, in concluding the Association Agreements a
notable source of discord was encountered over the agricultural liberalisation promised
by the Barcelona Declaration. There was friction over quotas on olive oil in the case of
Tunisia (Euro-Med Partnership, 1998a), while for Morocco the agreement was delayed
because of member states’ objections to imports of canned sardines, citrus products, cut
flowers and potatoes.77 These tensions and the accordant implications for the AAs were
not anomalistic: there was an average ratification period of three years, described by the
Economic and Social Committee as “almost humiliating for the South” (2002, §4.1.2).
This delayed the completion of the FTZ beyond the 2010 goal while the whole
procedure was said to be “more lengthy” and “much more difficult than expected”
(ibid., §4.1.1 & §2.7).78 To refer back to Chapter II, this signalled a degree of tension
have been much higher than their counterparts in manufactured goods, with averages of 18-28% vs. 3%
(Emlinger et. al., 2008).
77 Another important site of debate was that of the fisheries agreements. When, for example, an agreement
between the EU and Morocco failed because of the latter’s insistence on greater compensation for fishing
in its waters, Spanish and Portuguese MEPs argued that aid to Morocco should be cut. The failure to
come to an understanding was said to have had “serious economic and social implications for fishermen
and the economy as a whole in Portugal and Spain”, in response to which the Commission was reminded
of its duty, “first and foremost, to EU citizens, whose welfare has, in this particular case, been seriously
undermined” (Written Question E1228/01; see also Written Question E2715/01).
78 Yet even after ratification of the AAs the problem could be said to persist. For example, the agreement
with Jordan stated that the parties “shall gradually implement greater liberalisation of their reciprocal
trade in agricultural products”, but made no clear reference to measurable future changes (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2002c, §15). Cut flowers, for example, were subsequently granted a tariff quota of 100
tonnes, which was an increase from the approximately 50 tonnes maintained in the 1990s (see Council
Regulation 2604/93). However, under the terms of an exchange of letters between the Community and
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between absolute and relative interests in EFP. Both were present in the EMP, but this
was not a productive relationship.
To conclude, we have seen how the European Union’s actions aligned closely
with the causal beliefs that we have identified. Furthermore, as these causal beliefs and
the accordant policies were consistent with what has been hypothesised as shared
European economic interests, our tracing of EU policy within the second basket allows
us to state that our hypothesis has passed the tests we set out to undertake. After all, it
would be extremely difficult to make sense of EU behaviour within the second basket
without taking into account its economic interests, as represented by the ambition to
open up Mediterranean markets for European investment. While it is difficult to find a
‘smoking gun’ in this instance, we have considered a wide range of evidence and sought
to identify patterns and recurring commonalities, which together provide a good hoop
test for important elements of our hypothesis.
However, as the second part of this section has shown, the reality of Euro-Med
relations has known a variety of complexities that are not easily reflected in abstract
theorising. Within the fretting over the FEMIP instrument as well as the EU’s
reluctance to offer agricultural liberalisation, the significance of economic interests is
patently visible. Rather than engendering an assertive foreign policy, however, the
evidence suggests a push-and-pull effect between divergent intra-European economic
interests. The initially limited focus on FDI within the second basket could be explained
Jordan tariff preferences were conditional on Jordanian prices not falling below 85% of the Community
price level, thus limiting Jordan’s competitive advantage (European Community, 2002). For many other
products, e.g. garlic, tomatoes, beans, aubergines and oranges, the Union reserved the right to revise tariff
quotas if it was found that a product “threatens to cause difficulties on the Community market” (Euro-
Med Partnership, 2002c, Protocol 1, §5). These measures were applied to other Med countries as well,
and only “mitigated results” could thus be registered as regards agricultural liberalisation (European
Commission, 2005a). In terms of agricultural tariff headings there was a relatively low average of 39%
(17% MFN) liberalisation on the EU side vs. 9% (4% MFN) in the Mediterranean (ibid.).
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from this perspective as it appears to have been a compromise between European
member states based on their most strongly shared interest. In this manner we have shed
some light on the interlinkage between material interests, causal beliefs and EU policy.
Yet we must add the caveat that the influence of material interests has also been of a
more ‘negative’ sort, impelling maintenance of elements of the status-quo rather than
driving an ‘imperious’ foreign policy. Thus, whilst our hypothesis passes the tests, when
discussing ‘European interests’ a degree of sensitivity to internal dynamics and the
distinction between relative and absolute gains is in order.
Table 6: The EMP and Economic Interests
EU problem
definition




Structural adjustment and removal of non-tariff barrier to
trade, focus on FDI, EU support for SAPs




Focus in MEDA, Association Agreements and Structural
Adjustment Facilities on FDI, strong congruence between
structural adjustment and EU economic interests (hoop test
passed)
Challenges Lack of consensus on how EU economic interests were best
served: tension between relative and absolute gains within EU,
disconnect between funding and needs of partners,
FEMIP/agricultural issues
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Actual outcomes Structural adjustment did not resolve instability, poverty and
unemployment, EU investment did not significantly increase
Conclusion Whilst the EU overestimated the role that the EMP could play
in the economic development of the MENA partners, the
evidence provides relatively strong support for the
hypothesised role of material interests in EU policies towards
the south
Decentralised Cooperation, Justice and Home Affairs
The third and final basket of the Barcelona Process was the ‘partnership in social,
cultural and human affairs’. This basket included a remarkably diverse range of issues,
including culture, human resources and civil society. There was also attention for issues
such as the reduction of migratory pressures, cooperation to prevent terrorism, and
fighting against drug trafficking and international crime.
In the current section we investigate the third basket in light of the EU’s causal
beliefs and the interests/principled beliefs reflected therein, as necessitated by our
hypothesis-testing approach. We find that there were two main areas of action:
decentralised cooperation and justice and home affairs (JHA). Our data suggests that for
the time period considered in this chapter decentralised cooperation was a relatively
insignificant element of the EMP. This leads us to the conclusion that as evidence for
wider theoretical claims it provides a relatively weak basis. Thus, no strong argument
could be made, as the evidence pertaining to decentralised cooperation and cultural
initiatives appears as inconclusive for supporting a particular conceptualisation of EFP.
For this reason we point to the necessity to consider further data in our subsequent
chapters.
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Secondly we consider the EU’s actions within the sphere of JHA. Actions within
this field were initially limited as well, but a (potential) trend can be identified. It
consisted of increasingly restrictive measures, which are placed in this section in the
context of the difficulties in the second basket of the EMP and the overall issues within
the reformative approach that were experienced. This poses a challenge to our
hypothesis as it points to an intervening variable in the form of an exclusivist stance on
migration, running contrary to the more extensively discussed European ambition to
undercut spillovers of MENA instability by addressing the root causes. However, given
the still limited range of EU actions in this field during the period 1995-2003 we are
cautious in drawing wider conclusions here, pointing again to the need for further
attention for this issue in our subsequent chapters.
Decentralised Cooperation, Culture and Mutual Understanding
Cultural and human cooperation was described in the Barcelona Declaration as “an
essential factor in bringing [the participants’] peoples closer, promoting understanding
between them and improving their perception of each other” (Euro-Med Partnership,
1995). In this vein it was stressed that culture should be seen as “a source of mutual
enrichment” and there was mention of matters such as inter-cultural and inter-religious
dialogue, the role of the media, and cultural education and exchange (ibid.). These
spheres of action belong to the category of decentralised cooperation, where the
essential aim could be said to be the reorientation of people’s beliefs about ‘the other’
by bringing different groups in contact with one another. It is a good example of the
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kind of ‘ground-up’ socialisation that is often highlighted by constructivists (Attinà,
2003).79
If decentralised cooperation was indeed a strong locus of action, this might
highlight some aspects of EU policy that have until now not been addressed extensively
in this thesis. However, the Union’s track record for the first years of the EMP points to
a rather serious set of problems in the third basket. In essence decentralised activities in
the Barcelona Process marked a continuation of the MED programmes that had been
initiated under the RMP. These programmes consisted of a series of actions undertaken
in local government (MED-Urbs); migration (Med-Migration); higher education (MED-
Campus); media (MED-Media); research (MED-Avicenne); and business (MED-
Invest). Between 1992 and 1995 about 470 networks had been funded with a total of
€67m (European Commission, 1998c). Yet the programmes became a source of great
controversy when a Court of Auditors report identified what it called “serious
irregularities and weaknesses in the financial management of implementation” (Court of
Auditors, 1996, §4). The chief problem pertained to the Commission’s subcontracting
of management and monitoring of the programmes to an organisation called ‘Agency
for Trans-Mediterranean Networks’ as well as to a number of Technical Assistance
Bureaus (usually consulting firms). Specifically, the Court found that there was no legal
basis for the Commission’s delegation of responsibilities to third bodies, that sound
financial management within the funded networks was largely absent, and that there had
been serious conflicts of interest arising from duplicate roles played by external
consultants in both managing and monitoring the programmes. In response to these
rather damning findings funds for the MED programmes were frozen “in order to ensure
79 One author stresses the “potential of cultural diplomacy and exchanges to increase understanding,
shatter stereotypes, and change the way people view each other, which ultimately can lead to changes in
the way governments interact” (Schneider, 2009, p. 276; see also Panebianco, 2005).
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the transparency and efficiency of the management system”, as the Commission put it in
response to questions from irritated MEPs (e.g. Written Question 1015/97).80
In addition to these severe bureaucratic difficulties we may mention some more
conceptual concerns regarding the effectiveness of the programmes. It must be
acknowledged here that it is, in essence, impossible to isolate the independent effects of
actions such as student exchanges or local government dialogues, making it difficult to
conclusively reach a conclusion. As mentioned by the Court of Auditors (1996, §110),
measuring the impacts of the MED programmes was complicated because “the volume
of resources devoted to these actions in their respective sectors is limited, and isolating
the impact of these measures from other factors affecting them is often not feasible”. In
addition, “some of the actions … have no concrete output”, while others “form part of a
long-term process designed to influence trends and change mentalities” (ibid.).
However, one of the Court’s findings was that most projects in e.g. MED Urbs were
proposed by European bodies, as a result of which they were “better suited to the
concerns of northern cities than to the priority needs of those in the south” (ibid., §83).
The Committee of the Regions furthermore stated that programmes “often go no further
than ‘inter-city diplomacy’” and that no provision was made “for actually implementing
the projects devised” (Committee of the Regions, 1998, §3.6). In this light it is clear that
altogether a deep crisis existed in the sphere of decentralised cooperation, where activity
was paralysed due to mismanagement whilst broader questions regarding the nature of
European support were being raised. This makes it highly difficult to evaluate the
80 The European Parliament described the state of affairs as follows: “Commission officials contributed to
the creation and operation of a system which made proper management of Community funds impossible,
which led to additional costs and significant anomalies and consequently discredited and paralysed a
major area of Community Mediterranean policy over a number of years” (European Parliament, 1998a,
P).
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relationship of the third basket to the causal beliefs and independent variables
highlighted in our hypothesis, given that little substantive evidence could be found of
significant activity (which was frozen) or the deeper rationale.
As a result of this situation, action within the relevant fields of the third basket
consisted primarily of workshops, summits and dialogues (see Euro-Med Partnership,
1997, Annex III). More specifically, there had been summits of the Economic and
Social Councils (€1.3m MEDA), there was the annual Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum
where civil society organisations from Europe and the MENA could meet and give
recommendations to the Euro-Med governments (€2m MEDA), and there were the
bilateral cultural activities of the Commission’s delegations (€10m MEDA) (European
Commission, 2002a). Furthermore, still in the field of culture but not ‘decentralised’,
the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Culture had regular meetings, focusing primarily
on the broader strategy to be followed in their field. At their meeting in Rhodes in
September 1998, for example, the ministers endorsed the so-called ‘Stockholm
Conclusions’ (based on the UNESCO Stockholm Conference of 30 March-2 April
1998) emphasising the interdependence of sustainable development and culture (Euro-
Med Partnership, 1998d).
Against this still hamstrung backdrop, after repeated calls for the re-launch of
the MED programmes three of them were reinstated in 1998 (European Commission,
1998c). First was Euromed Heritage. It was a continuation of MED Urbs, with the goal
of contributing to “increase the capacity of Mediterranean countries to manage and
develop their cultural heritage” (European Commission, 2001e, §3) – the allocated
budget was initially €17.2m (European Commission, 2002a, p. 68). Second, the Euro-
Med Youth programme was founded in 1999 (following MED Campus, with funding of
€6m from the MEDA instrument) with the aim of improving “mutual comprehension
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and cohesion between young people across the Mediterranean basin” (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2006a, p. 15). In practice this encompassed support for training courses,
student exchanges, dissemination of information and the organisation of activities like
summer camps.81 Lastly, the audio-visual sector (previously MED Media) was
identified as a sphere of potentially fruitful decentralised cooperation. Euromed
Audiovisual (€20m MEDA) was initiated in 2000 in this vein so as to e.g. develop
media in the southern Mediterranean, promote exchange between European and
Mediterranean producers and encourage the distribution of films from Europe and the
partner states (ibid.). Altogether these three programmes were the most concrete
expression of decentralised cooperation during the period considered in this chapter,
amounting to approximately 0.8% of the MEDA I budget for the first phase of the
programmes.
Based on the process traced above it is possible to make two key observations.
First of all, it is clear that with 0.8% of the MEDA I budget, decentralised cooperation
was not a priority area of the EMP. This underscores how it does not reflect the balance
of EU policy within the EMP accurately to focus on the third basket at the expense of
political and especially economic dynamics. Yet we must distinguish between structural
and incidental causes for the observed dearth of initiatives and funding, and in this
regard it is clear that the bureaucratic problems experienced in the MED programmes,
which paralysed the field of decentralised cooperation, were of an incidental nature.
This indicates that as evidence for testing our hypothesis the problems analysed above
do not provide the most solid ground. However, as a second point, this does not mean
that the processes within the third basket that have been discussed until now are
81 In a similar vein the TEMPUS programme for cooperation in higher education was extended to the
Mediterranean in 2002.
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analytically useless. Despite the problems and complications that we have highlighted,
the structural element that can be identified consists of a mild but constant push to
include decentralised cooperation in the EMP. The MED programmes scandal did not
lead to abandonment of the third basket, and there were some modest achievements
such as the endorsement of the Stockholm Conclusions. Thus, decentralised and cultural
cooperation formed a relatively minor yet visible part of the EMP. Can this complex
balance be accommodated by our hypothesis?
In our view, given the limited range of action undertaken in the period under
consideration and the lack of a substantively defined rationale, the evidence is
inconclusive for testing our hypothesis. On the one hand there were hints at a degree of
instrumentalism in light of the wider modernisation agenda, which could be perceived
as providing support for our perspective. For example, references to ‘social flanking
measures’ (Euro-Med Partnership, 1999, §2) might be viewed in this manner. On the
other hand, the EU also expressed its ambition to mitigate the perception that “the
partnership is solely about creating a free-trade area” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2003b,
§2.2), which might indicate a more independent role for cultural cooperation. In this
vein Michelle Pace has concluded that “what seems to be missing is the connection
between [third basket] programmes and activities under the first and second baskets”
(2005, p. 65). On this basis it is possible to envision a variety of explanations for the
EU’s actions, but it is difficult to find strong evidence to support particular theoretical
claims given the fact that the third basket was clearly still a ‘work in progress’. We will
therefore return to this topic in Chapter IV to further consider whether it is possible to
find supporting or challenging evidence for our hypothesis.
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Of Bridges and Walls
The second core topic covered in the third basket was cooperation on issues pertaining
to justice and home affairs. In this light, the theme of the 2003 Euro-Mediterranean civil
forum in Naples (28-30 November) was ‘building bridges, not walls’ (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2003c). With such a topic one of the forum’s conclusions was striking in its
irony (ibid., §17):
[W]e ask the governments of the EMP to end the current visa policies, and other
impediments of free movement, that for many years have systematically
complicated EuroMed civil society meetings, including the one in Naples,
harassing civil society actors, affecting their dignity or simply impeding them to
meet.
The difficulties experienced by civil society actors attempting to attend the 2003
conference touched upon a wider process in the sphere of migration. The thrust of the
Union’s policies here has increasingly been to stop immigration in the short run rather
than to provide a long-term solution. In some ways this belied the more progressive or
reformative vision of the EMP, and as we will see in this section as well as in Chapter
IV it poses some challenges to the sufficiency of our independent variables to explain
the EU’s policies.
However, to begin we must note that at the start of the EMP there was no
comprehensive common European asylum and migration policy. Each member state had
its own policy, regulated somewhat by the Schengen agreement. Generally speaking
these bilateral policies converged towards an increasingly restrictive approach (Bade,
2004). Especially important for the Mediterranean were the activities of the southern
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member states who had borders with the Maghreb and Mashriq, and by the second half
of the 1990s their approaches shared some important common characteristics (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2004):
 Required pre-entry authorisation in foreign consulate with guaranteed job
(regulated by labour ministry quotas);
 One or two year permits;
 Continuous employment required to renew permits;
 Restriction of many previously held legal rights;
 Aggressive policing and other measures to detect illegal immigrants;
 More secure borders;
 More reliance on readmission agreements with sending and transit countries.
Particularly the latter instrument, the readmission agreements, provided an important
tool for the (southern) European countries. The purpose of a readmission agreement is
to facilitate the (forcible) return of an illegally present individual (irrespective of their
nationality) to a sending or transit country. This can be regulated by formal legal
accords as well as private understandings – a relevant example of the ‘formal’ kind is
the Spanish-Moroccan provisional agreement of February 1992, while an ‘informal’
example is the French-Algerian exchange of letters for 1984-1994. Since the start of the
EMP several of these bilateral agreements were concluded.82 What is striking is that this
kind of deal essentially constitutes an ‘unbalanced reciprocity’ in which the receiving
state has no inherent interest in taking migrants back in (Cassarino, 2010, p. 34).
82 For a complete list of readmission agreements with third states see
[http://www.mirem.eu/datasets/agreements/index], accessed 6 June 2011.
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Consequently the practice of readmission is typically accompanied by a policy of sticks
and carrots, and in this regard the workers quotas (e.g. for seasonal labour) played an
important role. Sometimes these quotas were used to reward partners, but their usage
also included punishment of states found to be uncooperative, which is what Italy did
vis-à-vis Morocco in 2001 (see European Commission, 2004c, §1.4). Altogether this
modus operandi corresponds to the kind of behaviour expected from a realist
perspective, in which relative power is mobilised in order to secure zero-sum interests
and to uphold the “impermeable external shell” (Rumford, 2006, p. 160) of ‘fortress
Europe’ in defence of extant wealth (Driessen, 1996). As said, however, there was not
yet a common European policy based upon such parameters.
The Treaty of Amsterdam granted the Community competences in the field of
immigration. Before the treaty’s entry into force (1 May 1999) some groundwork was
laid with the creation of a High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration
(HLWG) in December 1998, which drafted a number of action plans, including one for
Morocco (European Council, 1999a). Rhetorical emphasis was placed on the ‘root
causes’ of immigration, but the Morocco action plan’s most distinctive tangible
recommendations were to promote “measures aimed at assuring the effective
implementation of existing readmission agreements” and to encourage “EU/EC
cooperation with Morocco to deal with the return of Moroccan nationals who have
entered the territory of the European Union illegally” (ibid., p. 15 & 19). It can be said
that this focus on return reflected a consensus amongst the key European institutions.83
83 The evidence for this statement is as follows. In 1998 the European Parliament argued for the
negotiation of “specific measures for the readmission and integration of illegal immigrants who have been
refused the right of entry” (European Parliament, 1998b, §7). A special meeting of the European Council
in Tampere emphasised the inclusion of “readmission agreements or … standard clauses in other
agreements between the European Community and relevant third countries or groups of countries”
(European Council, 1999b, §27). In a subsequent Communication the Commission also highlighted
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This appears as somewhat of a deviation from the ambition to address the root causes of
migratory pressures by relieving economic problems, which was the chief route of the
‘modernisation’ causal beliefs. Thus, whilst the concern with immigration was nothing
new, a significantly reactive European stance would signal a more ‘defensive’ policy
than what is suggested by our hypothesis.
On the basis of the abovementioned processes the notion of readmission came to
play a role of sorts in the Barcelona Process. Building on the Barcelona Declaration’s
mentioning of the partner states’ ‘responsibility for readmission’, the topic was included
in the Association Agreements that were drawn up after the Amsterdam Treaty.84
Justice and home affairs was also explicitly put forward in the Council’s Common
Strategy of 2000 (see European Council, 2000, §22). In the case of Morocco, whose AA
did not contain the post-Amsterdam readmission clauses, the Council authorised the
Commission to negotiate an agreement in September 2000. Morocco, however, objected
to an approach which it thought “was still excessively dominated by the security aspect”
instead of long-term socio-economic factors such as those mentioned in the Common
Strategy (High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 2000, §20). Indeed, it
was said that, despite the mentioning of measures such as “reducing migratory pressure
… by improving living conditions, creating jobs and developing training” (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2000b, §71.1(a)), the stance of the EU had the effect of making third
countries “feel that they are the target of unilateral policy by the Union focusing on
readmission agreements, identifying them as “the most valuable instrument” to facilitate return (European
Commission, 2000f, §2.4; see also Schieffer, 2003).
84 In the case of e.g. Lebanon it said that the country “agrees to readmit any of its nationals illegally
present on the territory of a Member State, upon request by the latter and without further formalities once
such persons have been positively identified as such” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2006b, §68.1(b)).
Additionally, it was stated that there would be further negotiations on the conclusion of bilateral
agreements including the option of “the readmission of third country nationals” (ibid., §69.1).
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repressive action” (High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 2000, §53).
Public opinion in the south viewed with scepticism a Europe that was “always giving
lessons about openness, democracy and human rights” but was now “‘slamming’ the
doors in the face of the poor [and] imposing European will on a small and weak
country” (El Arbi, 2003, p. 385).
The above critiques resonate with the (realist) idea that the unification of Europe
would only draw a new dividing line between another ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Costalli, 2009).
But how do the observed dynamics bear upon our hypothesis? The EU had posited
earlier that the best way to achieve its goals in the MENA lay with the promotion of
domestic change in the partner states and with economic integration with Europe. Given
that this was a long-term roadmap, with only limited results in the first five years, the
strengthened JHA agenda could be considered as somewhat deviating from the thrust of
the EMP. In turn, this suggests that a ‘learning process’ that promoted short-term
concerns to the fore might have been present. Yet given that common policy on JHA
was still in its infancy, the fact that we can observe some movement in this direction
does not in itself provide strong evidence to make wider claims. Thus, it is important to
consider the relevance and weight of JHA activities relative to other policies under the
EMP in order to be able to adjudge their significance vis-à-vis our hypothesis.
In this vein it can be observed that the events of 9/11 had a reinforcing effect on
exclusionary practices in the field of migration. Though it is true that, in the words of
Richard Youngs, “refinement rather than rupture was the maxim guiding European
reaction to 9/11” (2006a, p. 222; see also Gillespie, 2003), it is possible to identify
certain impacts on the third basket after the 2001 terror attacks. An extraordinary EU
Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting on 20 September 2001 focused exclusively
on anti-terrorism measures (for more on this see Chapter IV), highlighting Europe’s
146
external borders as one of four important areas of cooperation (European Council,
2001).85 Further underlining the EU’s increasing prioritisation of migration were factors
such as the creation of a specific budget line (B7-667) to support action in countries of
origin and transit, the creation of the ARGO programme for administrative cooperation
on migration, and the emphasis on migration-based conditionality by the Seville
European Council. As was stated: “Insufficient cooperation by a country could hamper
the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union” (European
Council, 2002a, §35; this view was echoed by the European Commission, 2002f).
For Euro-Med relations the increasing emphasis on migration contributed the
creation of a separate JHA basket for the EMP at the April 2002 Valencia ministerial
meeting, following preparations by senior officials since the Marseille Conference of
November 2000 (Bicchi, 2006, pp. 297-298). It would be focused on “combating drugs,
organised crime and terrorism” and “cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to …
migrants, migration and movements of persons” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2002, §5). This
could be regarded as the culmination of a process wherein issues pertaining to JHA
attracted increasing attention in EFP. Significantly, the tenor of these policies was one
of primarily repressive rather than fundamentally reformative measures, somewhat in
contrast to the earlier causal belief in MENA reform as the best way to resolve the
problems. As the Economic and Social Committee remarked: “clearly, the EU is
interested in securing its external borders” (2003, §3.2). Altogether this hints at the
possibility that that a revision of sorts took place with respect to the EU’s causal beliefs,
with additional focus being placed on short-term measures to fill the gaps left by the
difficult process of reform in the MENA. In this vein it could be envisioned that the
85 The Council (2001) called for, inter alia, a strengthening of controls at borders (§24); “more systematic
checking of identity papers” (§25); and “maximum rigour” in the implementation of visa policies (§26).
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disappointing results of the EMP in terms of stabilising the MENA created what could
be called a short-term side track to deal with the more immediate issues in the field of
JHA. It should be stressed here that we must be cautious in interpreting causal beliefs
from policies in an ex post facto manner (given that this makes it difficult to falsify the
relevant elements of our hypothesis). Also, due to the relative novelty of the policies
considered many of the changes took place on an intra-European or declaratory level,
without significant implementation in the reality of Euro-Med relations other than
through the revised AAs. Therefore, it can be said at this point that developments in
what was now the fourth basket pointed to a development that potentially challenges
certain elements of our hypothesis, appearing more short-term and repressive than what
is suggested by our independent variables, but as this dynamic had not yet fully taken
shape we will return to the topic of JHA in Chapter IV.
To conclude the current section it is useful to reiterate our two main findings
with respect to the third basket of the EMP. Firstly, due to the problems encountered
within the field of decentralised/cultural cooperation, it is difficult to point to
overbearing trends in support of a particular theoretical perspective. Consequently we
have argued that in relation to our hypothesis the evidence has been indecisive and that
further evidence is required to say more about how the relevant field of action bears
upon our conceptualisation of EFP. Secondly, actions undertaken within the sphere of
JHA evince a somewhat clearer but not yet decisive direction. From our theoretical
perspective this development could be explained in terms of refinement of causal beliefs
in light of disappointing outcomes. Significantly, it has been more difficult to connect
this move to our independent variables, but we have emphasised that more evidence is
needed to solidify our analysis. The Union’s agenda on particularly immigration might
give rise to a realist argumentation on the basis of a ‘fortress Europe’ understanding of
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EFP, but on balance the EU’s actions until 2003 have not been strong or extensive
enough to support such an interpretation conclusively. The EU’s policies in the third
and fourth baskets thus do not legitimate far-going conclusions, serving primarily as
pointers for the following chapters.
















Expected outcomes Ambiguous Cooperation from MENA states
on JHA leading to stronger EU










Common policy relatively novel
in this field
Actual outcomes Ambiguous No clear results observed
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Conclusion Results inconclusive for
hypothesis
Evidence suggests potential shift
in EU causal beliefs, but
evidential basis needs to be
broadened
Conclusion
In this chapter we have made an effort to answer the first three questions/tests that were
outlined to analyse our hypothesis. This was done one the basis of evidence pertaining
chiefly to the 1995-2003 period, encapsulating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and
the EU’s policies undertaken in its context. Before we proceed with our analysis in the
next chapter it is useful to reiterate our main findings and to begin to address the fourth
question that was posited to test our hypothesis. In this light we will also be able to
discuss some of the advantages and challenges experienced in our analysis vis-à-vis the
existing literature.
To begin, we have assessed the nature of the EU’s causal beliefs with regards to
the Mediterranean region. Since our hypothesis posits that such beliefs serve as a
roadmap for foreign policy it was important to gain an understanding of them and to test
whether this roadmap was indeed reflected in Europe’s collective policies. Based on our
consideration of a broad range of evidence from the years immediately preceding the
EMP, it has become evident that two core ideas emerged in European thinking on the
MENA. First was the causal belief that persistent social and economic problems in the
south would have detrimental effects on Europe, which meant that certain
Mediterranean problems came to be seen as (partially) European problems too. In
concert with this view, the second causal belief that we have identified prescribed what
measures needed to be taken to improve the situation of the MENA states. The solution
that was suggested was rooted in the prevalent politico-economic theories and processes
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underpinning the structural adjustment processes under way in many of the southern
states, with some attention for political (democratic) reform. Evidence in support of this
reading consists of the manifold statements made by European leaders as well as
concrete endorsements of the ‘modernisation’ process put forward by the EU. These
beliefs were synthesised in the Barcelona Declaration, which we have regarded as a
critical juncture, putting forward a comprehensive vision for future policy based upon
an extensive set of causal beliefs.
For our hypothesis to be valid and to pass a (hoop) test, it was important to find
support for our causal mechanism (causal beliefs as a roadmap) in the form of
convergence between causal beliefs and actions. In this regard we have concluded that
particularly in the first two baskets of the EMP it is possible to find strong evidence of
behaviour consistent with the identified causal beliefs. The EU followed its programme
of privileging economic modernisation, based upon market principles with a heavy
emphasis on FDI, whilst paying some attention to political reform. Despite the very
broad nature of the EMP, therefore, at its core the programme aligned very closely with
the priorities and principles highlighted in the EU’s previously formed causal beliefs.
This has provided us with mostly hoop evidence to support our hypothesis, given that it
was difficult to pinpoint more decisive smoking gun tests. Another way to put it would
be to say that we have been unable to conclusively falsify the notion that causal beliefs
provide a roadmap for the EU’s policies, which means that our hypothesis retains its
credibility. While some complications were encountered in the third basket’s sphere of
decentralised cooperation, extraordinary circumstances (bureaucratic failure) and its
ongoing development have led us to consider it as insufficient for building a convincing
case either for or against our hypothesis. JHA activities posed a more significant
potential challenge in terms of their deviation from the EU’s reformative, integrative
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stance, but it is possible to envision this revision as a result of disappointing outcomes
and emergent political pressures, which will be further analysed in Chapter IV. In this
light it can be said that the ‘causal beliefs as roadmaps’ element of our hypothesis
appears as feasible, passing the hoop test.
The third question that we have addressed is whether economic gains and
principled beliefs regarding democracy and human rights played a necessary role in the
EU’s roadmap/policies. To rephrase this: the issue at stake is whether the observed
behaviour could be explained without considering either the EU’s economic gains or its
principled beliefs. Our findings implicate that this is highly unlikely, for evidence of
both independent variables was clearly present across the range of EU actions. Without
its principled belief in human rights and democracy, the EU is unlikely to have posited
the desirability of democratic reform in the south and to have taken action in that field
(as it did in the first basket). And without a shared economic interest, FDI is unlikely to
have featured so prominently in the EU’s programme for economic reform. This has led
us to assert that hoop evidence exists in support of our hypothesis. This covers a key
ambition of our research, which aims to demonstrate how a polarised focus on either
material interests or ideational variables inevitably leaves crucial dynamics
unexplained. Investigating their joint input into EU policy via the mechanism of causal
beliefs (i.e. expected outcomes) thus provides a nuanced, comprehensive way to account
for EU policy. This also proved to be consistent with the data gathered through
interviews, as EU officials and other individuals working in the field of Euro-Med
relations uniformly agreed upon the idea that economic interests and principled beliefs
152
both formed indispensible pillars of EU policy within the EMP (Interviews with EEAS
Officials, 2, 3, 6 & 16 June 2014, telephone).86
The fourth question to be addressed to test our hypothesis is whether the relevant
ideas and material interests are jointly sufficient to explain EU policy. This is a
somewhat stronger claim than that associated with question three, and given that it
builds upon a series of hoop tests we expect to have mainly straw in the wind evidence
in its support (in an optimal scenario). Required for this is a more extensive evidential
basis than what is presented in this chapter, but let us nevertheless begin to consider the
potentialities. Two issues are of key importance: 1) is there evidence of material-
ideational interplay; 2) are significant areas of EU policy left unexplained by our
hypothesis?
To answer 1, it is necessary to find significant covariance between the two
independent variables. In some measure this is observed in the fact that EU policy has
consisted neither of economic exploitation nor of a more strongly principles-driven
approach. Instead a balance appears to have been struck in which both principled beliefs
and economic interests were represented. This was enabled by the nature of the EU’s
causal beliefs: a marriage of the two aforementioned dynamics was envisioned in the
EU’s roadmap, constituting a win-win scenario not only between the two sides of the
Mediterranean but also between ideational and material drivers. We have asked whether
this was genuinely believed in or whether it was (as some cynics have suggested) more
of a foil, serving merely to mask economic self-interest. To answer this question the
changes in response to the problems encountered in the EMP, to be considered in
86 However, it must be noted that the importance given to each somewhat differed according to the person
interviewed. This serves to underscore both the strengths and weaknesses of personal interviews: they
offer the ability to triangulate findings with knowledgeable sources, though with a degree of malleability
to personal interpretation.
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Chapter IV, will be of particular importance. Thus, hoop evidence of covariance exists,
but more data needs to be analysed to be able to make more confident statements in this
regard. This also applies to the second point. Our evidence suggests that as hypothesised
the major dynamics of EU policies can indeed be explained with reference to ideational-
material coexistence. Yet some challenges were encountered in the seemingly fluid
nature of material interests as well as the ambiguity and nature of certain aspects of the
EMP, particularly its JHA dimension. While none of these challenges were adjudged to
speak decisively against our hypothesis, they highlight the need for a broader evidential
timeframe as well as a high degree of sensitivity to the complex nature of EU
policymaking. Its ability to accommodate these needs will be a crucial determinant for
the strength of our approach. For now, it is our judgement that the independent variables
highlighted in our hypothesis explain the key dynamics of the EMP for 1995-2003 to a
very high degree.
Finally, it is important to consider alternative interpretations and their bearing
upon our analysis. Not long before the EMP was initiated, one MENA diplomat was
quoted as saying that “we are the biggest remaining market in the world” and that the
European states “want to exploit it” (The Independent, 1994). Others spoke in terms of
a “new stage of neo-colonial exploitation characterized by unilateral exploitation”
(Kienle, 1998, p. 10). This is a rather strong claim, rooted in the belief that the EU
sought merely to advance its economic interests. While it is true that we have found
important evidence suggesting causal links between shared economic interests and EU
policy, a number of caveats were added to attenuate the strength of a pro-active pursuit
of European interests abroad. Their upshot is that the breadth of the shared economic
interests put forward in our hypothesis as an independent variable is subject to change,
more so than appears to be the case for principled beliefs. Of course it is known that any
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assumption of ‘independence’ in social science research relies on a theoretical
abstraction, which is why we do not consider this finding to be fatal to our research
programme. Yet it does impel a significant degree of sensitivity to the different kinds of
EU economic interests to be able to gain a truthful and balanced insight into their role in
EFP. In addition, it raises questions over characterisations of the EU as an ‘imperial’
type of actor (e.g. Amin, 2003).
Conversely, it could be argued that Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis’ discussion of the
EMP as “an idea that, from the bottom-up, [contributes to] creating we-ness” (2004, p.
23), though cautiously formulated, distracts from the very strong role played by
economic interests and the more ‘defensive’ elements in the EU’s approach. For
scholars who have looked at the EU’s normative power or its ‘distinctive’ approach to
IR, the EMP was an important example. As some have argued: “The EU is making an
explicit effort to project its own identity of a democratic polity into its relations with
third countries” (Börzel & Risse, 2007, p. 19; see also Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007;
Börzel & Risse, 2005). Notably, the third basket has been put forward by scholars
focused on the normative side of EFP in support of their views. “There is great
appreciation for the inclusion of the cultural dialogue in the Barcelona Declaration”,
writes Attinà (2003, p. 193), “and great expectations are placed in the initiatives and
exchanges promoted in the framework of the third chapter.” Adler and Crawford
concur, arguing that cultural dialogue has the potential to contribute to shaping shared
identities which may “ease negotiations and compromises among conflicting interests,
provide a basis for shared interests, and thus create a more solid basis for political
stability” (2006, p. 18).
Our findings clearly challenge some of these statements, and we differ with
normative approaches on whether ideational variables provide a satisfactory explanation
155
for EFP. As we have seen, the available evidence corroborates our view as it rather
conclusively falsifies the notion that principled beliefs are sufficient to explain EU
policy, even in the first basket which has this specific focus. We do not wish to argue
against a straw-man argument, so it must be admitted that few authors have argued
explicitly that normative dynamics capture the full reality of EFP. Yet if this is true it
follows that the normative characterisations of the EU that have been put forward in the
literature inevitably miss key aspects of EU action and that an exclusive focus on such
issues might not be sufficiently justified. Thus, while some authors have explained the
EU’s apparent timidity in the first basket with reference to its identity-driven belief in
‘partnership’ (Gillespie & Whitehead, 2002), our approach complicates this reading as it
suggests that an explanation might instead be sought in the existence of alternate
variables that played a role in shaping the EU’s approach. In this manner some of the
benefits of our comprehensive approach come forward, as it is suggested that only
through an extensive analysis of all the relevant evidence it is possible to explain EU
behaviour and policy outcomes within the EMP. We admit that the trade-off lies with
the simplicity of our explanatory model, as a more ‘eclectic’ mode of analysis inevitably
follows a broader approach. Through a further testing and refining of our approach we
aim to contribute to the literature by allowing for further improvement on this score.
As a last remark it could be said that our analysis of the second basket reveals a
sleight of hand in some of the literature. “It is widely admitted”, writes Attinà, “that the
problems of the economic basket can be solved to a large extent with financial aid and
knowledge transfer. Accordingly, the researchers of the socialization/inclusion
perspective focus their attention on first [and] third chapter affairs” (2003, p. 10). The
problem here is twofold. Firstly, it is not evident that financial aid and knowledge
transfer alone would resolve the issues, given that the EMP’s market-reliant
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‘modernisation’ philosophy seemed at least partially inadequate for promoting a more
stable and prosperous MENA region. Secondly, it seems disproportionate to highlight
first and third basket aspects of the EMP whilst the EU’s causal beliefs were primed on
the second basket. In this regard our theoretical framework, which focuses on the causal
mechanism of roadmaps to relay ideational and material variables into foreign policy,
has an advantage over alternative approaches in that it is sensitive to the assumptions
and areas of focus held by the EU itself. This allows us to seek explanations for EU
policy that are in closer alignment with the behaviour observed, thus feeding into a
balanced understanding of Euro-Med relations.
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- IV -
The European Neighbourhood Policy
In Chapters I and II we have demonstrated how in the wider literature on IR, and Euro-
Med relations more specifically, it is possible to identify a binary between approaches
that stress ideational (or normative) factors and ones that highlight material drivers, with
a more limited number of studies that incorporate both variables. The goal of this thesis
is to strengthen and clarify the latter stream by proposing a merger between realist and
constructivist theory. This is undertaken by testing the hypothesis that the EU’s
principled commitment to democracy and human rights and its desire to pursue
economic gains coexist as drivers for the EU’s policies towards the MENA.
In consideration of a broad range of evidence for the period 1995-2003, Chapter
III has demonstrated how our hypothesis passes several tests. We have seen how the
EU’s economic interest consisted of market expansion and how its causal beliefs
pointed towards a regional policy in support of structural adjustment to achieve this
goal. This coexisted with a principled belief in democracy and human rights, which was
represented in the EU’s modest support for existing efforts across the Maghreb and
Mashriq. Altogether it was believed that such support, in harmony with economic
initiatives, would lead to improvements across the region. In this regard causal beliefs
have been shown to be the vital link between principled beliefs and material interests,
fusing the different drivers of EFP. This underscores our argument that a limited or
polarised perspective inevitably misses key variables to account for EFP.
However, we have also said that more evidence is required to further
substantiate our argument and to clarify some of the issues encountered thus far.
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Important is the fact that, as we have seen, the EMP did not achieve the gains that were
expected. Simply put: there was a gap between expectations and outcomes. The EU’s
response to this situation is important for this project, given that some of the major
problems pertained to our causal mechanism: causal beliefs as roadmaps. Subsequent
policy reformulations will therefore be highly important for testing the validity and
explanatory usefulness of our approach. What is more, a potential challenge was
encountered in the growth of exclusivist JHA measures, for which the connection to our
independent variables was more difficult to trace. The contribution of the current
chapter is to shed further light on these issues by analysing EU policy from the
introduction of the ENP in 2003 until the creation of the UfM in 2008.
We start with an analysis of the ideas and expectations that underpinned the
Union’s policy (re)formulations in order to answer our first question. Here we highlight
change as well as continuity vis-à-vis the Euro-Med Partnership, noting that the context
of enlargement and the war in Iraq created a juncture at which there was room for a
modest revision of the Union’s approach. The evidence considered signifies that the
ENP served primarily as a refinement and a rebalancing of extant causal beliefs, which
is explained as the result of a learning process after the experience of almost eight years
of the EMP as well as EU enlargement.
The chapter proceeds by undertaking our second and third empirical tests for
each of the respective policy areas, structured similarly to the EMP’s baskets. Evidence
is thus considered in order to assess the hypothesis that material and ideational variables
were jointly driving EU actions under the ENP. For each of the focus areas considered
our hypothesis passes the tests, but we note that some challenges are posed by the
continued tension between shared and zero-sum interests (absolute vs. relative) as well
as the increasing prominence of security-related initiatives not entirely covered by our
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set of independent variables. These challenges, we argue, have some important
implications for our hypothesis and the remainder of our investigation.
In the conclusion we address the final question of whether our approach offers a
sufficient explanation, as we reflect on our findings and discuss comparative strengths.
A number of significant advantages are highlighted, as we indicate how our approach
urges more nuance vis-à-vis claims of the EU’s ‘imperial’ nature (Zielonka, 2008; see
also Sepos, 2013). Yet we do admit that the significant (self-interested) drive towards
economic expansion in the EU’s Mediterranean policies cannot be ignored, and this has
implications for claims regarding the normative thrust of EFP. A dual perspective thus
has some important advantages in allowing analysts to appreciate both dynamics, but
we note that several challenges remain. Whilst in our view these challenges do not
fatally undermine the hypothesis, they do place certain limits on the extent to which we
can claim that our approach offers a sufficient explanation for the EU’s Mediterranean
policies. In this manner we reach a balanced conclusion, opening the way for our final
chapter on the Union for the Mediterranean.
From ‘Partnership’ to ‘Neighbourhood’
This section is concerned with the emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy
over 2003-04, focusing in particular on the ideas and assumptions – that is to say: the
causal beliefs – that informed the new approach as well as the synergies and differences
with the existing Barcelona Process. We argue that in terms of the underlying causal
beliefs the ENP was in large part a continuation of existing policy, but with some
refinements. As we will see, these changes were fuelled by the disappointments
experienced in the EMP as well as the 2003 war in Iraq and EU enlargement. In
aggregate this context enabled a new programme to be iterated, amounting to a situation
consistent with our characterisation of a ‘critical juncture’ with room for renewed ideas
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to be put forward. However, whereas the Barcelona Declaration had constituted a
comprehensive roadmap for future policy, the documents produced by the EU over
2003-04 were more open-ended and general – with closer elaboration to take place in
bilateral Action Plans. The main indication this provides regarding the EU’s causal
beliefs is that a shift took place from focusing on general modernisation principles and
their assumed benefits, as in the EMP, to a more intensive approach with greater
sensitivity to context.
Below we trace the key processes related to two respective proposals, enabling
us to contextualise the ENP and to pry deeper into the EU’s causal beliefs. The first of
these proposals was set in motion by the Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’
Communication, introducing the idea of granting the Maghreb and Mashriq partners a
‘stake’ in the common market. The main conclusion drawn on the basis of our evidence
is that the EU was moving towards a slightly more nuanced set of expectations
regarding the costs and benefits of economic reform, drawing on the challenges of the
EMP’s previous approach. Second was the idea of a strategic partnership with the
MENA as well as the 2003 European Security Strategy. Their significance rests on the
identification of a greater role for political reform in the EU’s hierarchy of priorities,
thus indicating a further modification to the roadmap of the EMP.
Enlargement and ‘Wider Europe’
On 1 May 2004, the European Union experienced its biggest single enlargement to date,
adding countries such as Poland, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia as well as former
Mediterranean partners Cyprus and Malta. This territorial enlargement to 25 member
states significantly expanded the EU’s external borders and increased its population to
more than 450 million people with a combined GDP of almost €10,000 billion
(European Commission, 2003c). In anticipation of these developments the Council
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stated that enlargement “presents an important opportunity to take forward relations
with neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic values”, stressing
the need to “avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity
within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Council, 2002b, §22). In
response to the Council’s call for a renewed foreign policy, the Commission suggested
that:
The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in
enhancing relations with the new neighbours. Over the coming decade and
beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable
development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in
close cooperation with the neighbours. (European Commission, 2003c, p. 3)
For the MENA, this perspective did not evince a substantially new vision. After all, the
interrelated nature of Europe and the Mediterranean region had long been posited by the
major players in EU foreign policymaking (see Chapter III). Though the Commission’s
Communication was in principle aimed at all neighbouring states that did not face the
prospect of EU accession87, the focus was therefore primarily on the new (eastern)
neighbours. The reason for this, as the ESC confirmed, was that the eastern countries
had hardly been included in EU foreign policy initiatives, in contrast to the MENA
(2003, §2.4). Accordingly the Commission spoke of a “new impetus to help realise the
objectives of the Barcelona Declaration” (European Commission, 2003d, §3). In light of
87 This included Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as well as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority. Russia was dealt with outside of the new
framework, Turkey was excluded owing to its EU candidacy, and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were
added in 2004. Formally, participation in the ENP did not exclude EU candidacy.
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the disappointing performance of the EMP, there was a broadly felt need across the
EU’s institutions for such a stimulus.88
What could the ‘new impetus’ consist of, and what does it tell us about potential
changes in the EU’s causal beliefs? A significant degree of the Wider Europe
Communication’s focus was placed on the economic dimension, which had also been
the EMP’s central topic. In this respect, the reforms that were believed to be necessary
for the Mediterranean partners would now be promoted via actor-specific offers of
concrete benefits and privileges, manifest in a so-called (but undefined) ‘stake’ in the
common market. This has been characterised by analysts as a shift from regionalism to
differentiated bilateralism with benchmarked positive conditionality (Smith, 2008, p.
106; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). Yet it should be noted that what was perhaps the
most significant policy tool within the EMP – the Association Agreements – was
already of a bilateral nature. The main innovation thus consisted of the push to refine
the European Union’s Mediterranean policy and to take on board some of the tactics of
enlargement. In contrast to the EMP’s often generic references to the expected benefits
88 A significant amount of evidence exists to support this claim. The European Parliament believed that
“there should be a relaunch of the current Euro-Mediterranean partnership”, adding that the renewed EMP
ought to be repositioned “with the wider framework of the Wider Europe – Neighbourhood policy”
(2004b, §19). The Economic and Social Committee, for its part, thought that existing agreements should
be “utilised to fuller effect” (2003, §3.3). The Committee of the Regions also emphasised the need “to
give a new impetus to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership”, stressing the link between the countries of
the Mediterranean basin and “the future of the enlarged European Union itself” (Committee of the
Regions, 2004b, §1). The most important problems within the EMP were later identified by the
Commission as: “the partnership has not had any direct effect on the major unresolved conflicts in the
region… on the contrary, the persistence of these conflicts has had a negative effect on the process”; “[it]
can not be said to have resulted in a significant advance in democratisation”; “insufficient progress has
been made in the liberalisation of trade in services and in agricultural products”; “foreign and domestic
private investment … remain relatively low in the partners”; “income per capita … shows further
divergence between the EU and the partners”; “beyond-the-border domestic institutional reforms have
been slow” (European Commission, 2005a).
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of structural adjustment, in resonance with the enlargement process more faith was now
placed in the EU’s ability to catalyse economic progress through further market
integration. This required both a more active role for the EU and further-going reform
by the MENA partners.
After approval by the Council, the Commission’s Communication was followed
up in July 2003 with a document entitled Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood
Instrument (European Commission, 2003f). It stipulated a two-phase approach: until
2006 the Neighbourhood Policy would be introduced while standing commitments
would continue to be fulfilled; after 2006 a new instrument (the ‘European
Neighbourhood Instrument’ [ENPI]) would replace the existing MEDA and Tacis
instruments. Guidance was to be provided by Action Plans (APs) that would indicate on
a country-to-country basis what specific goals and benchmarks were to be applied. As
we have said, this suggested an approach that would be more sensitive to context and
less reliant on the general principles of IMF-led structural adjustment, which had not
produced the benefits that had been expected. Important issues that were mentioned by
the Commission included “existing differences in living standards across the Union’s
borders with its neighbours” and “efficient and secure border management … to protect
our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage” (ibid., §6). A notable
degree of similarity exists here with some of the concerns listed in the documents that
stipulated the rationale for the Barcelona Process (see Chapter III). And similar to the
prior idea of ‘anchoring’, most important in the Commission’s plans was the emphasis
on market integration. The strategic endgame was summarised by the Committee of the
Regions as follows: “a single market, free trade, an open investment system,
approximation of legislation and the use of the euro as a reserve and reference currency
for trade with the neighbouring countries” (2004a, §2.2). If implemented in full this
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would transcend what was envisioned in the Barcelona Declaration, taking the
previously formulated idea of anchoring a step further. In our reading this was not
necessarily a new way of thinking, but rather a more far-going operationalisation of
existing causal beliefs with a potentially more nuanced understanding of the costs and
benefits of reform. What this suggests is that a process of collective learning had taken
place since the start of the EMP (see Chapter II and Kelley, 2006; Adler, 2002), with as
its sources the challenges within the Barcelona Process as well as the successes of
enlargement.
After welcoming the Commission’s efforts, the Council took some items off the
agenda (most importantly the idea of free movement of persons) while limiting the
scope for economic integration (European Council, 2003a; 2004c; see also Balfour,
2007).89 The idea that ‘everything but the institutions’ would be on the table therefore
proved to be incorrect and was overtaken by the idea of a ‘ring of friends’ (Johansson-
Nogués, 2004) – the ‘everything but…’ idea was described as ‘terribly overambitious’
by one EU official working on the ENP (Interview with EEAS Official, 2 June 2014,
telephone). Overall, the most important suggestion of change to the EU’s causal beliefs
pertained to the methodology of reform, with some indication that the former reliance
on market forces had been at least partially relinquished. As said, from our theoretical
perspective this can be attributed to a learning process on the basis of experienced
problems and successes. As one interviewee for this study said when asked to comment
on the ENP’s innovations: “as a young foreign policy actor, the EU has been a learning
organisation” (ibid.). Once again this highlights how the EU’s foreign policy has been
89 For a full overview of the differences between the Council and the Commission see Balfour and Rotta
(2005, p. 12).
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in continuous development, representative of the Union’s search for optimal strategies
to attain its various policy objectives in the MENA.
Strategic Partnership and the Security Strategy
Alongside the drawing up of the ENP documents in the context of enlargement, a
separate stream of thinking on the future of Euro-Med relations emerged in light of the
war in Iraq. As mentioned previously it is possible to conceptualise the dual situation of
enlargement and the Iraq war as a critical juncture, enabling the iteration of refined
causal beliefs. The Iraq-related stream consisted of the idea to set up a ‘strategic
partnership’ with the Arab world, and the European Security Strategy (ESS). Much like
the documents related to the ENP, these initiatives did not evince a fundamentally new
way to approach the MENA but rather reformulated certain pre-existing causal beliefs.
In this manner they evince modest changes in the EU’s approach, reflective of its effort
to improve policy whilst retaining several important aspects.
The idea for a strategic partnership was put forward in the shadow of one of the
EU’s most considerable foreign policy disputes, pertaining to the war in Iraq (see
Spyker, 2007). A widely commented-upon and highly mediatised rift erupted between
the UK’s Tony Blair and France’s Jacques Chirac, with Blair reportedly undertaking a
‘diplomatic war’ against France, while the latter complained that Britain’s actions were
“not worthy of a country which is both a friend and a European partner” (The
Independent, 2003; see also The Times, 2003). The depth of the dispute proved to be a
‘cathartic’ experience for the Union (Menon, 2004): rather than marking the end of
common foreign policy it provided an additional impulse (Hill, 2004). Confirmation of
this outlook can be found in comments made by one senior official: “It is not
fashionable to say it but the war in Iraq concentrated our minds. It showed that the EU
had zero influence if its member states do not pull together” (Financial Times, 2003).
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This ‘cathartic’ realisation resembles our definition of a critical juncture (Ikenberry,
1993): in light of major events there was room for new initiatives to be put forward.
In this context it was argued that there was a need to revitalise policy towards
the MENA, with some emphasis on Europe’s cooperative approach (as opposed to what
was perceived as an imperious American disposition).90 The Thessaloniki European
90 Evidence of the perceived contrast between the US and the EU can be found in some of the latter’s
documents on Euro-Mediterranean relations that were drawn up during this period. Stressing the
‘partnership’ dimension, an interim report of March 2004 argued that “in order to be credible” the
Union’s relations with the Arab world must be based on a sense of ownership on the part of the Arab
states: “reforms cannot be imposed from outside. They must be generated from within” (European
Council, 2004a, pp. 4-5). In this instance the notion of ‘partnership’ was at least in part used to
distinguish the EU’s approach from what was seen as a more unilateral American disposition, manifest in
its ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’. Before the launch of this initiative, a copy of the American plan –
which diagnosed a democratic deficit as the core cause of the region’s ills – was leaked to Al-Hayat,
sparking widespread outrage in the Arab states owing to a perception that the US was scheming to impose
a certain political model on the region (The Economist, 2004). As Jordan’s foreign minister said in
response to the leak: “Our objective is for this document never to see the light” (cited in Ottaway &
Carothers, 2004, p. 5). The European response was lukewarm. It was stated that the Union should
proactively “define a complementary but distinct approach” (European Council, 2004a, p. 13). This view
was echoed by Chris Patten, who said that the EU should “focus on developing its own strategic
partnership with the region”, independent of the United States (Patten, 2004). There was clearly
scepticism regarding an American plan that would cover areas in which the EMP had already been active,
and the comparative merits of a partnership-based approach were stressed by EU officials: “[I hope] that
our friends across the Atlantic are recognising that our long-term, consensus-building approach has some
value, based as it is, on building common agendas that respect differences of approach in different
countries and regions. The Greater Middle East initiative from the US generated controversy in the
region, mainly because the objectives appeared to have been set without any real consultation process
with the region” (ibid.). A reformulated version of the American plan was adopted at the G8 meeting of
June 2004, where it was termed the ‘Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’ (BMENA). As far
as its strategic focus was concerned the BMENA could be considered a competitor of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. President Bush described it as “a forward strategy of freedom”, and the
initiative’s core emphasis was on promoting democracy, improving education, and creating jobs and
economic growth (US Department of State, 2004). However, observers described the adoption of the
BMENA at the G8 as a rather ‘hollow victory’ for the US, noting that the plan was unlikely to curb anti-
Americanism or to improve US-Arab relations (Ottaway, 2004). The EU, for its part, indicated that it
would seek “maximum coherence” with the US (European Council, 2004b, p. 16), but – in a reflection of
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Council of June 2003 argued that there was an urgent need to strengthen relations with
the Arab world, including the promotion of political dialogue, pluralism and democratic
reform (European Council, 2003b, §66). The Council thus expressed its desire to
strengthen one of the more neglected sides of the EMP: democratic reform. As we have
seen, the Union’s policy in this field had been subordinate to structural adjustment
rather than enacted as a significant priority area in itself. However, questions were
increasingly raised regarding the validity of the economic theories that had shaped
economic modernisation in the 1990s, and in part this had implications for the pursuit of
political reform. We have seen in Chapter III how the MENA provided a good example
of some of the challenges experienced, which is why it is not surprising that a process of
collective learning in EU thinking vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean could be seen.
The full extent of the shift was not yet clear at this point, but the evidence does indicate
the potential for a recalibration of priorities with more independent focus on issues like
human rights and democracy.
In December 2003 a draft for a new plan was put forward, entitled
Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World (European Commission,
2003h). On the whole, the Union’s main priority was described as an intensification of
efforts at the promotion of “prosperity, peace and stability, thereby not only
contributing to the welfare and security of the region, but also to its own security”
(ibid.).91 It was said that the EU should “encourage, support and facilitate reform in the
political, economic and social areas” using existing instruments “in a more focused
its search for a stronger common foreign policy – systematically continued to stress European
independence and the added value of its own particular approach.
91 The overall idea was restated by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who said that engendering
stability abroad was not merely a ‘political imperative’ (driven by values) but represented a matter of
European ‘self-interest’ (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006a). Europe, she argued, was not an island or a fortress: it
must ‘export’ stability in order to prevent ‘importing’ instability.
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manner [and] streamlining their co-ordination”.92 In this manner the Union was moved
to strengthen its existing philosophy of promoting security by changing the domestic
circumstances of the Maghreb and Mashriq states, thus reconfirming the assumptions
that had given rise to the EMP. ‘More assertiveness’ and ‘more effective utilisation of
extant frameworks’ thus constituted the common theme for the Union’s documents and
statements on the Mediterranean throughout 2003-04.
This analysis is underwritten by the contents of the European Security Strategy
of late 2003.93 The document said that Europe was “inevitably a global player”
(European Commission, 2003e, p. 1) – consequently it should be “more active, more
coherent and more capable” in promoting its interests on a global scale (ibid., p. 11).94
As CFSP High Representative Javier Solana commented, Europe must redouble its
efforts “to combat the great ongoing challenges of extreme poverty, hunger and the new
pandemics, breaking the cycles of insecurity and tackling bad governance, corruption
and disregard of rule of Law” (Solana, 2003). A key feature of Europe’s approach
remained a focus on transformational issues such as human rights and democracy
(European Commission, 2003e, p. 10). While this was more explicitly linked to
European security than had previously been the case, the main causal beliefs in evidence
92 The idea of greater attention for political and social reform in the Mediterranean region was not
exclusive to the strategic partnership. It had also been asserted in a separate Communication from the
Commission in May 2003, entitled Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratisation
with Mediterranean partners (European Commission, 2003a). This document advised a more proactive
European approach, involving the mainstreaming of issues of good governance, human rights and
democracy through more effective usage of existing instruments.
93 The launch of the ESS sparked a lively debate on Europe’s status as a security actor. See e.g. Biscop &
Andersson (2008); Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2006); Posen (2006); Giegerich & Wallace (2004);
Shepherd (2003).
94 As one author observed: after enlargement and the Iraq War it was harder for the EU to “pose as a
small huddle of vulnerable do-gooders sheltering under the wing of NATO and the United States”
(Bailes, 2008, p. 119).
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here are evidently consistent with those underpinning the EMP (see Chapter III). On the
basis of the Security Strategy presented by Javier Solana the European Council of
December 2003 requested a concrete proposal for its implementation in the Middle East
and North Africa (European Council, 2003c, §86). This led to the combination of the
notion of a strategic partnership with the stipulations of the European Security Strategy,
taking forward the Union’s stated ambition of strengthening its policies in the south.
Eleven objectives and principles were formulated, including the promotion of a
common zone of peace, prosperity and progress, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the promotion of democracy and human rights, further support for domestic reform, and
enhancement of the existing security dialogues (ibid., pp. 10-12). This strategy was
reconfirmed in the concluding document on the strategic partnership, approved by the
Council in June 2004, stressing once again the need for political, social and economic
reform in a spirit of partnership, to be implemented via the ENP (European Council,
2004b).
Table 8: Causal Beliefs in the ENP
Economic Political
Problem Analysis Med Markets remain
closed; expected gains of
EMP did not materialise
Human rights and democracy
situation in MENA not
improved
Action Needed Deeper economic reform,
market integration
Stronger EU focus; more
support for actors in MENA
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Operationalisation Bilateral Action Plans:




strengthen existing EU efforts
Anticipated
outcomes




of/respect for human rights and
democracy principles by MENA
regimes, greater stability in
region
To summarise this section and to underline its importance in terms of our theoretical
framework; we have attempted to gain an understanding of the EU’s evolving causal
beliefs on the basis of several important policy documents that were put forward over
the course of 2003-04. The significance of this period can be understood with reference
to the enlargement of the EU and the war in Iraq, which together created a critical
juncture that enabled a reformulation of European policy. This reformulation has been
characterised as one of refinement of existing causal beliefs. Given the widely felt
failings of the EMP, the evidence suggests that there was a degree of collective learning
with regards to the methodology best suited for promoting change in the MENA. In
particular, the insistence on the need for domestic reform in the south was retained, but
there are hints at a shift in its operationalisation. Thus, the key ‘lesson learned’ was that,
rather than trusting in the benefits of dynamics like limited market access, IMF-led
structural adjustment and FDI, a broader set of tools was needed to address socio-
economic imbalances in the south, with greater attention for political reform.
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What Role for Democracy and Human Rights?
Having gained an appreciation of some of the subtle changes to the causal beliefs
evinced in EU collective thinking, we must now test whether there is evidence of these
causal beliefs serving as a roadmap for actual foreign policy. In addition we must test
whether the empirical evidence supports (or refutes) our hypothesis that principled
beliefs and economic interests were necessary variables for the causal beliefs-foreign
policy nexus. If smoking gun or hoop evidence can be found to support these claims,
our hypothesis will have gained in credibility.
One of the elements that was thought to be in need of stronger efforts during the
2003-04 policy reformulations was the human rights/democracy agenda (European
Council, 2003c). What had been the first basket of the EMP had experienced some
significant problems, which is why it is vital for testing our hypothesis to gain an
understanding of how the EU’s policies in this field changed over time.
Under the ENP, it is possible to distinguish two ways in which the EU tried to
promote human rights and democracy in the MENA. The first of these can be
characterised as government-level or top-down cooperation between the EU and the
Maghreb/Mashriq states – described as ‘leverage’ by Lavenex & Schimmelfennig
(2011).95 This approach had not been utilised extensively within the EMP, and one of
the Neighbourhood Policy’s refinements consisted of stronger inclusion of this
dimension in the areas of the first basket. The second EU approach consisted primarily
of its ‘bottom-up’ instrument for normative reform in the MENA: the EIDHR
(characterised as ‘linkage’ in ibid.96). Here we focus in particular on the so-called
95 As they write, leverage “induces democratic reforms via political conditionality” (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 886).
96 Defined as: “activities that tackle the societal preconditions for democracy and give support to the
democratic opposition and other civil society actors in the target countries” (ibid., p. 886).
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‘microprojects’ instrument, which serves as a good case-study for determining the
particulars of European democracy and human rights promotion. As we will see our
hypothesis passes several hoop tests, but throughout this section we also highlight areas
where challenges and complications existed.
Government-Level Efforts
A principal way in which the European Union could give substance to its stated
ambition of promoting democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean was via direct
bi- and multilateral contacts with the states of the Maghreb and the Mashriq. In addition
to the traditional tool of declarative diplomacy, some of the key characteristics of the
Barcelona Process associated with this route included the ‘essential element’ clauses in
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (which allowed for suspension of the
agreements in case of serious violations of human rights), references made to
democracy and human rights in the Council’s MEDA Regulation (opening the option of
linkage with financial aid), and discussion of relevant issues at the biannual association
council meetings (see Written Question E0601/02). However, as we have seen in the
previous chapter these tools were not always fully utilised, with the EU missing a
number of opportunities to showcase its commitment to democracy and human rights.
On this basis we have said that the hypothesised role of principled beliefs passes a hoop
test, but that further evidence must be considered to make more solidly supported
claims.
Already in 2000 the Commission had recommended a further prioritisation of
democracy and human rights (European Commission, 2000a). This ambition was
reflected in the documents that formed the basis for the ENP. Its main policy tool
consisted of the ENP Action Plans (they were not binding like the Association
Agreements). The first Mediterranean states with whom APs were concluded (approved
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through the Euro-Med Association Councils) were Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel and
the Palestinian Authority.97 Consistent with the expressed intentions, human rights and
democracy were awarded a more defined role in the Union’s bilateral plans than what
had been the case for the Association Agreements. With slightly different wordings it
was said in each Action Plan that “the level of ambition” of bilateral relations would
depend on “the degree of commitment to common values as well as the implementation
of jointly agreed priorities to mutual benefits” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2008a).
However, rather than connecting specific ‘rewards’ to achievements by the partner
states, nothing was said in the Action Plans about benchmarks or benefits to be enjoyed.
Upon a detailed reading of the APs we find that under the header ‘democracy
and the rule of law’ there was mention of the promotion of stable, effective and
transparent democratic institutions; enhancement of the independence of the judiciary;
support for media freedom; ensuring respect of human rights in line with relevant
international agreements; promotion of labour standards; and rights of women (ibid.).98
A distinction was made between short and medium-term objectives and for each a list of
‘actions’ was provided.99 While some argued that the Union’s methodology risked
97 Following a longer procedure, Lebanon and Egypt agreed to their Action Plans in 2007, while no
agreements were signed with Algeria and Syria (the latter’s AA was not ratified by the member states).
98 For an overview of the Action Plans see [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm], accessed
28 November 2011.
99 In Tunisia’s AP, for example, short-term actions to “strengthen institutions guaranteeing democracy
and the rule of law” included increasing participation of Tunisian society in political life and developing
the role of civil society, while medium-term action included providing support for the Tunisian
authorities’ efforts at political reform and increasing transparency (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005b, Annex,
§2.1). The biggest exception was Israel, where human rights were addressed in a brief section under the
header ‘shared values’ (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005c; see for more on the Israeli Action Plan; Herman,
2006). It may be added that Europe’s stance towards Israel was the target of much criticism: “Israel
continues to violate the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territories and
discriminate against the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, and the EU’s operative diplomacy continues
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supporting superficial reforms that strengthened incumbent elites (Echague, 2008;
Balfour, 2007), this critique focuses on the EU’s causal belief in strengthening existing
efforts and does not necessarily undermine the idea that there was a commitment to
principled beliefs. The more detailed provisions indicate that the focus on democracy
and human rights was at least partially strengthened under the ENP. This aligns with our
analysis of the causal beliefs expressed in the ENP’s founding documents, which
suggested a modest rebalancing of the EU’s priorities.
Several challenges and limitations must be noted, however. The Action Plans
presented a rather unstructured collection of suggestions for reform that did not address
deeper political issues (see Kausch, 2008). Measurement of success was difficult and
the Action Plans were relatively widely criticised. The general opinion within e.g. the
Moroccan NGO community was that the EU-Morocco Action Plan ought to be
“reformulated within a logical framework that will highlight better-defined goals as well
as the actors, timelines, and financial and human resources needed for each action”
(Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2007, p. 6). In interviews and
conversations with individuals active in MENA-based civil society organisations,
including activists from Tunisia (Interview on 12 July 2011, Berlin), Palestine
(Interviews on 22 and 23 October 2010, Bethlehem), and Egypt (Interview on 13 July
2011, Berlin), the desire for a clearer and more forceful EU policy was also frequently
expressed.
These issues notwithstanding, it is true that an overview of the evolution of
funding allocations to some of the Union’s key partners points to growth of the budget:
to accommodate many of Israel’s illegal policies … The EU can not knowingly allow its contractual
relations with any third country to operate in this manner without itself violating EU law and international
humanitarian law” (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2005, pp. 2-3).
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Table 9: NIP allocations for Governance and Human Rights in Million €100
2002-2004 (MEDA) 2005-2006 (MEDA) 2007-2010 (ENPI)
Jordan 2 (1.4% of total) 5 (4.5%) 17 (6.5%)
Morocco n/a 5 (1.8%) 28 (4.3%)
Egypt n/a 5 (2.1%) 40 (7.2%)
Tunisia n/a n/a n/a
Apart from growing absolutely, the numbers reveal that there was also a relative
increase in the budget for reform, though it was still regarded as “relatively modest” by
the Commission (2006f, §3.7; see also European Commission, 2007c).101 If this point to
an increase in importance for principled beliefs, complicating matters is the fact that
political reform continued to be secondary to economic progress. In the case of Egypt,
100 Source: National Indicative Programmes, available at:
[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm], accessed 29 November 2011.
101 An additional development within the sphere of the first basket that must be mentioned was the
establishment of dedicated working groups on human rights. This had been done for the first time in 2003
under the Union’s cooperation agreement with Bangladesh, and the first Mediterranean state to become
involved with such a working group was Morocco in 2006 (Euro-Med Partnership, 2004b; 2006c). The
purpose of the working group was to discuss, at least once a year, the implementation of the Association
Agreement with regards to the rule of law, good governance and democracy (Euro-Med Partnership,
2006c, Annex §3). Jordan and Tunisia also agreed to the setting up of specialised subcommittees, as did
Egypt after its AP was adopted in March 2007, but the practice failed to spread further to other
Mediterranean partners. What is more, preparations for this form of deliberative cooperation (the working
groups had no decision making powers) were slow and difficult. As the Commission said about the EU-
Tunisia Association Agreement in 2006: “Little progress was registered on political issues, as evidenced
by slow preparations for a subcommittee on human rights and democracy” (European Commission,
2006c). For Jordan, after the subcommittee’s establishment it was said in a more positive tone that it
provided a forum “to discuss sensitive issues such as the death penalty and women’s rights”, adding that
“the mere fact that a dialogue on such issues can now take place within an institutional framework is a
progress brought about by the ENP” (European Commission, 2006d). It is difficult, however, to reliably
assess this upbeat claim, as the proceedings of the subcommittees were considered confidential and it was
not allowed to refer to them in public (e.g. in the European Parliament).
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for example, political reform was not included as a priority in the 2002-04 Indicative
Programme – the focus was instead on economic reform. Promoting human rights and
democracy was similarly only a sub-category of ‘supporting sustainable socio-economic
development’ in the 2005-06 NIP. And in the 2007-2010 financial planning it was said
that “the democratisation process will contribute to strengthening [Egypt’s] economic
development” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2006f, p. 20).
How do these findings bear upon our hypothesis? First of all, it is possible to say
that the impact of the Union’s refined causal beliefs, which now suggested that greater
attention needed to be paid to political reform without waiting for the expected benefits
of structural adjustment, is supported by hoop evidence from our empirical data. The
main indicators in this respect are the ENP’s more precise agreements and programmes
with regards to democracy and human rights as well as the gradually increasing budget
in this field. With a view to the causal beliefs undergirding these dynamics, it is evident
that the EU’s principled beliefs could not be ignored as a principal variable. That is to
say: there is hoop evidence to support the claim that principled beliefs constitute a
necessary variable.
However, in addition to what has been said above, several complications within
the relevant sphere must be taken into account. First, e.g. in the case of Tunisia the
difficulties that were encountered actually led to a partial termination of political reform
programmes (see European Commission, 2006e). The 2007-2010 NIP tellingly stated
that because of “serious difficulties in implementing third-generation MEDA projects
… the Commission takes the view that efforts … should focus on good economic
governance” (European Commission, 2006i, p. iv). Rather than following the
Commission’s own advice that “negative measures may … be more appropriate” when
a “third country [has] no genuine commitment to pursue change through dialogue and
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consultation” (European Commission, 2001b, §3.1), there was a shift towards less
controversial areas of cooperation. Second, in awarding Morocco funds from the
‘Governance Facility’ that had been set up to support reform (Euro-Med Partnership,
2005d) little correlation could be detected between achievements and funding, as
Morocco did not evince greatly advanced status (see European Commission, 2007d, p.
17).102 Finally, when Hamas won the Palestinian elections, the EU suspended
implementation of the ENP Action Plan and froze aid to the Palestinian Authority.103
This had adverse repercussions, both politically and on a socio-economic level, whilst
sending a negative signal to the wider region (see Pace, 2007). It was felt that the
European Union had betrayed its commitment to democracy by undermining significant
steps towards a properly functioning democratic order in a priority area of institution
building (Interviews with Commission Officials, 18-23 October 2010, East Jerusalem).
This stood in contrast to the EU’s positive response to the Moroccan parliamentary
election of 2007, despite a 37% voter turnout and suspicions of gerrymandering
(Kausch, 2009; Hamzawy, 2007).
Similar to the lack of smoking gun evidence of a commitment to democracy and
human rights within the EU’s enactment of the EMP, these findings appear as a
challenge to the assertion that principled beliefs provide the best explanation of EU
foreign policy. Yet they do not allow us to say that democracy and human rights were
irrelevant altogether. Given the EU’s causal belief that reform was best promoted with,
rather than against, incumbent regimes, and the possibility to note convergence between
102 From the eastern partners, Ukraine received funding. The funds were used by Morocco to support
ongoing public administration reform programmes, while Ukraine invested in reform of its energy sector
(European Commission, 2007a).
103 A temporary mechanism (TIM) was put in place to circumvent Hamas, followed by PEGASE in 2008
(Musu, 2010, p. 131).
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these causal beliefs and the policies discussed in this section, principled beliefs do
appear as indispensible for explaining significant elements of the ENP. Thus, on the
basis of the above we can say that principled beliefs were necessary, but certainly not
sufficient for explaining the EU’s actions. This analysis can be further strengthened with
reference to the Union’s actions within the EIDHR.
The EIDHR and Microprojects
In the Commission’s Communication on human rights and democracy in the
Mediterranean of early 2003, a number of recommendations were made. Perhaps most
importantly, it was suggested to revise the EIDHR’s strategy and to pay greater
attention to the complementarity between EIDHR and MEDA programmes (European
Commission, 2003a). Within the design of the ENP, the EIDHR was regarded as part of
the existing institutional infrastructure, and it was stated that its programming would be
“consistent with the [Action Plans’] policy goals while supporting civil society in areas
such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European
Commission, 2004a, p. 25). Thus, until 2007 (when the ENPI became operational) no
significant changes were made to the EIDHR. The exception was the programme’s
widening in 2004, after criticism on its initially limited scope, to include all
Mediterranean partner states (see Written Question E2673; European Commission,
2004b). Additionally, the financial resources that became available after the accession
of the new EU member states opened the door for a larger budget allocation after 2003:
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Table 10: EIDHR Allocated Budget, € Million104
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
100 101 125 128 122 130 137 142
The steady growth of the budget indicates how the programme grew in scope and
importance over the years, correspondent to the intention to strengthen this dimension
of EFP in the Neighbourhood Policy. A variety of actions could be supported under the
EIDHR programme105; but most characteristic were the microprojects (managed by the
Commission’s Delegations). According to Federica Bicchi they were “the type of action
that can best exemplify the EU’s approach to democracy assistance” (2009, p. 67). This
is so because, in the terms of our theoretical framework, they best showcase the EU’s
causal belief in the importance of working with existing groups and initiatives without
taking too aggressive an approach against incumbent regimes. For this reason the
microprojects serve as a representative testing ground for our hypothesis.
Microprojects were defined by the Commission as “projects under a given
campaign with a support volume between €10,000 and €100,000, exclusively for local
civil society-based applicants within a country eligible under the campaign” (European
Commission, 2004b, p. 29).106 As regards the budget, for 2002 the microprojects made
up 14% of the total EIDHR budget (European Commission, 2001f, p. 14); for 2005-06
this had increased to 31.1% (€60m, see European Commission, 2004b, p. 32). For the
104 Source: Řiháčkov, 2008, p. 16.
105 These included ‘targeted projects’ (initiated by the EU, focused on e.g. the ICC) and ‘macroprojects’
(on the basis of a call for proposals, mostly aimed at large NGOs and human rights organisations).
Another key element of the EIDHR consisted of the Election Observation Missions. The combination of
proactive and responsive methods was explained as the best way to preserve local ownership while
preventing becoming a ‘hostage of fortune’ (European Commission, 2001f, pp. 11-12).
106 The maximum amount was later raised to €300,000.
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Mediterranean partners this materialised in the following allocations (on average 19%
of the total microprojects budget was allocated to the Med region):
Table 11: Microprojects Budgets in €, 2001-2006107
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Algeria - 500,000 500,000 435,000 840,000 765,000
Egypt - - - 1,000,000 970,000 1,115,000
PA 500,000 - 500,000 435,000 1,235,000 1,118,000
Jordan - - - 680,000 875,000 765,000
Israel 450,000 - 500,000 435,000 855,000 615,000
Lebanon - - - 500,000 545,000 280,000
Morocco - - - 1,000,000 1,025,000 950,000
Syria - - - 500,000 - -
Tunisia - 250,000 - 215,000 - 175,000
These numbers indicate that, despite relatively significant budgets for e.g. Egypt and
Morocco, there were also various gaps and an elongated start-up period. What is more,
between 2001 and 2007 only 24 calls for proposals went out via the Council’s
Delegations in the nine Mediterranean partner states (Bicchi, 2009, p. 68); until 2005
calls for proposals were launched only in Palestine and Algeria. This means that the
above allocations do not accurately reflect the actual funds that were spent, and for 2005
and 2006 the numbers include the reallocation of previously unused funds. The
Delegation in Tunisia did not launch a call for proposals at all; in Syria and Algeria
107 Source: European Commission, 2004b, pp. 34-35 & European Commission, 2007b, p. 17.
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none of the selected projects were concluded108; and in most cases the Delegations
underplayed potentially more controversial aspects of the EIDHR in their calls for
proposals (ibid.).109 In addition, a persistent problem noted by observers was the
“unduly overly rigid” complexity of the application procedure (Economic and Social
Committee, 2009, §3.4), which made it extremely difficult for relatively inexperienced
organisations to apply and which enhanced a so-called ‘donor darlings’ effect
(Řiháčkov, 2008, p. 12). Finally, the projects that did receive funding typically focused
either on narrow human rights issues with limited political impact or on more generic
discursive/training activities. Whilst more limited initiatives should of course not be
dismissed, it is also true that they, in the words of one human rights organisation, “can
only be effective if they are deployed alongside, not instead of, concrete efforts to
ensure respect for human rights and good administration of justice throughout the
EUROMED countries” (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 3).110
With respect to our hypothesis, the microprojects serve as useful hoop evidence
in support of the necessary role played by principled beliefs. They demonstrate how a
principled belief in human rights and democracy existed and how the EU’s causal belief
108 Indicative of the difficult situation in Algeria was the country’s earlier refusal to issue visas to an
EIDHR technical committee in 2002 (see Written Question E0881/02).
109 In one of Jordan’s calls for proposals, for example, the aims for Campaign 3 included: “raising
awareness of citizens regarding their rights to participate in the political life”; “increas[ing] the dialogue
among executive and legislature institutions as well as civil society organisations”; “establishing
networks of civil society organisations”; and “fostering the development of independent media”
(European Commission, 2006g, pp. 5-6). Evidently this left somewhat underdeveloped the also included
aim of developing electoral democratic processes. See the Commission’s webpage for a full overview of
the calls for proposals: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/funding/index_en.htm], accessed 9 December
2011.
110 In this vein, one review concluded that e.g. justice reform funding was aimed mostly at general
advocacy while failing to ensure “that justice is actually done on the ground” (DG for External Policies of
the Union, 2005, p. 16).
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in small-scale cooperation with existing initiatives was operationalised. Yet the
programme was obviously far from perfect. In a detailed study of the microprojects’
implementation process, Bicchi (2010) attributes the problems that were experienced to
the ‘interpretive space’ that existed at various levels: there was “no overarching
rationality to coordinate and direct the implementers of the policy” (p. 992). Where does
this leave our analysis?
To begin, it is clear that issues within the first basket of the EMP did not rise to
prime importance in the ENP. It is true that more attention was paid to the political
dimension and that, owing to the earlier problems of the first basket, the EU’s causal
beliefs now prescribed a greater focus on democracy and human rights. In this regard,
and in light of the modest evolutions observed, there is relatively strong hoop evidence
for the hypothesised relationship between principled beliefs, causal beliefs and EU
behaviour. Principled beliefs continued to provide input into EU foreign policymaking
whilst causal beliefs were refined in response to a changing context.
It must be added here that if bureaucratic failure was indeed primarily to blame
for the EIDHR’s problems, it would be difficult to build a structural analysis upon its
performance (bureaucratic failure typically being of a more accidental nature). Despite
being characteristic of the EU’s wider approach, therefore, as evidence to test a
hypothesis the EIDHR must be placed within a broader context. In this sense we might
reinterpret the openness that had allowed the microprojects’ divergent implementation
as a result of the wider lack of willingness to act decisively in support of human rights
and democracy, as has been demonstrated with respect to government-level efforts.
Partially this was a product of the EU’s causal beliefs, which prescribed a cautious
approach, but the lack of more convincing action implies the possibility of a balancing
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act with other drivers. In sum, principled beliefs appear as necessary, but it has proven
difficult to locate smoking gun evidence in support of stronger claims.
Changes after 2006 confirm this interpretation. It was admitted by the
Commission that “the emphasis has been on ‘single issue’ projects” whilst “collective
impact or synergies at national level have not been so evident” (2006h, §2.3). However,
when in 2006 the scheduled overhaul of the instruments for EU foreign policy took
place, the Commission’s initial plan was to incorporate the EIDHR as a thematic
heading in the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (see Youngs, 2006b, pp. 69-
70). This move would have relinquished the EIDHR’s autonomy vis-à-vis other EU
development actions, but owing to pressure mainly from the European Parliament and
civil society it was ultimately decided to create a dedicated regulation for human rights
and democracy: the ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights’ (‘EIDHR
II’).111 The aim of the new EIDHR was to achieve a ‘radical’ simplification of European
external assistance and to answer in this way to some of the criticisms levelled at earlier
efforts. Significantly, it was now possible for individuals to apply for funding, thus
opening the way for more ‘political’ support. What is more, an operational distinction
was made between countries in ‘transformation’ – where existing efforts could be built
upon – and ‘authoritarian’ ones – with little extant political liberalisation (e.g. Libya,
Tunisia and Syria) (European Commission, 2007d). Specifically devoted to the ENPI
and the Middle East was €77.3m (ibid.), but it could be said that the resources were
spread relatively wide and thin – both geographically and thematically (Human Rights
and Democracy Network, 2009; Herrero, 2009).112 However, once again the programme
111 See: Regulation 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council.
112 For EIDHR II the microprojects were renamed as the ‘country-based support scheme’, active under
objective 2 with a total budget of €161m (3% of which could now be spent on promotional activities by
the Commission’s Delegations).
184
was slow to take off, coming underway only in the second half of 2008 (European
Commission, 2010g, p. 4). Through 2010, 116 projects were undertaken in the MENA.
An overview of the projects that have received funding indicates that the focus has
continued to be on issues such as training, networking and awareness-raising, not
dissimilar to the previous EIDHR (see EIDHR, 2011).113 This indicates that despite the
consistent role of principled beliefs and the gradually evolving nature of EU causal
beliefs, the parameters within which policy revisions took place were not so wide as to
allow for a more comprehensive overhaul. Our hypothesis suggests that this might have
been due to the influence of material variables, which determined the range of
possibilities for EFP. This will be further tested in the next section.
Table 12: The First Basket under the ENP
EU problem
definition
Lack of effective/transparent democratic institutions,
insufficient degree of respect for human rights principles in




Stronger action required, support best given to existing efforts
rather than explicitly against incumbent regimes, bottom-up
focus
Expected outcomes Greater alignment with international agreements but few
additional measurable benchmarks given
113 An additional focus has been the protection of human rights defenders (with 22 projects undertaken to




Action plan prioritisation, more independence from economic
side of Euro-Med relations, increased financial aid,
microprojects (hoop test passed)
Challenges No benchmarks in Action Plans, unstructured approach, lack
of will to address problematic cases (smoking gun test failed)
Actual outcomes Ambiguous - no clear normative effects or material impacts
observed
Conclusion Hoop evidence to support necessary role of principled beliefs,
but challenges imply that other variables were involved
In sum, the evidence appears to support our claim that a process of collective learning
took place, with gradual refinement of the EU’s operationalisation of its first basket
agenda. Human rights and democracy emerged as a moderately more significant field of
action, indicating that the EU was acting in line with its partial relinquishment of the
rather limited focus on economic reform in the early years of the EMP. But this does not
mean that the first basket overtook economics, which was still a more significant area of
focus. What is more, across the EU’s range of actions it has been difficult to find a true
smoking gun to support a normative conceptualisation of EFP. The evidence that we
have considered has been increasingly complex, with a number of ambiguities and
challenges. That said, we do feel confident in asserting that there is broad support for
the claim that principled beliefs played a necessary role as drivers of the EU’s policies.
It is true that this is a relatively weak claim still. For this reason we will continue our
analysis in the following section with a focus on the economic side of the ENP, which
has been hypothesised as coexisting with principled beliefs in driving the EU’s
Mediterranean policies.
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The ENP’s Economics and Trade Dimension
In Chapter III we have seen how the EMP was expected to improve socio-economic
conditions in the south whilst opening up new markets for European investment. The
most significant benchmark that was set was the conclusion of a free trade zone by
2010. When the ENP was being drawn up and implemented, however, little had come of
this vision. As one report stated: “reality lags far behind the aims … the 2010 project
that underpins the whole process is at risk” (EuroMeSCo, 2005, pp. 7-8). What is more,
the expected benefits in terms of regional prosperity did not emerge. According to Josep
Borrell, then president of the European Parliament, the Mediterranean Sea remained
“the most unequal border in the world” (Borrell, 2005).
In our investigation of the EU’s evolving causal beliefs we have argued that a
refinement of sorts took place. The roadmap for policy implied by the reformulated set
of beliefs aspired to the same goals as the EMP but contained an updated operational
element, inspired by various successes and failures across EFP and changing ideas on
how to promote prosperity abroad. The EU promised more support for economic
adjustment, but it also required deeper-going reform in order to allow the MENA
partners to benefit from the ‘stake’ in the common market that would be on offer. In the
present section we investigate these two core dimensions of what had been the second
basket of the EMP. We begin by asking to what extent the reformulated causal beliefs
were reflected in concrete policy initiatives pertaining to supporting reform in the
MENA, enabling us to test the extent to which the identified causal beliefs provided a
roadmap for EU foreign policy. We then proceed by tracing processes related to market
integration between north and south, which allows us to explore some of the more
detailed applications of EU causal beliefs and to test whether our independent variables
played a role in this process. We argue that relatively strong evidence can be found in
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support of our hypothesis on both counts, but in light of our data we also reiterate some
of the additional remarks made in Chapter III regarding the tension between shared and
relative (zero-sum) interests within the European Union’s foreign policy.
European Financial Support under the ENPI
From the perspective of this thesis’ theoretical framework, one aspect that is remarkable
about the ENP is the way in which it reflected a refinement of causal beliefs amongst
European policymakers. The causal logic of the ENP was partially based on the process
of enlargement and the failure of the EMP, implying a process of collective learning
within the EU. In this light it is notable that one explanation for the success of
enlargement can be found in the support given for reform, such as through the Union’s
Structural and Cohesion Funds (up to 2.4% of their GDP) (Martín, 2006). Previously
there had been criticism of the disjuncture observed between the costs of reform and the
amounts of aid provided by the EU within the EMP (see Chapter III), which is why this
topic provides a useful avenue to explore the extent to which refined causal beliefs
provided a roadmap for the EU’s Mediterranean policies.
A variety of instruments was envisaged under the ENP to provide support for the
eastern partners, the Maghreb, and the Mashriq. The option of access to the Structural
Funds was not on the table, so the most important financial tool was the successor to
MEDA: the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In addition to this
the ‘Technical Assistance and Information Exchange’ (TAIEX) and ‘Support for
Improvement in Governance and Management’ (SIGMA) instruments became available
to the Mediterranean partners. A system for ‘twinning’ with EU member states’
institutions was also designed. Finally, investment was promoted with the
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (set up in 2007), which built upon the earlier
established FEMIP (see also Chapter III). As we will see, investigation of these
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instruments supports our analysis that the ENP now followed a refined roadmap with a
larger role for EU support, marking a slight departure from the EMP’s more explicit
reliance on market forces.
To start with the ENPI, as stated in Regulation 1638/2006 its goal was to
promote “enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the
European Union and the partner countries” (§1). The grand total of ENPI funding
available for 2007-2013 was set at €11.5 billion. Allocation of these funds would be
decided on the basis of the Association Agreements and the ENP Action Plans (73%),
with some funds reserved for regional initiatives and cross-border cooperation
(European Commission, 2006l). A relatively large share of the budget was awarded to
the Mediterranean countries:
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Table 13: 2007-2010 ENPI Support in € million114
Med countries Eastern Partners
Algeria 220 Armenia 98.4
Egypt 558 Azerbaijan 92
Israel 8 Belarus 20
Jordan 265 Georgia 120.4
Lebanon 187 Moldova 209.7
Libya 8 Ukraine 494
Morocco 654 Russia 120
Palestine 632 Regional Programmes 223.5
Syria 130 Sub Total: 1378
Tunisia 300
Regional Programmes 343.3
Sub Total: 3305.3 Total 4683.3
Whereas MEDA II had committed a total of €5.350m for 2000-2006 (i.e. an average of
€764.3m per year), purely Med-specific funds (regional and bilateral) now amounted to
€826.3m annually for 2007-2010 (excluding cross-border cooperation programmes,
inter-regional programmes and the governance and investment facilities). On a per
capita basis, annual funding for e.g. Morocco increased from €4.80 in MEDA II to
€5.45 after 2006 (Bremberg, 2011).
Whilst this represented a useful increase, indicative of a more active EU
approach, the total amount was still relatively marginal compared to the significant
114 Source: European Commission (2006l).
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debts and negative trade balance of most Med countries (see Eurostat, 2011, p. 67).115
The European Commission admitted the problem as it spoke of a scarcity of resources
(2006b). In this regard, funds alone do not provide a significant basis for reaching the
conclusion that the EU changed its approach. It seems that this was recognised by the
Commission, which stressed the importance of also “seeking synergies between ENPI
and other EU funds as well as with Member States and their financing institutions”
(European Commission, 2006b). Coordination of this kind was provided for by thematic
groups, often led by the local EU Delegations, and through the provision of direct
budgetary support to Med partners (European Commission, 2010d, p. 36).116
As alluded to above, three instruments can be identified that were explicitly
designed to provide additional support for the ENP. It is especially in these instruments
that we can find evidence of how the ENP’s roadmap was enacted in EU foreign policy.
The first of the three is TAIEX. Available to the ENP countries since 2006 (see Council
Decision 2006/62/EC), its key goal has been to aid the approximation, application and
enforcement of EU legislation. To this purpose it provides demand-driven, short-term
advice (5 days maximum) to partner states through expert missions, workshops and
study visits to the EU, with an annual budget of €5m, shared with (potential) candidate
countries (European Commission, 2010c, p. 59). The SIGMA programme (€5.9m for
115 For Morocco, for example, if we assume a yearly bilateral sum of €163.5m, this works out at 0.27% of
GDP in 2008 (using data from Eurostat, 2011, p. 14). For Egypt this stands at 0.12%, and in the case of
Tunisia at 0.25% (ibid.); significantly less than the 2.4% for candidate-members.
116 In 2009 direct budget support made up 38% of the ENPI budget (European Commission, 2010d; see
also European Parliament 2010a). Another effort at achieving better coordination was made with the
‘European Consensus on Development’ of 2006 (European Union, 2006). With regards to direct
budgetary support we may add that though it could be supportive of national reform programmes (and
ipso facto promote co-ownership), budgetary support leaves little room for targeted aid and does not
easily allow for impact assessment. Consequently there is the risk of strengthening incumbent elites and
superficial changes (Harrigan, 2011; Open Europe, 2011, pp. 16-20).
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2008-2010, undertaken in cooperation with the OECD) operates under similar
conditions, except on a more involved level (assessment and assistance) and over a
longer period of time (up to six months). Finally, there has been the option of
institutional twinning between one or more member states and an ENP partner. Such a
project involves the secondment of an advisor to a beneficiary country for at least 12
months to help with the approximation of the EU acquis and structural reform (ibid., p.
58).
Since these three programmes are essentially EU accession tools, they could be
considered, in the words of Benita Ferrero-Waldner, as “central in applying the EU’s
transformative power” (European Commission, 2008b, p. 1). For the purposes of this
thesis, what the above set of instruments indicates is how the EMP’s causal
assumptions, i.e. the set of beliefs on how to best stimulate change in the MENA, was
concretised in the form of a series of instruments previously utilised in the context of
EU enlargement. This provides further evidence in support of our analysis of how the
roadmap for EU foreign policy towards the MENA was gradually adapted since 2003.
In our interviews with EU officials, it was stressed how the ENP showcases the EU’s
desire to have qualitatively more advanced relations with neighbouring states than with
others, with enlargement often mentioned as a model (Interviews with EEAS Officials,
2 & 6 June 2014, telephone). However, given the challenges that were experienced
previously and the large financial deficits within the MENA countries, the total amounts
of aid provided still appear as somewhat suppressed. This indicates that tough
enlargement may have been a model; there was certainly a quantitative difference with
the ENP.
A final avenue for increasing financial flows into the Mediterranean can be
found in investment. As investigated in Chapter III, a core goal of the EMP had been to
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increase investment to the benefit of both sides, which was reflective of European
economic interests as well as the wider market-oriented causal beliefs held by the EU. A
major frustration of EFP had been a lack of success in this sphere. Whereas an increase
of total FDI was observed in the region until 2007 (Anima Investment Network, 2011),
the Council still believed that “investment patterns in the region remain subdued … the
level of FDI inflows stands relatively low compared to other regions” (European
Commission, 2006m, §1.1).117 The attraction of private investment remained largely
dependent on domestic reform as well as political circumstances, and in this regard the
economic crisis since 2007 acted as a somewhat extraordinary intervening variable
(Montero Luque & Peeters, 2009). In this context the FEMIP (see Chapter III) was a
major source of loans, private equity, technical assistance and guarantees for initiatives
that were viewed as beneficial to investment and the private sector (European
Commission, 2006m). Funding increased gradually over the years, with 2010 as a peak
year (€2.6 billion worth of investments) – between 2002 and 2010 €12 billion was
invested in the MENA, and for 2007-2013 the budget available to FEMIP was set at
€8.7 billion. According to the EIB, these investments created more than 30,000 jobs in
SMEs in the Maghreb and Mashriq.118 In addition to FEMIP, an amount of €700 million
was reserved from the ENPI interregional programme for a Neighbourhood Investment
Facility (NIF) (European Commission, 2006f).119 The overall goal of this was to bring
117 Whereas in 2001 the MENA attracted 1.2% of European FDI (Quefelec, 2003) this rose to 3% in 2008
– surpassed by sub-Saharan Africa which attracted 3.3% (Eurostat, 2011, p. 103).
118 It is important to add that according to World Bank estimations 100 million jobs need to be created by
2020 to actually reduce unemployment (World Bank, 2003).
119 The idea was to combine grants with loans provided by multi- and bilateral European finance
institutions and thus to leverage concessional lending for investment in large projects in e.g.
infrastructure. According to the Commission (2010d, p. 35), the NIF “reached cruising speed in 2009”,
and it has supported 39 projects for a total grant contribution of €277 million over 2008-2010
(EuropeAid, 2011, p. 28).
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more tangible results for citizens in the ENP countries, to enhance donor coordination
and harmonisation of procedures, and thus to increase the effectiveness and visibility of
European aid (European Commission, 2009a).
Relative to the EMP, what stands out is that altogether we can observe a slight
shift towards a more active approach in terms of investing in infrastructure and building
up capital in the MENA. As we have said, this can be interpreted as the effect of a
collective learning process based upon the fact that the strongly market-oriented
expectations that had animated the EMP did not prove to be accurate. It is important to
note that this mirrored gradual changes in the Bretton Woods institutions’ approach,
particularly the World Bank, with a relaxation of conditionality requirements and more
emphasis on development assistance (see Pender, 2001; Gore, 2000).
In sum, the evidence considered here provides useful material for our second
test, which requires us to analyse the nature of EU policy and to ask whether causal
beliefs provided a roadmap for action. In the funding initiatives taken by the EU since
2003 this does seem to be the case, as we can observe a slight departure from previous
operational principles in terms of less dependency on private markets and a more active
role for the EU. The consistency between causal beliefs and policy thus provides hoop
evidence in support of an important element of our hypothesis. In the following
paragraphs we will analyse whether/how this was related to our hypothesis’ independent
variables.
A Stake in the Common Market?
The European Neighbourhood Policy promised to offer the partner states better
prospects at integration with the EU and greater incentives for their efforts at
approximation of EU standards and regulations. As we have argued this was not
fundamentally a departure from previous causal thinking, but rather a refined way to
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pursue the goals that had been set in the EMP. In support of this analysis, one IMF
analyst spoke of “a new mechanism to leverage domestic structural reforms” (Nsouli,
2006). This new mechanism consisted primarily of the ‘stake’ in the common market
that would be on offer. The EU’s causal beliefs had thus been moderated slightly, and
there is strong evidence on how this fit within the existing framework of pursuing
material interests:
[T]he objective of offering the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market to
the neighbours of the enlarged EU … will … offer EU enterprises both a large
domestic market and with easier access to abundant human or physical
production factors. This will strengthen the competitiveness of EU producers
and will enable them to remain present in market segments characterised by
strong competition from Far East producers … (European Commission, 2003g,
emphasis added)
Or as was asserted subsequently: “Europe cannot reach higher prosperity in a vacuum.
Prosperity in third countries helps build EU prosperity and reciprocally” (European
Commission, 2005b, §2.4). This provides us with relatively strong evidence in support
of our claim that the EU’s economic interest consisted of market expansion and that this
influenced its beliefs on how to engage with the MENA.
The ENP’s drive to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to exports, consistent with
the EU’s economic interests, could be observed in the deep-going reforms called for in
the Commission’s ENP Strategy Paper of 2004 (European Commission, 2004a, pp. 15-
16). While the EU’s Washington Consensus-inspired structural adjustment principles
were moderated slightly over time, there continued to be strong emphasis on market-
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based reform.120 The Action Plans contained relatively detailed lists of actions to be
taken with regards to trade and macroeconomic stability. In the case of Morocco, for
example, the AP stressed the removal of NTBs via policies such as continued reform in
the financial sector, the introduction of a comprehensive agricultural policy that would
enable modernisation and liberalisation, modernisation of customs services, alignment
of Moroccan legislation on industrial products with the EU, gradual capital account
liberalisation, and modernisation of the tax system in line with international and EU
standards (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005g; see also European Commission 2003b).
Evidently this was an extensive list, evincing a comprehensive theory of cause-and-
effect within the economic sphere. This contrasts notably with the political sphere (first
basket), where a much less clearly thought-out strategy existed.
As mentioned, one of the issues highlighted in the previous chapter was the
tension between absolute and relative benefits in the EMP. Whereas the overall
emphasis in the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been on absolute benefits and the need
to forestall a widening of disparities between north and south, we have also seen that
there is some evidence of relative or zero-sum interests influencing European behaviour,
often in a more ‘negative’ sense. From this point of view perhaps the most important
common denominator in the APs was the idea of liberalisation of trade in services and
120 This outlook was warmly welcomed by the International Monetary Fund, whose economic views on
the Mediterranean were broadly analogous. In a newspaper article on the Maghreb (published in
Morocco’s L’economiste), the Fund’s managing director put the need for continued structural adjustment
as follows: “To take greater advantage of the potential of the EU Association Agreements and the Wider
European Neighbourhood, it is in the Maghreb countries’ interest to facilitate trade among themselves as
well as with the European Union. They should build the institutions that are necessary to pursue common
goals and share best practices, including in banking reform, tax reform, and capital account liberalization”
(De Rato, 2005).
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agricultural goods, which had been a highly problematic aspect of the EMP.121 Given
the importance of services in the modern world-economy122 as well as the Med states’
long-standing interest in European concessions on market access for agricultural goods,
the renewed focus on these issues in the ENP marked a potential step forward in the
pursuit of the Barcelona Declaration’s long-term goals (see Euro-Med Partnership,
2005d, §8.a). In its review of the ENP in 2006 the Commission set itself the goal of
extending the free trade area to be ‘deep and comprehensive’, which “should cover
substantially all trade in goods and services” including “products of particular
importance for our partners” (i.e.: agriculture) (European Commission, 2006b, §3.1).123
In this light services and agriculture can serve as a useful testing-ground for our
hypothesis and to explore some of the (potential) challenges that were experienced with
regards to material variables in the ENP.
As far as services was concerned, particularly so-called ‘backbone’ services
such as transport, telecommunications and finance could generate an important
121 For Jordan, the AP underlined “measures to improve business conditions to enhance growth and
increase investment”; “further liberalisation of trade, in goods and agriculture”; and “a progressive
liberalisation of trade in services” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005e). In the case of Egypt, priorities were
said to include: “negotiation of an agreement on liberalising trade in services”; “increase economic
integration with the EU, particularly by taking steps to the gradual liberalization of trade in services and
on the right of establishment and to liberalize trade in agriculture”; and “the development of a climate
conducive to foreign direct investment, growth and sustainable development” (Euro-Med Partnership,
2007a). As a final example, Tunisia’s priorities included: “the development of conditions conducive to
foreign direct investment, growth and sustainable development”; “improving the climate and conditions
for the development of competitive businesses and entrepreneurship”; “facilitating trade in goods and
services”; and “the approximation of technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment
procedures” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005f).
122 The services sector has been responsible for about 75% of employment in the EU and between 50 and
60% of GDP in the Med partner states (European Commission, 2006j).
123 The AAs had set a five year deadline for the start of negotiations on services liberalisation. This
deadline elapsed for many EMP partners, including Tunisia, Morocco, Israel and Lebanon.
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connection between north and south and provide the needed infrastructure for a genuine
free trade zone.124 Liberalisation of trade in services could have significant positive
impacts: one OECD report concluded that it “generates substantial welfare gains … at
least of the same magnitude as goods liberalisation” (cited in Müller-Jentsch, 2005, p.
22). In addition, a more specific case study of Egypt by the World Bank revealed that an
increase of up to 21% of GNP could be achieved through the reduction of import and
export barriers in this sphere (Hoekman & Konan, 1999). Another example is Tunisia,
where the projected benefits of liberalisation of trade in services significantly exceeded
the expected benefits of goods liberalisation (Konan & Maskus, 2000). A strong
argument thus existed in support of liberalisation of the services sector. It could serve
European interests and produce benefits for the Med partners as well, serving as a good
example of an arena of potential shared gains.
However, as attested to by the difficult experience of the European Single
Market in this field (establishing a customs Union regarding services policies has
proven to be rather contentious), services liberalisation is typically a slow and
complicated process. According to the World Bank, it “continues to rank among the
most complex subject matters in modern trade diplomacy” (World Bank, 2009, p. 1).125
124 Following WTO standards, four modes of trade in services can be distinguished: 1) cross-border
supply (e.g. online purchases); 2) consumption abroad (mainly tourism); 3) commercial presence (e.g. the
establishment of a branch of a bank or supermarket abroad, which also links services to investment and
the right of establishment); and 4) the presence of natural persons (e.g. foreign consultancy or seasonal
labour) (Müller-Jentsch, 2005).
125 Two main reasons can be identified for this (FEMISE, 2008, p. 90). First, the implementation of non-
discriminatory treatment often has a limited effect on the services sector given the importance of domestic
regulatory frameworks. One option would be to harmonise rules, but this ‘one size fits all’ approach is
often costly and could eliminate certain firms’ comparative advantages in so far as they are rooted in
domestic legislation. Another option is mutual recognition of ‘core’ rules, but this often leads negotiators
to seek inclusion of regulations which are primarily beneficial to domestic service providers (and possibly
detrimental to foreign companies). Europe’s own solution to this issue is laid down in the rather hotly
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In the case of Euro-Mediterranean trade, the ENP’s language of a stake in the common
market and the provisions of the Action Plans indicate that, where applicable, the EU’s
rules and regulations (in combination with international standards) would serve as a
benchmark for harmonisation (e.g. in company law, accounting and auditing rules) (see
Marouani & Munro, 2009; Kox & Lejour, 2006). This would be beneficial for European
companies, as additional investment options abroad would emerge under such an
arrangement without any required reforms. The benefits for the Med countries would
once again be situated in the sphere of inbound foreign investment (see Euro-Med
Partnership, 2009a, p. 2). This serves as further hoop support for our perspective, as we
can see how the EU’s position was consistent with its hypothesised interest in European
market expansion.
debated EC Services Directive of 2006 (Directive 2006/123/EC), which is based on a third option, namely
the principle of the country of origin. Under this principle companies are essentially able to export
services under the rules and regulations that apply within their home country. This system is not without
its problems though, and it includes the risk of a ‘race to the bottom’ to attain comparative advantage as
well as the obligatory importation of services of a lower standard than what is applied domestically. The
fact that many member states (including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Slovenia and Spain) missed the December 2009 deadline to fully transpose the Services Directive into
their domestic legal systems illustrates how politically complex the process has proven to be (EurActiv,
2008). It is not surprising, therefore, that for Euro-Med trade such a solution was not considered as an
option. A second major difficulty pertains to the nature of the products on offer in the services sector.
More than goods, where a single decision to eliminate tariffs could boost competition, services are
heterogeneous and dynamic, requiring therefore constant review of existing regulations. A country thus
needs to trust its trading partners “not to establish new barriers, but also, above all, to enact and to enforce
a continuous flow of pro-active and pro-competitive regulatory reforms in the years to come” (FEMISE,
2008, p. 91). This requires a large amount of resources, technical expertise, openness, and coordination
between countries – factors which are often constrained in developing economies such as those of the
Maghreb and the Mashriq.
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Several challenges existed, however, primarily pertaining to the GATS126 and
the Med states’ limited previous commitments (European Commission, 2006j).127 After
what was described as ‘a strong push’ by the Commission (2004a), the Euro-Med
working group on trade in services drafted a non-binding document that was endorsed at
the 2004 Istanbul Ministerial meeting (Euro-Med Partnership, 2004c, §4).128 This
‘Istanbul Framework’ (which did not address the right of establishment) was inspired by
the language of the GATS, including a positive list approach and a regional most-
favoured nation clause, but with the added option for the Med partners to bilaterally
conclude further-going agreements without EU involvement (allowing for more
extensive south-south trade) (European Commission, 2006j). This marked a first step,
leading to further discussion at the 5th Euro-Mediterranean trade ministerial conference
in Marrakech (24 March 2006). At the start of the conference, EU Trade Commissioner
Peter Mandelson made clear his intention to “begin the work of putting services at the
heart of [Euro-Mediterranean] trade” (Mandelson, 2006). This was reflected in the
126 GATS stands for ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services’; it was one of the main results of the
WTO’s Uruguay round and entered into force in 1995. (All EU member states and about half of the Med
partners are WTO members [except Algeria, Lebanon, the PA and Syria]). Article II of GATS obliges
members to reciprocally extent treatment of services no less favourable than that accorded to any other
country (the most favoured nation [MFN] arrangement), but they were allowed to select in which specific
sectors they would make commitments to freeze or lower tariffs (this system is referred to as a ‘positive
list’ approach). An exception to the MFN rule could only be made in case of ‘economic integration
agreements’, providing for substantial sector coverage, elimination of substantially all discrimination
between the parties, and development-related flexibilities (e.g. asymmetric commitments) (European
Commission, 2006j).
127 Generally speaking the Mediterranean countries had commitments in fewer sectors than most other
countries at similar levels of development. Egypt, for example, had commitments in only four sectors and
Tunisia in three. Jordan was an exception with all 11 sectors selected under GATS. See for the full list of
commitments and exemptions: [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm],
accessed 20 January 2012.
128 See: [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_118225.pdf] for the framework (accessed
20 January 2012).
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conference’s conclusions, where it was said that “the liberalisation of services and the
right of establishment is an indispensable step in establishing a genuine Free Trade Area
by 2010” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2006d).
Following this reaffirmation of political will, a two-track negotiating structure
was chosen to take matters further, including a multilateral dimension for issues of
common interest (as represented by the Framework Protocol) and a bilateral track for
country-specific issues. Regional-level negotiations started in July 2006 (involving the
EU, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia), and several rounds of
negotiations were subsequently conducted. These talks focused on a non-paper that had
been proposed by the EU, which included a framework for regulatory alignment in inter
alia computer services, postal and courier services, financial services, international
maritime transport services and telecommunication services (Egypt Ministry of Trade
and Industry, 2008). However, owing to disagreements over the scope and areas of
liberalisation the negotiations were not successful, and the goal of presenting a text at
the trade ministerial meeting in Lisbon was not reached (Euro-Med Partnership, 2007b).
Further efforts until 2010, bilateral and regional, were equally unsuccessful (see
European Commission, 2011a; 2010a; Euro-Med Partnership, 2008b; Barroso, 2008).
How does this picture fit into our analytical framework? First of all, as said the
EU’s behaviour appears as consistent with its interest in market expansion and a
strengthening of the competitiveness of European businesses. Without an appreciation
of this variable it would be very difficult to account for the nature of EU policy in this
sphere. However, there were several complications and challenges, and it is remarkable
that despite strong interest from both sides no agreement could be concluded. The
evidence suggests that in large part the observed failure could be explained in terms of
the EU’s emphasis on issues of relative rather than absolute benefit. In other words,
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despite the possibility of services liberalisation to benefit all parties involved the
emphasis was on matters mostly beneficial to Europe (e.g. financial services; Tovias,
2007).
Thus, what we see here is that the EU has an interest in market expansion and a
causal belief that Euro-Mediterranean services liberalisation would strengthen EU
competitiveness, which is part of the larger set of causal beliefs focused on
strengthening market forces in the MENA. Yet in several ways the scope for EU action
was limited by a tension between relative and shared interests. For example, an
important bargaining chip could have been a relaxation of restrictions in Mode 4 of the
GATS framework (presence of natural persons), as requested for example by Egypt
during both regional and bilateral negotiations (Egypt Ministry of Trade and Industry,
2008). But given the EU’s scrapping of the ‘workers’ aspect of the four freedoms this
potentially useful incentive could not be utilised (see also Hoekman & Özden, 2010).
Further contributing was the fact that the EU had not moved towards a fully-fledged
Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank for investment in backbone services (see
Chapter III). The lack of commitment implied arguably discouraged further steps
towards a loss of regulatory sovereignty in the services sector for the MENA partners
(Knio, 2010, p. 118).129 Once again this highlights how the evidence supports some
129 This was despite reaffirmations of support from the European Parliament (2011, §9), members of the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (Council of Europe, 2006), and the Mediterranean states
(Marweb, 2010; Mira, 2002). As the Commission said: “It is expected that reaching higher business
volumes would be facilitated by the greater involvement of Mediterranean countries in the subsidiary's
governance and extended local presence … [L]ending activities could go beyond the levels contemplated
for FEMIP, reaching EUR 1.8bn in 2009 and then a cruising speed of EUR 2.6bn by 2013” (2006m,
§2.5). Moreover:, such a move “would strengthen [Europe’s] political presence in the region and anchor
its commitment vis-à-vis its Mediterranean counterparts” (Knio, 2010, p. 116). Until now the idea has
been supported by southern member states such as Italy and Spain, but northern member states like
Germany, Britain, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden have continued to express reservations
(see Euro-Med Partnership, 2011).
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important elements of our hypothesis, but also that we must be sensitive to variation
within the sort of economic interests pursued by the EU. When an interest is broadly
shared, it appears easier for the EU to convince Mediterranean partners to accept its
point of view as there is more leeway to provide incentives and thus to make sure that
the arrangement is truly of benefit to all. In fact, the (potential of) disagreement between
the member states was strongly underlined as a significant challenge to devising
impactful EU policy in the MENA (Interview with EEAS Official, 3 June 2014,
telephone).
A parallel can be drawn with the earlier situation regarding reciprocal
agricultural liberalisation, as discussed in Chapter III. Here the prospect of MENA
competition with southern European products had posed a formidable barrier to
progress (European Commission, 2006k, p. 3; Garcia-Alvarez-Coque, 2002). In
addition to services, agricultural liberalisation formed the most concrete part of the
‘stake’ in the common market. The first step that was taken was the adoption of the
‘Euro-Mediterranean roadmap for agriculture’ (also known as the ‘Rabat Roadmap’) at
the 10-year anniversary of the EMP (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005d). It is interesting to
note that there was explicit mention of EU ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ interests in this
roadmap (European Commission, 2006k, §7). Both could be said to represent different
kinds of material interests, with the distinction between absolute and relative, as we
have highlighted in Chapter II. On the offensive side it was mentioned that EU exports
enjoyed very little liberalisation, and there was concern regarding Latin American and
US competition in the region (ibid., §4). This gives a good indication of the potential
material advantages and the underlying economic interests driving European policy.
Defensively, the main concern remained to be increased competition from the MENA
itself. Reflecting the ENP’s causal logic, the approach that was favoured in the
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Roadmap was intended to be flexible and tailored to individual partners, including the
option of asymmetrical timetables for liberalisation to reflect developmental differences
between the EU and the Med partners. Yet the main innovation was the replacement of
the old gradualist system (periodical reviews leading to limited mutual concessions
based on traditional trade flows) for a comprehensive liberalisation process for all
sectors, with the option of exclusion of sensitive products to protect defensive interests
(a so-called ‘negative list’ approach). The first partner state with whom an agreement
was made under this renewed philosophy was Jordan in early 2006 (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2006e). Negotiations with other EMP countries followed: in February 2006
Morocco agreed to holding talks, and during that year Israel and Egypt also made
overtures towards the Union. Concrete deals to emerge out of these negotiations were
with Israel (Euro-Med Partnership, 2009b), Egypt (Euro-Med Partnership, 2010), and
the Palestinian Authority (Europolitics, 2011).130 But did the new direction mark a
transcendence of earlier tensions?
In light of this question the case of Morocco provides some interesting insights.
Pursuant to King Mohamed VI’s remarks on a state visit to France in 2005 Morocco
was granted ‘advanced status’ in October 2008, the most important implications of
which were integration with the single market, the gradual adoption of the Community
acquis, and the opening up of Community programmes to Moroccan participation
130 E.g. the agreement with Egypt contained full liberalisation for all products except tobacco, wines,
spirits and pig meat, while the EU maintained its calendars, tariff quotas and entry price levels for
‘sensitive’ products such as tomatoes, cucumbers, artichokes, courgettes, grapes, garlic, strawberries, rice,
sugar, and processed tuna and sardines (ibid.). Though not without benefits for Egypt, the agreement was
thus somewhat skewed in favour of the EU – as EU Commissioner Fischer Boel said: it will “strengthen
the position of European exporters on what is our most significant market in the Middle East region”
(European Commission, 2008a).
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(Euro-Med Partnership, 2008c).131 The EU-Morocco agreement of 2008 did not address
agricultural liberalisation, but after long negotiations a deal was finally agreed upon in
2009. It provides for progressively implemented full market access for European tinned
food, dairy products, oilseeds, fish, fruits and vegetables (up to 70% of exports).
Morocco, for its part, would gain better access to Europe’s fruit and vegetable sector,
excluding however tomatoes, strawberries, courgettes, cucumbers, garlic and
clementines (entry prices were maintained across the board) (European Commission,
2010b). Like previous agreements this seemed favourable from a European point of
view, but Morocco’s access to the EU market remained limited (Kausch, 2010, p. 4).132
This was also the case with the other agreements, which generally maintained quotas
and tariffs on imports in excess of the defined quantities. For sensitive products such as
131 It remains unclear exactly how this is different from the ENP itself – one Commission official
admitted that “it doesn’t mean anything concrete” (cited in Bremberg, 2011, p. 11) – especially as the
advanced status continued to fall short of the ‘everything but the institutions’ formula (Kausch, 2010;
Jaidi & Martín, 2010). In a 2011 Communication (responding to the Arab Spring) the Commission
described advanced status as allowing for “significantly strengthened political dialogue”, “increased links
between the partner country and EU institutions”, “deeper engagement on mobility”, and “improved
market access to the EU” (European Commission, 2011b).
132 Within the EU there was nevertheless notable concern regarding trade concessions during a period of
economic crisis, which was said to be “jeopardising farmers’ futures, as well as the development of many
European regions” (Economic and Social Committee, 2010, §6.10). An Opinion drafted by the European
Parliament’s Agricultural Committee recommended rejection of the EU-Morocco deal. Amongst the cited
reasons we find: “potential negative economic repercussions on regions which specialise in vegetable
cultivation”; “an objective imbalance in the tariff reductions agreed upon by the two parties”; “the issue
of the Western Sahara territories”; “competitiveness problems caused by labour cost differentials”; and
finally the fact that “Community producers already have to deal with the substantial quota increases
resulting from agreements with other Mediterranean countries” (European Parliament, 2011a). In this
sense there appears to have been a remarkable mix of normative concerns (Western Sahara) and
straightforward trade interests, and the crisis was further deepened when extension of an EU-Morocco
fisheries agreement was also rejected by Parliament in late 2011 – leading to a direct Moroccan ban on
European fishing (European Parliament, 2011b; BBC, 2011). The EU-Morocco agricultural agreement
was finally passed by the European Parliament in February 2012 (European Parliament, 2012b).
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tomatoes and cucumbers seasonal windows and entry price levels were also maintained,
though often in a slightly more flexible manner.
What, in conclusion, does the process of services and agriculture liberalisation
tell us about the validity of our hypothesis? First of all, we may note that relatively
strong hoop evidence exists in support of the hypothesised causal relationship between
economic interests, causal beliefs and behaviour. The EU’s policies have in general
been consistent with an interest in market expansion and strengthening competitiveness,
and this explains many of the features of the more detailed proposals put forward by the
EU. In this regard there is strong support for asserting that economic interests are a
necessary variable for accounting for the EU’s Mediterranean policies. Furthermore, in
response to the failings of the EMP’s more limited approach it has been observed that
there was a push to reach a more united stance on liberalising services and agriculture,
strengthening shared interests by ameliorating intra-EU divisions. However, the
ongoing challenges observed in this field highlight how there continued to be a degree
of tension between differing kinds of material interests. This reconfirms how variations
within economic interests can have important consequences for the scope of EU foreign
policy.
Table 14: The ENP and Economic Policy
EU problem
definition
Insufficient progress in EMP liberalisation programme, limited
market access, persistent north-south inequality
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Deeper reforms needed via actor-specific offers of benefits,
‘stake’ in common market, enlargement-inspired approach,
more effective utilisation of EFP potential
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Expected outcomes Increased market access and strengthened competitiveness for
EU businesses, welfare gains in MENA
Evidence in support
of hypothesis
Usage of enlargement instruments, FEMIP increase, market-
based reform emphasis, push to include services and
agriculture
Challenges Tension between shared and zero-sum interests in EU
Actual outcomes 2010 FTZ deadline missed, no services liberalisation, limited
agricultural liberalisation, modest improvement of reciprocal
market access but with advantage for EU
Conclusion Strong evidence in support of hypothesised relationship
between economic interests, causal beliefs and behaviour, but
challenges continue to draw attention to differentiation
between EU economic interests
Cultural Cooperation and JHA
Now that we have investigated both the political and economic dimensions of Euro-
Med relations under the ENP, with each shedding light on the role of ideational and
material variables in the EU’s policies, the final dimension that must be considered is
that which had previously been the third basket of the EMP. As we have seen this was
broken up into two baskets, one focusing on what was called human affairs and the
other on justice and home affairs. Given the tentative nature of efforts in both these
spheres within the EMP until 2003, we have previously argued that our evidence for the
third/fourth basket does not lend strong support for wider theoretical claims. In this
section we will analyse to what extent this changed under the ENP.
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We begin by testing our hypothesis in light of the EU’s policies in the field of
human affairs, focusing on cultural and decentralised actions. Our findings indicate that
in a departure from earlier efforts a clearer causal theory was now connected to the third
basket, enabling it to play a stronger role within the ENP. Most significantly, the
cultural sector was viewed as capable of playing a supportive role for the other
dimensions of the ENP, serving not so much as a goal in itself but rather offering a tool
to realise ambitions in other spheres of Euro-Med relations. This neither confirms nor
falsifies our hypothesis, given that the third basket’s instrumentalism can be connected
to our independent variables. Secondly we investigate the JHA dimension of the ENP.
What is striking here is how anti-immigration and anti-terror measures came to play an
increasingly significant role in the EU’s policies, verifying that the overtures observed
in Chapter II represented a trend of sorts, which poses some challenges to our
hypothesis. In light of these challenges we will be able to discuss our fourth empirical
test – pertaining to the sufficiency of our hypothesis to explain EFP – in the final
conclusions of this chapter.
Towards Cultural Instrumentalism?
A weakness of the third basket that has been mentioned in Chapter III was that there
appeared to be little connection with the other two baskets of the EMP (Pace, 2005, p.
65). In this regard the third basket seemed somewhat divorced from the main causal
beliefs underpinning the EMP, but given the problems that were experienced and the
limited range of action we have argued that the available data does not clearly support a
particular theoretical vision. How does our hypothesis hold up in light of subsequent EU
policies?
When the ENP was introduced in 2003 the Commission did not specifically
address cultural/decentralised cooperation. Yet in 2006 it identified the human
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dimension as an area where progress could be made: “the ENP must have a ‘human
face’, and citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries should have more
opportunities to interact … On both sides of the borders, people should be able to see
directly the impact of a stronger bond between the Union and its neighbours” (2006f, p.
6). Obtaining publicly ‘tangible’ results became an often referenced goal of the third
basket, and it could be said that this provides some indication as to the envisioned
linkage with other EU-Med activities. This perspective allowed for greater integration
with the ENP’s predominant causal beliefs, highlighting how intercultural programmes
were not necessarily a goal as such but came to be viewed as a wider instrument in the
ENP’s toolbox.
Following the shift from MEDA to ENPI a variety of specific programmes was
incorporated into the new instrument, including EuroMed Audiovisual, Heritage, Youth
and Gender, as well as a Regional Information and Communication programme. The
cumulative budget for the latter set of programmes was €67m, corresponding to 19.5%
of the ENPI’s overall regional budget (€343.3m) (European Commission, 2006n, p. 53).
Relative to the total ENPI budget this was a small sum, but a strengthened sense of
purpose was evident in some of the EU’s statements, such as the first Agenda for
Culture (adopted in 2007). The Agenda stated that intercultural dialogue is “one of the
main instruments of peace and conflict prevention”, emphasising also its function to
“convey important messages in third countries about Europe” (European Commission,
2007e, p. 7).133 Whilst this suggests a potential public diplomacy role, with a view to the
Lisbon Strategy there was also an economic rationale: “Creativity is the basis for social
and technological innovation, and therefore an important driver of growth,
133 With regard to such ‘messages’, it was said in the internal context that “culture can contribute to
‘seduce’ European citizens to the idea of European integration” (KEA European Affairs, 2006, p. 1).
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competitiveness and jobs in the EU” (ibid., p. 9).134 Altogether this gave the third basket
an added instrumentalist, politico-economic flavour. It is notable that decentralised
action was justified from a very wide range of perspectives. For example, a link was
made between anti-terror policies and cultural dialogue. In the words of the EU’s
counter-terrorism coordinator:
[I]nter-cultural understanding enhances the legitimacy and effectiveness of our
counter-terrorism policies, because it demonstrates that these are not directed
against one community or religion. Therefore, as a EU Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator, I fully recognise the benefits of inter-cultural dialogue to … ‘the
struggle for hearts and minds’. (De Kerchove, 2007, p. 2)
These comments shed some further light on how intercultural dialogue was viewed by
some important actors in the EU’s foreign policy making establishment. Rather than
being a desirable objective in its own right, culture was at least in part believed to
enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of practices in different areas of cooperation.
What is more, as it was connected to ‘the struggle for hearts and minds’ it is difficult to
escape the impression that it sometimes took the form of unidirectional public
diplomacy rather than ‘exchange’. One example can be found in an EU-sponsored event
on study abroad opportunities for Palestinian students – undertaken in light of the
TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundus programmes for higher education exchange that had
134 Or as one report advised: “The prediction is that the cultural and creative sector is going to become as
important as car-making and coal mining once used to be. Europe’s competitiveness in the world will
depend on its ability to nurture its creative talents and industries” (KEA European Affairs, 2006, p. 187).
The Committee of the Regions expressed some reservations: “despite its wholehearted support … [the
Committee] would nonetheless warn against placing one-sided emphasis on the purely economic
importance of culture in this context” (Committee of the Regions, 2008a, §8).
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been opened for the Med countries135 – that was attended by this author (Palestine
Polytechnic University, Hebron, October 2010). The general impression was that the
EU was trying to promote a specific image of Europe, rather than facilitate dialogue,
whilst most of the offered programmes were not actually open to the students that were
present. In another example, also drawn from the Palestinian case, an EU-sponsored
television quiz named Stars (after the EU flag) asked students questions about the
European Union (Maan News, 2009). What these concrete examples confirm is that
third basket activities sometimes focused on projecting an image of Europe abroad
rather than inviting reciprocal dialogue – this being consistent with the more
instrumentalist public diplomacy role implied by winning ‘hearts and minds’.136
One innovation of the post-2003 period in particular is significant: the Anna
Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF). Headquartered in
Alexandria (Egypt), it was launched in 2005 with the overall purpose of “[contributing]
to the visibility of the Barcelona Process through intellectual, cultural and civil society
exchange” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2004d, §II.1). The focus on the ‘visibility’ of the
EMP implies a primary role of gaining support for the ENP’s other dimensions. The
135 Particularly after the unrest experienced in the Middle East and North Africa in response to the
cartoons published by the Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005, there was emphasis on the role of
education. As Benita Ferrero-Waldner argued: “The cartoon crisis was a particularly disturbing example
of the gulf of misunderstanding between us … [W]e all have work to do to fight prejudice and to build
bridges of greater understanding and respect between us. How do we do this? The answer is education”
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b).
136 Some statements from the European Parliament also underline such an interpretation: “Europe’s
cultural heritage … has, over the course of history, placed Europe in the vanguard of all the continents,
proved to be an unrivalled driver of innovation, development and progress, which has spread in every
direction, and today still constitutes an essential reference point for humanism, spiritual enrichment and
enlivenment, democracy, tolerance, and citizenship”; “in an increasingly globalised world, the
outstanding specific qualities contained within the nucleus of Europe’s cultural richness constitute
genuine European added value and their identity-giving role is vital for Europe and the Union in that it
helps … assert themselves in relation to other peoples” (European Parliament, 2009, F, G, K).
211
main instrument of the Foundation has been a region-wide ‘network of networks’ of
civil society actors (43 networks in total137), but as detailed in its 2005-2008 programme
it would also directly organise events, co-organise initiatives with external actors, and
launch calls for proposals (Euro-Med Partnership, 2006a, p. 48). The co-ownership
incorporated in the Foundation’s headquartering in Egypt as well as the concrete
institutionalisation of cultural dialogue and cooperation have been utilised as evidence
in support of a ‘socialisation perspective’ (Nicolaïdis & Nicolaïdis, 2004; see below).
As admitted, however: “It would be naive to believe that such a Foundation can itself
create we-ness in the region” (ibid., p. 13). What is more, funding was not wholly
institutionalised and has been dependent on voluntary contributions from the Euro-Med
states (€5.7m, topped up to €12.7m by the Commission for 2008-2011) (Anna Lindh
Foundation, 2011, p. 142). This subjected the Foundation to budgetary insecurity and
implied a rather low level of overall EU commitment. Furthermore, the dependency on
funding by states who might feel threatened by overtly ‘political’ initiatives led to the
revision of various initiatives that were considered too controversial. As Aliboni writes:
“to put it bluntly, a degree of censorship was used” (2009, p. 5; see also Khalifa, 2010).
In the terminology of our theoretical framework, what is notable is that the
evidence suggests how an additional element was added to the ENP roadmap. It was
believed that public apprehensions regarding political and economic collaboration
between north and south might form a barrier, which is why cultural approximation
came to play a more defined role in Euro-Med relations. Yet this remained rather
limited in relation to the wider ENP and was mostly subsumed within the existing set of
causal beliefs. Given this instrumentalisation, the third basket does not imply a
137 The total composition has been: NGOs (53%), public institutions; (9%), foundations (13%); local and
regional authorities (2.4%); individuals (2.8%); and private organisations (9%) (Anna Lindh Foundation,
2011, p. 12).
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significantly altered set of drivers than those incorporated in the other areas of the
ENP/EMP. In other words, the evidence suggests that third basket was mostly
instrumental for, rather than a challenge to, wider economic interests and/or principled
beliefs. This is not to underplay the fact that the EU did formulate an approach in which
cultural approximation was a policy tool, but in terms of the wider problem diagnoses
and suggested solutions there is no evidence that this played a principal role in the ENP.
Therefore, in our view the evidence considered neither undermines nor strongly
supports our hypothesis.
Table 15: Human Affairs and the ENP
EU problem
definition
Insufficient visibility ENP, potential resistance to EU policies
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Decentralised cooperation; focus on education, culture, Anna
Lindh Foundation
Expected outcomes Winning hearts and minds, broaden support for EU and ENP
Evidence in support
of hypothesis
Limited addition potentially made to ENP roadmap
Challenges Limited prioritisation and funding, censorship in ALF
Actual outcomes Not enough evidence to reach a firm conclusion
Conclusion Played an instrumental role to wider ENP, overall of limited
significance
Justice and Home Affairs
As argued in Chapter III, the priority awarded to cooperation on issues pertaining to
JHA increased since the Common Strategy of 2000, 9/11 and the April 2002 Valencia
Action Plan. Within the design of the ENP as well as the ESS there was a further
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augmentation of this dimension. It was openly admitted by the Commission: “In the
wake of September 11, the second Intifada and the war in Iraq … issues related to
justice and home affairs, border control, the fight against terrorism and crime have come
to the forefront in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (European Commission, 2006n,
p. 7). This orientation was further fuelled by events such as the Madrid train bombings
of 11 March 2004 and the London bombings of 7 July 2005 (Q&A with Marc Otte, 3
December 2010, Londo).
With regards to terrorism, since 2000 the EMP Association Agreements
contained specific clauses, stating e.g. in the case of Algeria that “both Parties agree to
cooperate with a view to preventing and penalising acts of terrorism … through the
exchange of information” and by “pooling experience of means and practices for
combating terrorism, including experience in the technical and training field” (Euro-
Med Partnership, 2005a, §90). The Valencia Action Plan stressed that “the Barcelona
Process cannot remain indifferent to the phenomenon of Terrorism” (Euro-Med
Partnership, 2002, §2(a)), while under the Spanish and Greek presidencies efforts were
intensified to involve Mediterranean states in the ESDP. In May 2004 it was decided at
the Euro-Med conference in Dublin to intensify both regional and bilateral counter-
terror cooperation, and opportunities for engaging in operational joint activities were
also explored (European Commission, 2005a). In addition, the EU’s counter-terrorism
strategy of November 2005 highlighted assistance to the Maghreb and the Mashriq
(European Council, 2005, §5), and efforts were made to prioritise the issue of terrorism
at the EMP’s 10 year anniversary. Whilst the familiar problems between Israel and the
Arab states persisted, it was notable that the EU now “tried instead to force their own
agenda onto their partners” (Bicchi & Martin, 2006, p. 202). Yet the result – the Euro-
Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism (Euro-Med Partnership,
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2005h) – was rather limited and did not provide a definition of terrorism. Nevertheless,
on the basis of the abovementioned developments it was argued by some that “counter-
terrorism measures have eclipsed other agendas and human rights in particular”
(Amnesty International, 2005, p. 4; see also Wennerholm et. al., 2010). Importantly, if
true this would not mean that principled beliefs did not play a role in EU policy at all,
but it would indicate that different (intervening) variables were involved as more
significant drivers of EFP.
Bilaterally, cooperation and assistance programmes were initiated with Algeria
and Morocco, with technical assistance given for e.g. anti-radicalisation measures and
border security (Wolff, 2009, p. 149). However, limited financial resources and a lack
of counter-terror experts were identified as the major obstacles to maximising EU
leverage (European Council, 2007b, p. 10) – a problem to which the ‘Instrument for
Stability’ was a partial solution. Though the EU decided to support the Algiers-based
African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (see Council Joint Action
2007/501/CFSP – the first CFSP Joint Action in the field of terrorism), overall
cooperation has mostly been limited to issues such as judicial reform and policing.
Given the illiberal nature of most MENA regimes, such a focus on law-enforcement
could potentially complicate the promotion of human rights. For example, criticism on
the EU’s policing mission in the West Bank, EUPOL COPPS, though subject to the
complex dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can serve as a reminder of the risks
of a purely technical approach: “The insistence on separating the teaching of technical
skills from the political reality and the overall security system has created a police force
that is highly skilled and yet easily co-opted by political leaders” (Kristoff, 2012, p. 13).
In this light it can be said that EU action increasingly focused on repressing terrorism
through policing rather than addressing its root causes through long-term reformative
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programmes (Watanabe, 2011, p. 4). As Richard Gillespie has concluded, cooperation
in this sphere was not “part of a broader region-building project based on shared
understandings” (2002, p. 10).
In light of the above it would go too far to assert that anti-terror measures have
significantly ‘eclipsed’ other areas of the ENP. Funding was relatively limited and there
were no major overtures to put terrorism at the top of the agenda. However, it is
certainly true that a shift towards wider inclusion of anti-terror cooperation in the ENP
took place. What this shift indicates is that the earlier causal belief that economic
progress would promote stability and security was gradually supplemented by a more
short-term impulse to action. In this regard it further underlines the way in which causal
beliefs were refined in response to changing circumstances, but the link to our
independent variables is less direct than was the case for some of the other elements that
we have discussed. As we will discuss below as well as in Chapter VI, this suggests that
principled beliefs and economic interests might not be fully sufficient to account for the
EU’s Mediterranean policies.
A final element that is of importance is that of immigration. After all, as
discussed at length in the previous chapter immigration had played a role in the causal
beliefs that animated the EMP. It was believed that migratory pressures could be
ameliorated by providing stability and prosperity through economic modernisation.
However, similar to anti-terror, as results in this sphere failed to materialise it is
possible to identify a gradually more reactive/repressive approach in the EU. For some,
the reinvention of the Barcelona Process was directly related: “It is plain, even for an
EU member far from the Mediterranean, why a Euro-Med Partnership is necessary,
given the concerns throughout the Union about … illegal immigration” (UK House of
Commons, 2005, §16.9). Another factor driving an increasingly short-term approach
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was the presumed link between migration and security. For example, the EU’s counter-
terror strategy stated that “we need to enhance protection of our external borders to
make it harder for known or suspected terrorists to enter or operate within the EU”
(European Council, 2005, §16). Some even went so far as to claim that “illegal
immigration is infiltrated by Al Qaeda” and that it is often run “by terrorists in order to
bring persons, weapons and drugs to Italy and Europe” (Antonio Martino, former Italian
minister of defence, cited in Cuttitta, 2007, p. 6). There was furthermore a significant
degree of scandalisation of the topic, as illustrated by newspaper headlines such as
“Malta fears it will sink under growing tide of migrants from Africa” (The Daily
Telegraph, 2005).138 Underlining the general sense of urgency was the fact that the EU
‘big five’ organised joint return flights of illegal immigrants (The Independent, 2005).
In this charged political context there has been a proliferation of measures to
improve immigration controls and cooperation, but it must be noted that most of these
measures were initiated at the member state level (see also Khader, 2005).139 Migration
was recognised in the five year EMP work plan of 2005, which emphasised the need to
“reduce significantly the level of illegal migration” and to “reinforce judicial co-
operation, including on cross border issues” (Euro-Med Partnership, 2005d, §11(b)-(d)).
€10m of the Development Cooperation Instrument (nearly as much as the entire Anna
138 Similar sentiments could sometimes be found in the south, e.g. in Morocco’s Al-Shamal: “Black
locusts are taking over Morocco!” (cited in Goldschmidt, 2009, p. 1)
139 For example, under the Neptune programme of 2003 Tunisia and Libya cooperated with Greece,
Malta, Italy and the UK in the first joint surveillance exercise of EU external sea borders (Cuttitta, 2007,
p. 14). Since 2004 joint Moroccan-Spanish patrols have taken place, and an EU-funded project (AENAS
programme, €120m [see Regulation 491/2004]) was held over 2004-06 to provide financial and technical
assistance to third states (EuropeAid, 2006). In 2007 agreement was reached on six Italian police patrol
boats that would feature Libyan guards on board (The Guardian, 2007), while another measure has been
the setting up of so-called ‘transit processing centres’ in sensitive locations such as Lampedusa and Ceuta
– arguably in violation of the Geneva Refugee Convention (Goldschmidt, 2006).
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Lindh budget) was earmarked for the training of Libyan law enforcement and
authorities to act against immigration, but this project was halted in 2011 as a result of
the Libyan uprising (see Open Europe, 2011, p. 12).
The diversity of measures and the mix of state and EU-level initiatives make it
hard to provide an overall sum of resources devoted to immigration controls, but what is
clear is that a gradual change took place in EU foreign policy. Strikingly enough,
however, little progress was made in terms of deeper cooperation between north and
south, specifically in the form of readmission agreements. While several bilateral
agreements have been in place140, no EU-wide readmission deals were concluded with
Mediterranean partner states in the period under consideration. In 2006 the Commission
said that talks with Morocco were “almost concluded” (European Commission, 2006b,
p. 6), but in a later Communication it was said that after 15 rounds of negotiations had
taken place there was “little prospect of a swift conclusion”, while planned negotiations
with Algeria had not yet been opened (European Commission, 2011d). The main
reasons that were identified for this situation were a lack of incentives provided by the
EU and a lack of flexibility of certain member states. As for the former, we have seen in
Chapter III that readmission involves ‘unbalanced reciprocity’, which is why third states
typically require concessions in terms of visa facilitation and/or financial assistance in a
‘package deal’. Algerian President Bouteflika, for example, complained that “our civil
society is fed up with the growing restrictions on the circulation of people … We want
to see a tangible loosening of our current shackles and more freedom of movement
across our borders” (Magharebia, 2005). Khader cites Italian professor Giuseppe
140 For example, workers’ quotas were increased for Egypt after it agreed to readmit thousands of its
nationals from Italy in 2004 and 2005 (Cuttitta, 2007, p. 8).
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Sciortino to this effect: “Fortress Europe never really lifted its drawbridges” (2005, p.
90).
The problem was acknowledged by the Commission:
[A]n enhanced ENP will … require a very serious examination of how visa
procedures can be made less of an obstacle to legitimate travel from
neighbouring countries to the EU … [T]his can only be addressed in the context
of broader packages to address related issues such as cooperation on illegal
immigration, … efficient border management, readmissions agreements and
effective return of illegal migrants. (European Commission, 2006b, p. 6)
In summary: for the EU member states, in order to advance the ENP it was necessary to
facilitate legitimate travel between the EU and the Med partners, and this incentive
could be used to reach agreement on readmission agreements. This represents a rather
complex interplay between various dynamics, in which eased visa regulations can be
offered as a carrot to conclude a readmission agreement. A certain degree of deadlock
has prevailed, however, and the Commission concluded that “there have so far only
been small-scale offers which can hardly be regarded as incentives for making progress
on readmission” (European Commission, 2011c). In addition, member states have
demanded that the agreements include provisions on third country nationals, obliging
partner states to take individuals back in irrespective of their nationality. For North
African states that often serve as transit countries this makes an agreement altogether
rather costly and unattractive. According to the Commission, if this demand had not
been made, or if it was “underpinned with appropriate incentives”, negotiations with
e.g. Morocco and Turkey “could have been concluded already” (ibid.).
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Thus, whilst there has been a proliferation of initiatives, many of them were at
the member state level or have not yet actually been implemented. In this regard it
would go too far to state that Euro-Med relations were overshadowed by repressive
practices, but it is true that a trend can be identified. As we have said, it is more difficult
to link this trend to our independent variables as the focus on immigration can be seen
as an intervening variable that impelled action on a more immediate basis. This is also
the case for the anti-terror dimension of the ENP; for both fields it is difficult to explain
the EU’s actions in terms of a significant economic interest or a principled belief in
human rights and democracy. The theoretical implications of this finding will be
discussed below.
Table 16: JHA in the ENP
EU problem
definition
Terrorist threat, migratory pressures, illegal immigration
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Code of conduct, focus on policing and judiciary in MENA,
readmission agreements (mostly repressive)
Expected outcomes Prevent terrorist actions, reduce (illegal) immigration
Evidence in support
of hypothesis
Evidence challenges hypothesis, no direct route to independent
variables
Challenges Difficulty to offer sufficient incentives for MENA partners
zero-sum interests
Actual outcomes Code of conduct, enhanced bilateral cooperation on anti-
terrorism, but failure on readmission agreements, little
indication of immigration reduction
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Conclusion Intervening variable leads to refinement of causal beliefs with
short-term focus, but more limited connection to independent
variables
Conclusion
Our analysis of the causal beliefs in evidence in the plans for revising the EU’s relations
with the MENA, formulated at the critical juncture provided by enlargement and the
Iraq War in 2003, indicates that a refinement of sorts took place. Based upon the
explicitly stated dissatisfaction with the results of the EMP and the suggested
modifications to the EU’s approach, we have said that a learning process could be
observed in which the previous gap between expectations and outcomes inspired a
revised outlook. Whilst structural adjustment retained its primary position within the
EU’s causal beliefs, broader action was suggested to support the MENA partners in
their efforts. Thus, the belief that economic reform and increased FDI alone would be
sufficient for the Maghreb and Mashriq states to achieve welfare gains was nuanced,
with more attention for EU support and action in the sphere of the first basket. What is
more, the bilateral focus that was chosen followed the path of the enlargement process
that had been successfully undertaken with the new member states. In this manner the
causal beliefs formulated by the EU had their basis in the EMP’s prior assumptions but
refined particularly how they were operationalised.
Our second empirical test has required us to assess, in light of the available
evidence, whether the identified causal beliefs did indeed provide a roadmap for the
EU’s actions towards the Mediterranean region. In two spheres of Euro-Med relations
strong evidence was found to support this element of our hypothesis. In the sphere of
the first basket we have seen how there was an increase in funding and prioritisation of
measures pertaining to human rights and democracy, in line with the ENP’s roadmap.
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For the second basket (economics), efforts were undertaken to broaden the EU’s
approach towards a more supportive and active role to engage with MENA partners on
reform. Enlargement instruments were made available whilst a broader set of incentives
for economic liberalisation was put on the table. Across the first two baskets, therefore,
a high degree of consistency between causal beliefs and actions has been observed,
serving as strong hoop evidence in support of our hypothesis.
The third basket, which pertains to human affairs, has been interpreted as an
addition to the EU’s roadmap, stipulating additional tools with which to pursue the
objectives of the ENP. However, it is important to be careful not to read back causal
beliefs from observed actions, given that the result of reversing the analytical order in
this fashion would be that the ‘causal beliefs as roadmaps’ element of our hypothesis
could never be falsified. After all, if we assume that the EU based its policies on cause-
effect calculations and proceed to infer what they may have been on the basis of
observed actions, our conclusions would be speculative at best. Nevertheless, we must
remain open to the potential of shifts in the EU’s causal beliefs, even outside the space
provided by critical junctures.
Closely related to the above is the fourth basket. One challenge we encountered
in our investigation is that the increasing focus on JHA in the fourth basket seemed to
fall outside the roadmap that was suggested by the EU’s causal beliefs. Whilst the
strengthened emphasis on repressive, short-term action resonated with the EU’s earlier
concerns about migratory pressures, the solution towards which the fourth basket
verged was of a different nature than the iterated strategy of pursuing stability through
increasing welfare in the south. Similar to how shifting causal beliefs were in evidence
in the third basket, this could be interpreted as an additional learning process based
upon the lack of tangible results in the EMP/ENP and the attendant continuance of
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migratory pressures. This could be seen as an intervening variable in our hypothesised
model, but given the slow pace of progress in this field it is important to consider
further developments, which is why we will return to this topic in Chapter V.
Taking the aforementioned challenges into account, it is possible to say that
there is relatively strong evidence in support of the ‘causal beliefs as roadmaps’
approach. There is evidence to suggest that a number of shifts occurred during the
period considered in this chapter, many of them inspired by the successes of
enlargement and the challenges of the EMP. For some of the other changes, pertaining
to JHA and the increasing presence of exclusivist measures, we have pointed to the lack
of success in the EMP, posing as an intervening variable. At this point it is possible to
say, therefore, that there are certain implications for the wider validity of our
hypothesis, as discussed below.
Our third test has required us to assess whether it is possible to trace a
connection between principled beliefs and/or economic interests on the one hand, and
causal beliefs and EU actions on the other hand. In particular, we ask whether the
evidence supports the claim that our independent variables were necessary for
explaining the observed policy dynamics. Another way to phrase the question would be
to ask whether an explanation for the EU’s actions could be envisaged without our
independent variables. Evidence in support of the necessary role of principled beliefs
was found primarily in the first basket, which focuses explicitly on human rights and
democracy. The evidence strongly points towards the conclusion that without an
appreciation of the EU’s principled beliefs it would be very difficult to account for EU
behaviour in the first basket. After all, we could posit counterfactually that if the EU
had merely been interested in securing its borders or expanding economically there
would have been no need to increase funding for human rights and democracy related
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initiatives. That is to say: without its principled beliefs it is unlikely that the Union
would have formulated the kind of problem definitions that we have identified.
In this light there is relatively strong hoop evidence in support of the hypothesis
that principled beliefs are a necessary driver of the EU’s MENA policies. However, it is
also true that the strength of this conclusion is somewhat ameliorated by the challenges
that have been observed. For example, in difficult cases like Tunisia the EU did not
press the human rights issue, opting instead to prioritise other areas of cooperation. As a
result it has remained difficult to find a true smoking gun example of the EU’s
commitment to human rights and democracy. The conclusion is that principled beliefs
are a necessary but not sufficient variable to explain the EU’s actions towards the
Mediterranean. This was certainly the consensus amongst the persons interviewed for
this thesis. All EU officials interviewed acknowledged the ‘difficult’ track-record of EU
democracy and human rights promotion, but stressed the significant value of having
such a policy.
With regards to our second independent variable, economic interests, we have
found strong evidence to suggest a link with causal beliefs and EU behaviour in
especially the second basket. EU actions were consistent with the hypothesised interest
in market expansion, as efforts were strengthened to integrate northern and southern
markets. Although this process was believed to generate welfare benefits for the
MENA, the burden of reform fell primarily on the Med partners and there was very
explicit linkage in EU statements between Euro-Mediterranean market integration and
the EU’s competitive strength. Altogether this gives us strong evidence in support of
our hypothesis, but it must be added that the previously observed tension within the EU
over the extent of market integration continued to hamper more far-going efforts. The
Commission spoke of defensive and offensive interests in this regard, underlining the
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importance of being sensitive to the more precise ways in which the EU defines its
economic interests.
An interesting question that arises on the basis of our findings is whether the
challenges for one independent variable could be explained with reference to the other,
which would suggest a degree of interplay between the two drivers. In this vein we
ought to ask whether the challenges to the promotion of human rights and democracy
could be explained with reference to economic interests. The EU’s prioritisation of the
second basket and its reluctance to press relatively advanced reformers like Tunisia and
Morocco on human rights and democracy suggests that this might indeed be the case.
Whilst the EU’s causal beliefs envisaged a harmonious confluence of the two
dimensions, it can thus also be observed that the material dimension set boundaries for
the extent to which principled beliefs were prioritised vis-à-vis MENA partners. Some
analysts warned that “the EU’s often-lauded ‘democracy promotion lite’” was in danger
of turning into “‘democracy promotion liter and liter’ and in some places even
‘democracy promotion undetectable’” (Youngs, 2008a, p. 13; see also Youngs, 2008b).
Our approach suggests that this could be explained with reference to the EU’s economic
interests, as a balance was sought between the two drivers; in general the second basket
took precedence in case of conflicted priorities. When asked whether there was a degree
of tension between economic interests and human rights, our interviewees appeared
more reluctant to speak but admitted difficulties. Not all agreed on the extent to which
problems existed, with some pointing chiefly towards external problems (Interview with
EEAS Official, 6 June 2014, telephone) and others looking more inward (Interview with
EEAS Official, 3 June 2014, telephone). However, it was widely stressed that the need
to resolve this kind of tension was one of the lessons of the Arab Spring (this will be
discussed in our final conclusions).
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Vice-versa, it is somewhat more difficult to explain the challenges to the EU’s
pursuit of economic gains with reference to principled beliefs. The fact that the EU did
not succeed in e.g. putting together a convincing set of incentives for services
liberalisation did not seem to be related to human rights or democracy, pertaining
instead to intra-EU disagreements as discussed previously. It could perhaps be argued
that the EU did not seek a more explicitly exploitative relationship with the south on the
basis of its principled beliefs, but given the disagreements within the EU it is
questionable whether it had the ability to do so even if there was a desire for ‘neo-
colonial exploitation’. In a very broad sense, however, it is possible to say that the EU
has clearly strived not to violate its human rights and democracy principles, even
though it did not always take purposive action to promote them. On this basis we can
conclude that a degree of interplay between our independent variables could be
observed, with each setting broad limits for the range of EU behaviour considered to be
desirable or acceptable.
Where do these findings leave us with regards to our final test, which asks
whether principled beliefs and economic interests provide us with a sufficient
explanation for the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean? This is a stronger claim
than arguing that our independent variables are ‘necessary but not sufficient’, which is
why we expect to be able to provide straw in the wind evidence in the best scenario. The
key challenge to our hypothesis can be found in the relative rise of JHA-related
activities within the ENP. On the one hand it can be said that the rationale underpinning
them was chiefly security-driven, and hence it is more difficult to trace a link to
economic interests or (especially) principled beliefs. Of course it is possible to
conceptualise security as a scarce good and to argue that anti-immigration measures
were rooted in a drive to retain possession over zero-sum goods, but this would be
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stretching our definition of economic interests further than how it was originally
intended. Yet on the other hand, in an absolute sense both funding and action pertaining
to JHA remained limited – their relative rise owing primarily to the fact that under the
EMP there had been little collective action in this field at all. The straw in the wind
evidence in support of our overall hypothesis thus consists of the finding that the broad
outlines of the ENP can indeed be explained with reference to an interplay between
economic interests and principled beliefs. Yet the more we zoom in, the more additional
variables appear to be necessary to account for EU behaviour. Chapter VI will have
more to say on this topic.
A final question to be addressed here is how our reading of the ENP can be
situated within the wider literature. First of all, it has been relatively widely stressed that
the ENP was inspired by enlargement (Kelley, 2006, p. 30; Bechev & Nicolaïdis, 2010).
If we consider Javier Solana’s assertion that enlargement has been the most values-
driven, original and successful strategy in the history of IR (Solana, 2006, p. 2), it is
possible to see how the ENP initiative could be interpreted through a normative lens
(Adler & Crawford, 2006; Adler & Crawford, 2004; Attinà, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Börzel
& Risse, 2005). Our main critique of such a perspective is that it takes the EU’s
principled beliefs as a (somewhat) sufficient explanation, but this misses out on several
concurrent dynamics best accounted for with reference to material variables. What is
more, the emphasis placed on the normative dimension seems out of sync with the
actual balance in EU policy, which highlights economics to an extent not easily
reconcilable with the normative perspective. In addition, the EU’s actions with regards
to human affairs have been taken by some as evidence for a focus on processes of
socialisation through deep cooperation with partners on a relatively equiponderant basis
of mutual respect (Nicolaïdis & Nicolaïdis, 2004). However, the causal logic in
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evidence in relevant EU statements indicates a more explicitly instrumentalist
operationalisation of the third basket than what is allowed for within such a framework.
And if we put decentralised cooperation in perspective, it is clear that in terms of
funding or overall priority it was only a minor aspect of Euro-Med relations. This means
that granting theoretical primacy to this element over others would somewhat
misrepresent the empirical balance of facts. Since our approach is more open to the
overall balance between concurrent dynamics in foreign policy, it avoids falling into
this trap.
From a different perspective, certain authors have focused on the relative power
dimension. Here the argument has been that the ENP signalled the EU’s
acknowledgement of unequal power relations and a willingness to pursue European
interests (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, pp. 27-28). The more Euro-centric aspects of
EU foreign policy were highlighted by e.g. Jan Zielonka, who suggested that both the
ENP and enlargement implied a process of “economic and political domination” (2008,
p. 475). Others still have posited that the ENP sent a “strong signal that the EU is trying
to consolidate its position as a regional power” (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 19). These
views resonate with our findings to an important extent, even though it could be said
that many of these elements were already present in the EMP. What is missing,
however, is a deeper appreciation of the EU’s concrete enactment of its intended
policies and what challenges it experienced in this process. Here our approach offers
relative benefits, as the process tracing methodology allows for a very clear
understanding of intended and actual causal chains in foreign policy. What is more,
even at the relatively ‘high’ level of analysis adopted by Zielonka there is not a
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significant degree of evidence to suggest EU ‘domination’ over the MENA.141 It is
undoubtedly true that in certain spheres the EU has been able to virtually impose its will
upon the south (e.g. regulatory reform), but the fact that so many challenges and
problems remained tells us that there was certainly no politico-economic domination in
a truly hegemonic manner. Thus, even though we have presented straw in the wind
rather than hoop or smoking gun evidence in support of our hypothesis and have
encountered several challenges, it can certainly be argued that our approach offers
comparative benefits through its nuanced outlook and its sensitivity to the real-world
dynamics of foreign policy.
141 The Times’ headline upon the launch of the ENP that Brussels Plans to Expand its Empire Again
could thus also be said to have somewhat overstated its argument (2004).
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- V -
The Union for the Mediterranean
In this chapter we examine the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) for the period 2008-
2010. Launched by French President Nicholas Sarkozy on 13 July 2008, the UfM is the
most recent major EU policy initiative for the MENA and represents the final case study
considered in this thesis. As in the previous empirical chapters, we will trace the key
processes of the UfM in order to address the four questions/tests that were formulated in
Chapter II. This will allow us to gain further insight into the strengths of our approach –
which posits that it is best to investigate material and ideational variables jointly to
account for EFP – and it will substantiate our conclusions with a comprehensive
evidential basis.
At the outset, what is important to note about the Union for the Mediterranean is
that it was not, like the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy,
conceived as a comprehensive framework to deal with a multiplicity of relevant aspects
of Euro-Med relations. Compared to the other two frameworks the UfM appears as
limited in both scope and funding, focusing on a number of more functional fields of
cooperation. “Effectively”, writes one observer, “the UfM has carved out a sub-section
of the [EMP and ENP] for enhanced emphasis” (Hunt, 2011, p. 178). Despite its limited
breadth, however, the UfM is of key importance for this thesis. As we argue below,
what can be gained from investigating the UfM is a further insight into the evolution of
some of the EU’s causal beliefs vis-à-vis the MENA, which has important implications
for our assessment of material and ideational variables. We have said in Chapter IV that
developments in particularly the third and fourth baskets suggested potential shifts in
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the EU’s causal beliefs towards a more short-term approach, but we have also
highlighted the dangers of interpreting causal beliefs on the basis of observed actions.
The UfM provides an opportunity to reinvestigate this point and thereby to critically
assess our hypothesis that economic interests and human rights/democracy were the key
drivers of EFP towards the south.
We begin by tracing the processes that led to the formulation and initiation of
the UfM, focusing on its beginnings in French domestic politics and the programme’s
subsequent uploading to the European level. This serves to answer our first question,
which seeks to define the EU’s causal beliefs as evinced in key documents and
statements. Our findings support what was proposed in Chapter IV, namely that a
moderate shift took place in which the generally long-term, reformative political and
economic ambitions of the EMP and ENP were supplemented with a focus on short-
term objectives. What this indicates, we argue, is a reduced level of faith in the benefits
of economic and political reform, as previously expressed in particularly the Euro-Med
Partnership. In turn, this suggests that the EU moved in part from a full-fledged strategy
for Euro-Med relations towards a more ad-hoc stance. Whilst it must be taken into
account that the UfM was a supplement rather than a substitute, it is nevertheless a
significant change in the EU’s approach towards the Maghreb and the Mashriq,
reflective of a deeper crisis that existed in this field.
The implications of these shifts become apparent in this chapter’s second
section, which seeks to undertake our second and third tests. To do so we investigate
two respective key elements of the UfM, beginning with its intention to serve as an
intergovernmental regional forum. Here we focus particularly on the role of principled
beliefs, given the political nature of human rights/democracy and the potential to bring
up related concerns in direct contacts with MENA leaders through ‘leverage’ (Lavenex
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& Schimmelfennig, 2011). As we will see, the political agenda was dominated mainly
by Arab-Israeli tensions. Notwithstanding the resultant lack of progress within the UfM,
we conclude that the evidence does not support the hypothesis that principled beliefs
were a necessary variable to account for the observed actions.
This raises the question: what of economic interests? To find an answer to this
query we look at the UfM’s projects as well as its funding, which are taken to represent
the material side of the new framework. The major challenge here consists of the fact
that to date few projects have been initiated or completed, as a result of which our
empirical basis is somewhat narrower than was the case in our previous chapters. With
this in mind, we find some evidence to link the UfM’s projects to EU economic goals,
but given the observed lack of interest from the EU’s member states the UfM does not
seem to evince a strong drive towards the pursuit of shared economic interests. For this
reason, we conclude that our hypothesis falls short of explaining the UfM satisfactorily.
The cause of this state of affairs, we suggest, lies with the fact that no comprehensive
set of causal beliefs had been found to deal with the failures of the EU’s earlier efforts,
putting the pursuit of shared strategic goals – ideational or material – beyond the reach
of the UfM.
In this chapter’s conclusions we discuss how the UfM represents the most
substantial challenge to our hypothesis, given that neither a clear economically
expansionist policy nor a strongly principled stance could be detected. As we will
explain, our most significant finding in this chapter pertains to the wider symbolism of
the UfM for the EU’s Mediterranean relations, signalling as it does the gradual
abandonment of the strategy that had driven Europe’s policies since at least 1995. In
light of the previous chapters and the UfM’s limited role this leaves intact the necessity
of our independent variables, but it does affect their sufficiency for explaining Euro-
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Med relations. Whilst our approach provides a highly useful way to understand the
EU’s trajectory, it is applicable to a lesser extent to the crisis observed in Euro-
Mediterranean relations since 2008. In this light we conclude the chapter by addressing
our fourth empirical test and situating our findings vis-à-vis the relevant academic
literature.
From ‘Union Méditerranée’ to ‘Barcelona Process: UfM’
The dynamics that led to the launch of the UfM are best understood as a two-stage
process. In this section we investigate the two subsequent stages so as to be able to
answer our question regarding the EU’s causal beliefs.
The first stage is characterised by leadership and activism of the then French
President Nicholas Sarkozy. Outside the purview of the EU institutions (see below), he
envisaged a cooperative union across the Mediterranean that would be distinct from the
EMP. Notably, at this point the plans were still quite ambiguous, and the initiative did
not evince an explicit set of causal beliefs for Euro-Mediterranean relations. This means
that in and of itself the first stage of the UfM’s development holds relatively limited
relevance for our hypothesis, but it is nonetheless important to gain an understanding of
the UfM’s origins, as a careful tracing of the relevant processes enables us to understand
how the idea was progressively reimagined and made commensurable with existing EU
efforts.
Thus, as we will see in the second part of this section, due to a variety of reasons
the plans were uploaded to the European Union level. At this stage the European
Commission recast the UfM as an addition to the existing Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership. It is at this point that we are able to identify a number of problem
definitions underpinning the UfM, enabling us to appreciate the nature of the program’s
envisaged cause-effect relationships. In this light we find that what is notable is that the
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new programme was initiated in a manner that was different from the EMP and ENP, as
it did not come at a substantial critical juncture like the other programmes. For this
reason it was not as innovative as the EMP/ENP had been, but we do note that the UfM
did provide the opportunity to realign EU policy vis-à-vis certain fissures in the existing
frameworks, particularly by downscaling the EU’s reformative and integrative
ambitions in the Maghreb and Mashriq. We argue that in this manner, despite its limited
breadth and budgetary insecurity, the UfM was symbolic for wider dynamics within the
EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean, representing a crisis that existed in light of
the ineffectiveness of existing policy frameworks.
The ‘Union Méditerranée’
Though proposals for a Communauté du Monde Méditerranéen had already been made
in 2005 (Roumenotis & Guigou, 2005), the concrete starting point for the initiative lay
with a campaign promise made by French presidential hopeful Nicholas Sarkozy to
facilitate rapprochement and to create a ‘Mediterranean Union’ involving the littoral
states on both sides of the Mediterranean (excluding northern EU member states).
Sarkozy subsequently referred to the Union Méditerranée in his electoral victory
speech: “we have to overcome all kinds of hatred to pave the way for a great dream of
peace and a great dream of civilization … the time has come to build together a
Mediterranean union that will form a link between Europe and Africa. What was done
for the union of Europe 60 years ago, we are going to do today for the union of the
Mediterranean” (BBC, 2007). Little clarity was offered on the specifics of the plan
(which the French press satirically dubbed ‘Club Med’ after a well-known chain of
holiday resorts), but it was said to involve a number of concrete projects (e.g. on the
environment, terrorism and/or migration), a Mediterranean Council, and an investment
bank (Der Spiegel, 2008a; Balfour & Schmid, 2008). The original idea was to undertake
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this new endeavour separately from the Barcelona Process. As Henri Guaino, political
advisor to President Sarkozy, had said, it would be “neither against Barcelona nor for it,
it has a different kind of focus on it” (cited in Aliboni et. al., 2008, p. 11). This left
undefined what the relationship of the Union Méditerranée would be to the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy, as it was at this
point primarily a unilateral French initiative rather than a European idea. This
impression was strengthened by the fact that Sarkozy promoted it through a series of
speeches in Arab capitals in which defence and nuclear technology exports as well as
French involvement in infrastructural projects were mentioned (Gillespie, 2011, p.
1210). Against this backdrop it can be said that the early plans were fairly ambiguous;
as a result it is possible to envision various (non-mutually exclusive) explanations of
what Sarkozy was aiming to achieve.142 A common denominator, however, was the
centrality of France and the sidelining of the European Union.
Cooperation with other Mediterranean EU member states was necessary for
Sarkozy given the regional focus of the plan. Yet the purely Mediterranean (rather than
Euro-Mediterranean) orientation was feared mainly by Spain to overshadow and
counteract against its previous efforts to promote a common EU policy towards the
MENA (see Gillespie, 2008). Some suggested early on that excluding the Commission
142 This includes the domestically-oriented goal of placating French citizens of North African descent;
renovating France’s politique arabe; increasing French influence vis-à-vis Germany as well as in the
Maghreb and Mashriq; creating a substitute for Turkish EU membership (which Sarkozy opposed);
increasing French commercial leadership in the south; and/or responding to the disappointments of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (see Gillespie, 2008, pp. 278-279). Elsewhere the idea was simply
described as “an idea intended to bestow some foreign policy gravitas” on his campaign (Der Spiegel,
2008b). Another interpretation was that France tried to revitalise its politique arabe. Its policy in this
regard was often described as relatively unique and different from the United States: “La France est la
seule grande puissance qui a une politique arabe; c’est à dire qui considère le monde arabe comme un
partenaire important et privilégié” (Saint-Prot, 2008, p. 3).
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and northern member states would weaken ‘the Union’ (see Institut de la Méditerranée,
2007). Slovenia, holding the EU Presidency before France was due to take over,
complained about being overshadowed (EU Observer, 2008). Key actors Italy and Spain
accordingly endeavoured to ‘rein in’ the plan and to ensure its consistency with existing
Euro-Mediterranean programmes. The product of these efforts was the Appel de Rome,
issued after a trilateral meeting that was held in Rome on 20 December 2007. The name
‘Union for the Mediterranean’ was now adopted, and it was clarified that the approach
would be founded on concrete projects of common interest (the substance of which
would be decided later on).143 This signified what has been called a functionalist
interpretation of foreign policy, in which mostly technical, lower-level projects were to
serve as the foundation for cooperation (Interviews with EEAS Official, 2, 3 & 16 June
2014, telephone; see also Holden, 2011).
What is notable about the plans at this point is that, in contrast to the EMP/ENP,
they were driven less by an explicitly formulated set of ideas regarding prominent
problems in the MENA and the solutions that could be promoted by external actors to
help resolve them (e.g. help with structural adjustment). Another key difference lay in
the fact that the issue-specific approach that was suggested lacked the reformative
dimension that had been characteristic of earlier initiatives. But could this be interpreted
as a ‘break’ with the past? In other words: what would the UfM’s relationship with the
EMP and ENP be? In this respect a greater degree of complementarity was allowed for
than in Sarkozy’s original plan: the UfM was to be ‘supplementary’ to existing
frameworks, serving not to replace but to ‘complete’ them (Appel de Rome, 2007). This
left in the middle exactly in what way the initiative would be organised vis-à-vis
existing frameworks and where its added value would lie. An important hint was given
143 See [http://www.voltairenet.org/L-Appel-de-Rome-pour-l-Union-pour], accessed 22 February 2012.
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with the following remarks: “The Union for the Mediterranean is destined to be the
heart and engine of cooperation in the Mediterranean and for the Mediterranean … The
Union should be based on the principle of cooperation rather than integration” (ibid.,
emphasis added). The implication of this phrasing is twofold: 1) the statement connotes
that rather than being merely supplementary the UfM was envisioned as overtaking the
EMP as the ‘heart’ of cooperation; 2) again, ‘cooperation rather than integration’
implied clearly more of an intergovernmental and less of a reformative basis of
interaction, eschewing the integrationist aims of the EMP and the ENP.
However, there was still little specificity in the plan. The trilateral statement
called for a meeting in Paris on 13 July between the riparian states, just before an EMP
meeting on 14 July with all the EU member states, in order to further determine the
principles and structures of the Union for the Mediterranean. Notably, in light of this
obvious pre-emption of the EMP meeting as well as the sidelining of the EU there was a
significant degree of northern European scepticism. Particularly explicit was the critique
expressed by Germany’s Angela Merkel, who had earlier commented that separate
initiatives could lead to a “corrosion of the EU in its core area” and release “explosive
forces in the EU” (Der Spiegel, 2007). This was an unusually harsh formulation, and
some suspected in Germany that Sarkozy was attempting to establish a second-tier EU
led by France and to spend EU monies on a non-inclusive project (see Schumacher,
2011; Schmid, 2008). It was suggested in the German press that shared European
interests lay at the basis of Merkel’s opposition, particularly the commonality of
concerns over e.g. illegal immigration and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was
contrasted with France’s purely national concerns (Der Spiegel, 2008c). Others
suggested that a deeper motivation was the German desire to maintain an influential role
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in shaping European foreign policy and to prevent France from becoming primus inter
pares (see e.g. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008).
In our view, these analyses should be treated as hypotheses to be tested, but for
the current thesis this would go beyond the scope of our research aims. What we aim to
find out in this place is what causal beliefs were in evidence in the plans for the UfM,
but given the ambiguity of the initiatives as they existed at this stage the key indication
lies with the more general suggestion of a ‘functionalist’ programme. Notably, this
lacked (a connection to) the more ambitious reformative elements of the EMP and ENP,
suggesting an underlying set of causal beliefs that was focused more on the short-term.
We will now move to the second stage of the UfM’s development, where we will be
able to gain further clarity on these matters.
The Commission Takes Charge
On the basis of its extra-EU beginnings, the UfM was gradually brought into the fold of
existing EU efforts through pressure from the member states. This culminated in an
agreement on 3 March 2008, when it was decided that all 27 member states would be
involved. Accordingly, the Mediterranean summit that was supposed to be held before
the EMP meeting was rescheduled to include all EU members. Confirming the
reformulation of the initiative was the Franco-German presentation of the UfM at the
European Council of 13-14 March, where it was aligned with the EMP and recast as
‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’. The Commission was charged with
outlining further specifics (European Council, 2008a, Annex I; see also European
Council 2008b).
What is notable is that, until this point, little evidence can be found of
considerations regarding the needs of the Mediterranean partners or the strategy that
would best serve to further shared European objectives in the region. Yet this does not
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mean that there were no conceptual shifts at all – we can chiefly point to the more
functionalist and intergovernmental basis of the UfM. What was largely lacking,
however, was a clear, purposive drive. In contrast to the EMP and ENP, it is difficult to
characterise the circumstances that led to the formulation of the UfM as a critical
juncture, given that there were no equivalents to the substantial circumstantial changes
that had accompanied the other two programmes. Thus, the UfM was not designed to
replace the existing frameworks, but rather served to add something to them.
If the programme’s beginnings lay with political struggles between the member
states, it can also be seen that the window of opportunity created by these debates was
utilised by the Commission to address (or rather, sidestep) problems in extant EU
policies. Evidence for this analysis can be found in a variety of statements from the
European Commission and individuals closely involved with the process. Following the
Council’s referral, the Commission reformulated the UfM as a response to “the
shortcomings and difficulties” of the Barcelona Process, describing it as “a new political
and practical impetus into the process” (European Commission, 2008c, §3-4). The
strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the EU was restated by the
Commission (ibid., §5) and it was said that the EMP:
[R]epresents a strong commitment to regional stability and democracy through
regional cooperation and integration, and aims to build on that consensus to
pursue the path to political and socio-economic reform and modernisation.
However, the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East has challenged and
stretched the Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve the channels of
dialogue among all partners. (§6)
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In this manner the UfM was explicitly reformulated as a response to the limitations of
the EMP. It was emphasised that “further and faster reforms are needed if the EU's
Mediterranean partners are to reap the potential benefits of globalisation and free trade
with the EU and regional integration”, while it was admitted that progress in the
Barcelona Process had been “slower than expected” (§11). The Commission also argued
that “the formula of trade plus investment plus cooperation” remained pertinent (§11)
and that the priority was still for the Mediterranean partners to alter their domestic
structures in order to reflect the EMP and ENP’s ambitions. Finally, it was conceded
that the Union itself could do more and that “qualitative and quantitative change” was
needed (§12). Whilst the earlier set of formative causal beliefs (whose main
characteristic was the idea that a range of reforms was needed to promote socio-
economic progress in the MENA) was reiterated, the functionalist approach also
suggested that a ‘second-best option’ ought to be explored in parallel to the EMP and
ENP.
The EU’s earlier causal beliefs thus were not explicitly abandoned, yet it could
not be denied that the expectations that had underpinned the EMP/ENP had not
materialised. A clearer distinction between short-term and long-term goals was drawn in
light of the lack of results. Accordingly the UfM set the bar substantially lower,
evincing a reduced level of faith in the (immediate) benefits of reform in the south or
the EU’s ability to stimulate progress. As the Commission said, its Communication on
the UfM “takes stock of the achievements of the Barcelona Process and envisages the
new initiative to build on and reinforce these successes, while also acknowledging the
shortcomings that have compromised more rapid development” (European Commission,
2008d). In this light the ‘added value’ of the initiative was envisioned as strengthening
the multilateral dimension of Euro-Med relations, improving the partner states’ sense of
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co-ownership, and boosting the visibility of the Barcelona Process (ibid.).144 It could be
said that these were primarily peripheral matters to the existing frameworks, with a
much lower level of ambition than e.g. the construction of a free trade zone. In addition,
it is unclear how the UfM would help overcome some of the problematics explored in
Chapters III and IV, which had to do much more with internal European disagreements
than with a lack of co-ownership or the visibility of the EMP.
The Commission suggested to build the UfM upon practical projects of high
visibility, thus retaining one of the core elements of Sarkozy’s initial plan, along with a
political ‘upgrade’ through biennial summits of the heads of state and government under
a system of co-Presidency. Sarkozy’s earlier vision of an investment bank was forfeited,
however, which is perhaps not surprising in light of the controversies surrounding this
concept (see the relevant sections in Chapters III and IV). In addition, improved
institutional support was foreseen through the creation of a Joint Permanent Committee
and a UfM Secretariat, but no conclusion was reached on funding (EU funds were, after
all, locked until 2013). The Commission’s proposal was supported by the Council in
June, where the UfM’s status as a supplement to the Barcelona Process was reconfirmed
(European Council, 2008b).
It is worth discussing some of the further implications of the contours of the
UfM as it was now taking shape, particularly the idea of initiating practical joint
projects. The Commission suggested four areas of cooperation, namely infrastructure;
de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea and environmental governance; civil protection;
and solar energy (European Commission, 2008c, Annex I). Building on ongoing efforts
under MEDA/ENPI (see Chapter IV and Hunt, 2011), these were evidently more
144 Notably, non-EMP states Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco were also
included (they were said to have accepted the EMP acquis).
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pragmatic areas of cooperation in which potential common interests could be identified,
but at the same time it was difficult to detect the presence of the EMP’s acquis – with
attention for ideational dynamics like democracy, human rights and good governance –
in working together on projects in these spheres. Even though the UfM was meant to be
only one element of the wider constellation of Euro-Med politics, the complete absence
of these topics appears to counteract the ‘mainstreaming’ of ideational concerns that had
been attempted previously.
This state of affairs was brought to attention by European Parliament. It stated
that despite the EMP’s “insufficient achievements”, there is “potential which should be
optimised” (2008, D). It added that the Council and Commission should “clearly
enshrine the promotion of human rights and democracy in the objectives of this new
initiative” (ibid., §17). This was necessary given that “one of the main goals of Euro-
Mediterranean policy is to promote the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights
and political pluralism”, but the EMP “has not yet produced the expected results in the
area of human rights” (ibid., §17). Subsequently the EP warned that “the initiative of the
Union for the Mediterranean launched by the French Presidency … must not lead to less
attention and priority being given to the promotion of the necessary reforms in respect
of democracy and human rights in the region” (European Parliament, 2009b, §109). In
other words, the European Parliament was worried that the UfM’s pragmatic focus
would distract from the much more challenging field of political reform. Given the lack
of reformative ambitions this seems a legitimate concern; whether or not it materialised
is of importance for our hypothesis and will be considered in the following section of
this chapter. For now, it is notable that the ideational dimension was mostly lacking in
the UfM.
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After it was approved by the European Council, the Commission’s proposal
served as the blueprint for the EU’s position at the Euro-Mediterranean summit of 13
July 2008. Held on the eve of Bastille Day, the gathering of European and
Mediterranean heads of state in the Grand Palais (boycotted only by Libya’s Qadhaffi)
was described as a diplomatic success for President Sarkozy. In his speech he said that
“instead of continuing to hate and wage war” it was now time to “build peace in the
Mediterranean together” (The Guardian, 2008). A Joint Declaration was issued at the
summit, titled A Strategic Ambition for the Mediterranean (Union for the
Mediterranean, 2008a). This declaration, which was to serve as the roadmap for the
UfM, contained much of the language and structure of the Commission’s earlier
Communication. The goal was thus said to be to “increase co-ownership of the
[Barcelona] process, set governance on the basis of equal footing and translate it into
concrete projects, more visible to citizens” (ibid., §9). Exactly as suggested by the
Commission, biennial summits for the heads of state and government were agreed upon,
meant to set in motion regional projects in accordance with a two-year work
programme. In addition to the four areas for collective projects originally outlined by
the Commission, two more were mentioned: higher education and support for SMEs.
The creation of a co-Presidency was further confirmed (consisting of the EU’s external
representative and an elected Mediterranean co-president145) along with the principle of
a Secretariat (to manage and implement the projects) and a Permanent Committee based
145 A small row between France and the Czech Republic (who was due to take over the EU Presidency
from France) emerged over this point. Eventually it was decided that France would stay on as UfM co-
President for two years alongside the Czech EU Presidency. On the southern side Egypt was chosen as
co-President. The confusion regarding the northern co-Presidency persisted until the EU’s High
Representative for foreign affairs, the Commission (sometimes together with the EU Presidency), and the
External Action Service took over from France since March 2012 for foreign ministers meetings, sectoral
meetings, and senior official meetings (see European Council, 2012).
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in Brussels. Overall, the UfM was said to “build on the acquis and reinforce the
achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process” (ibid., §2). On balance,
however, short-term gains such as making Euro-Med “relations more concrete and
visible” through projects that are “relevant for the citizens of the region” come forward
as the primary goals (European Commission, 2009b).
In sum, whilst the UfM did not openly dismiss the causal beliefs underpinning
the EMP and ENP, it did signal a reduced level of faith in the potential of the EU to
stimulate growth and progress in the south at the level envisioned in the EMP/ENP.
This is illustrated by the following comments, made by former Spanish Minister and
Speaker of the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly Josep Borrell:
Our declared goal of strengthening the foundations of political change was
clearly not met, and I now believe that the lesson to be learnt from this
disappointing outcome is that the EU’s Mediterranean policy focus should be
more modest, setting our sights a bit lower instead of striving for over-ambitious
goals … The experience gained from the Barcelona Process warns us that
unrealistic aims like the idea of a major Mediterranean free-trade area must be
avoided. Instead, the focus should be on providing a more general framework
that concentrates on specific projects like the fight against pollution, energy
policy, migration and agriculture. This is to some extent what has now been
done with [the UfM]… (Borrell, 2010, emphasis added).
Once again, this could be viewed as an indication that the UfM was a type of ‘second-
best option’ to what had been tried in the EMP and ENP. It did not contain as clearly a
defined set of causal beliefs as its predecessors, but it is nevertheless possible to surmise
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the nature of the EU’s evolving expectations on the basis of the evidence considered.
This is especially true when we connect the UfM to what has been witnessed in the
previous chapter, where we noted a gradual increase in activities that were relatively
distant to the original approach of the EMP/ENP. From our theoretical perspective the
main difference between the UfM and its predecessors can thus be found in the causal
beliefs underpinning the programme, pointing to the fact that it was much more
pragmatic or functionalist, lacking a strategic, integrative perspective. As discussed in
Chapter IV, moves towards such a stance could be observed within certain elements of
the ENP, and for this reason the UfM can be regarded as symptomatic for certain shifts
within EU’s Mediterranean policies.
Table 17: The UfM's Causal Beliefs
Problem Analysis Lack of overall progress in EMP/ENP; previous goals too
ambitious and failure of regional collaborative initiatives
Action Needed Focus on concrete areas of common interest,
intergovernmental cooperation (rather than integration)
Operationalisation Designation of six areas for collective projects, creation of
co-Presidency and UfM Secretariat
Anticipated outcomes Ambiguous, but includes progress on concrete issues and
visible short-term gains on a small scale
As the above table suggests, the UfM, as it was launched in Paris, was notable almost as
much for what was said as for the questions that were raised. One of the biggest
unknowns was that of funding, given that the EU itself could not devote significantly
increased funds to the MENA within its ongoing budget. It was therefore argued that the
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UfM should mobilise additional funding from e.g. the participating states, the private
sector, FEMIP and the international financial institutions (Union for the Mediterranean,
2008a, §31). This exposed the initiative to a substantial degree of contingency, and this
vulnerability was worsened by the lack of clear strategic guidelines. As one Egyptian
official complained, the “UfM is just another layer of changes in the EU policy which
just adds vagueness and complexity” and which “remains vague in terms of objectives,
means of implementation and funding (cited in Ghoneim, 2009, p. 95). The Committee
of the Regions noted this aspect as well and remarked that the UfM “makes no changes
whatsoever to the programming or financial aspects of the Mediterranean dimension of
the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Committee of the Regions, 2008b, $15). For this
reason as well as the fact that it remained a work in progress we must at this point
remain cautious in terms of the wider significance attributed to the changes signalled by
the UfM. Deeper investigation into how the UfM was implemented will help us to
further appreciate its significance and meaning for our hypothesis.
Implementing the UfM
As we have seen, the Union for the Mediterranean lacked much of the drive and clarity
that had existed for the EMP and ENP. Yet in some ways it would be unfair to compare
the three programmes in a direct manner, since given its supplemental nature as well as
the absence of significant funding the UfM’s wider significance was determined to be
limited from the outset. Nevertheless, the new programme provides some useful
information for testing our hypothesis as it strengthens the impression that the EU’s
policies were partially being reoriented towards a short-term outlook. This also raises a
challenge, for if it is really true that the EU moved towards such a stance the importance
of our independent variables as drivers of the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean
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would be more difficult to trace. In this section we investigate to what extent this was
the case by undertaking our second and third tests.
In the previous chapters we have chosen for a sectoral division, following the
different ‘baskets’ of the EMP and ENP. Since the UfM was not ordered in such a
manner this would not be a useful way to structure the current section. Instead, a better
way to set up our analysis is to focus on the two types of actions prescribed in the
UfM’s founding documents: intergovernmental collaboration (through the co-
Presidency system) and the common projects (backed up by the Secretariat). Therefore,
in order to assess the available evidence as to whether support can be found for our
hypothesis, in the current section we will discuss the UfM’s actualisation since 2008 in
terms of its two main pillars. Specifically, we aim to find out whether causal beliefs
provided a roadmap for policy and to what extent material and ideational variables were
the determinants of this process.
We begin with the intergovernmental dimension of the UfM, which is drawn
upon to test the human rights/democracy element of our hypothesis. The idea was to
work with incumbent regimes collectively and thereby to strengthen the regional aspects
of the EMP, which had previously been gradually ignored due to the difficult
circumstances in the region. Similar problems were experienced in the UfM, and in the
context of a lack of progress and a series of intervening events little evidence is found in
support of the notion that principled beliefs were necessary to explain the observed
behaviour. We point to several sources of tension and contradiction in EU policy during
this period, the implications of which for our hypothesis will become clear over the
course of this chapter.
Secondly we investigate the UfM’s projects and funding. Processes in this
sphere have the potential to tell us primarily about the material side of EFP. Whilst we
247
find some evidence to support our hypothesis, its significance is somewhat
compromised by the lack of successful projects and the absence of strong interest from
the EU member states. Altogether this indicates a state of crisis within the UfM, but it
also represents a challenge to our approach. This will be discussed in the present
chapter’s conclusions as well as in Chapter VI.
The UfM and Human Rights/Democracy
One of the problems that had existed with the Barcelona Process was the fact that it was
often viewed as an EU-led project. As one observer said, the Mediterranean partners
were primarily ‘guests’ in a house that was owned by the EU; this was most clearly
exemplified by the concluding statements to the EMP meetings in which the EU
Presidency often included “items which were not truly shared by all members but
towards which the house guests showed acquiescence, condescension or complacency”
(Aliboni, 2009, p. 2). Therefore, by enhancing the regional nature of Euro-Med relations
and giving the MENA partners a greater role it could be possible to boost their sense of
ownership and thereby to increase their willingness to collaborate with the EU across
the board. As seen in the previous section, this was the (ambiguously defined) causal
belief underpinning the idea of a co-Presidency. With regards to our independent
variables, it is notable that promotion of the human right/democracy agenda via
leverage seems less suited for this format given the resistance to change to be expected
from the MENA states. As Al Jazeera (2008) wrote after the meeting in Paris:
[A]way from the bonhomie … stood a very inconvenient truth. Al-Assad, Olmert
and Hosni Mubarak, president of Egypt and a co-chair of the summit, do
actually have something in common. All in various and different ways, suppress
human rights, sometimes violently.
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This raises an important question, for what were the implications of the UfM for the
role of principled beliefs in EU policy towards the MENA?
Answering this question requires us to carefully trace events since the start of
the programme. After the Paris summit, specification of the UfM continued as there was
still a significant degree of ambiguity. Problems were encountered when the Arab states
insisted on the involvement of the Arab League. Israel was firmly opposed to this since
it feared that it might strengthen a common front that would be critical of its policies
(UK House of Commons, 2009).146 Disagreement over the issue led to a suspension of
meetings – Benita Ferrero-Waldner referred to this as “early teething problems”
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2008) – until the Foreign Ministers met in Marseilles (3-4 November
2008). In a diplomatic quid pro quo Israel dropped its objections in exchange for an
agreement that one of the UfM Secretariat’s five deputy secretary-general posts would
go to Israel (AFP, 2008).147 Moreover, there was another name change (back to ‘Union
for the Mediterranean’, thus dropping the ‘Barcelona Process’) and it was decided to
seat the Secretariat in Barcelona (Union for the Mediterranean, 2008b).148 The
146 As Aliboni had written: “The intergovernmental nature of the UfM is destined to reflect the conflictual
situation in the Middle-East without any filter whatsoever” (2009, p. 3). See also Johansson-Nogués
(2011).
147 The very fact that it was Israel deciding on the Arab League’s inclusion was said to be a further source
of frustration in itself. As Al-Ahram reported: “For Cairo it is particularly embarrassing that the
participation of the Arab League should be decided by Israel when Egypt, the host of the headquarters of
the Arab organisation, is co-chairing the [UfM]” (2008).
148 Regarding the change of name, the European Parliament argued that “this name would help highlight
the joint nature of the partnership” but highlighted the necessity to reconfirm “the policies which the EU
is already developing with its Mediterranean partners” in light of the “strategic value of Euro-
Mediterranean relations and the Barcelona Process acquis” (European Parliament, 2010b, §3).
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Secretariat’s statutes, funding and mandate were not settled yet, though it was agreed
that there would be a southern Mediterranean Secretary General.
With regards to principled beliefs, the most significant finding until this point is
the fact that human rights and democracy were not prioritised by the EU. In the
Marseille document’s outline of fields of cooperation to be pursued there was emphasis
on technical issues and matters such as implementation of the Code of Conduct on
terrorism and ESDP dialogue. While there was mention of a commitment to human
rights and exchange of experience on elections, this would take place “on a voluntary
basis upon the request of any of the partners” (ibid., p 9). The EU thus took an
extremely cautious stance, opting not to pressure MENA regimes on their record on
human rights and democracy. In fact, taking a wider view, it is apparent that this
dynamic could concurrently be found in the ENP. The European Parliament commented
that “since the launching of the Barcelona Process no substantial progress has been
made … as regards adherence to, and respect for, some of the common values and
principles highlighted in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration” (2009c, G; see also European
Commission, 2009c). Tellingly, this did not seem to stand in the way of deepening
cooperation on e.g. JHA issues. The example of Morocco illustrates this vividly:
Although the reforms to advance democracy and human rights could be more
ambitious, progress has nevertheless been made … Nevertheless, persisting
deficiencies in the functioning of the judiciary pose a risk to the reforms that
have been launched. Obstacles to freedom of the press remain. (European
Commission, 2009c, p. 6)
However:
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The dialogue with the EU in certain sensitive sectors has further intensified,
notably on the fight against organised crime and cooperation on border
management issues. (ibid., p. 6)
The situation in Tunisia reveals a similar dynamic. It was said that “challenges remain
on the ground in the implementation of objectives agreed, notably on freedom of
association and expression” (ibid., p. 6). Yet this did not halt JHA collaboration: “the
dialogue that has been initiated in the frame of the subcommittee on Justice and
Security should open the way for closer cooperation on the fight against terrorism and
organised crime, on border management and on migration issues” (ibid., p. 6; see also
Powel, 2009 for an analysis of EU-Tunisia relations). Thus, despite the barriers
experienced in the field of human rights, cooperation in the sphere of JHA intensified.
This suggests that the initial long-term, strategic vision of the EMP and also of the ENP
was gradually downscaled towards areas where more immediate progress seemed
feasible and where less resistance from the MENA regimes was expected. As we have
said before, this represented a second best option vis-à-vis the Union’s earlier intention
to address Europe and the MENA’s shared problems through comprehensive reform.
The UfM’s lack of a strong human rights component falls in sync with these
dynamics and could thus be said to be representative for certain wider developments in
Euro-Med relations. For the UfM, little evidence could be found to support the
hypothesis that human rights and democracy were a significant variable. In this regard
our hypothesis fails a hoop test for the hypothesised role of ideational drivers. As we
will see below, further developments in the programme did little to rectify this situation,
though we must note that this occurred in the context of a progressively worsening
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regional political climate. This political climate could be said to have ‘muddied the
waters’, making it more difficult to formulate far-reaching conclusions on the basis of
the available evidence.
Notwithstanding the moderate development that had been made in Marseille in
reconciling differences over the inclusion of the Arab League, Israeli-Arab (and by
extension Euro-Mediterranean) relations were subsequently largely overshadowed by
Israel’s three-week operation ‘Cast Lead’ in Gaza until 18 January 2009. More than
1400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis lost their lives in this operation (Amnesty
International, 2009).149 The Arab states responded by boycotting UfM meetings, which
halted progress and put on hold further development of the Secretariat. Evidently this
was a reminder of the difficulty of establishing multilateral cooperation in a region
where outstanding security issues continued to dominate the agenda. Further spill-over
was experienced when, after the Arab states had relinquished their initial boycott in
June 2009, a new barrier was encountered when a planned summit in Istanbul had to be
cancelled – this time following Egyptian objections to Israeli FM Lieberman’s bellicose
rhetoric on bombing the Aswan Dam in response to potential Egyptian military
redeployment in the Sinai (Haaretz, 2010a). In this manner events seemed to belie
Alfred Tovias’ initially optimistic (at least from an Israeli or European point of view)
projection that “there is … no risk of the project being kidnapped by other countries and
transformed into an arena that is politically hostile to Israel” (in Aliboni et. al., 2008, p.
149 According to the United Nations Fact Finding Mission’s report on the conflict (also known as the
‘Goldstone report’), more than 1,400 Palestinians lost their lives in a military operation that was “to a
large degree aimed at destroying or incapacitating civilian property and the means of subsistence of the
civilian population” (United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 2009, §1890). It
described Cast Lead as “a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize
a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself,
and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability” (ibid., §1893).
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27). In the German press there was a degree of Schadenfreude – in one discussion
forum it was rhetorically asked: Ist die Union ein tot geborenes Kind? (The European,
2010).150
The Egyptian co-Presidency subsequently used its position to halt further UfM
progress, and the European Union was relatively powerless to influence these
developments. As Nassif Hitti, representative of the Arab League, commented: “If you
cannot find the spirit of [the Madrid peace talks], there will be no Barcelona one, two,
or three” (MEDEA, 2009). But in addition to the Arab-Israeli problems there were also
continued tensions between some of the Arab states, such as Algeria and Morocco, who
were divided over the Western Sahara issue. Therefore, though several sectoral
ministerial meetings were held since 2008 (the first since the Gaza conflict was a
meeting on sustainable development in Paris on June 25th 2009, boycotted however by
Syria, Libya and Turkey [European Commission, 2009b]), it proved difficult to pick up
‘business as usual’, and criticism of the UfM was sometimes publicly expressed by key
European actors. “I do not believe in the politics wonderfully described by Nicolas
Sarkozy as a Union of today for tomorrow”, said EU ambassador to Morocco Eneko
Landaburu, arguing that “divisions in the Arab world do not allow for a strong
interregional policy” (La Vanguardia, 2010).
Accordingly, the locus of Euro-Med activity continued to be the Neighbourhood
Policy. In the Commission’s planning for 2010 it was said that “special emphasis will
be put on deepening bilateral relations” especially with Israel and Morocco, which is
notable given their still questionable records on human rights (European Commission,
2009d). A similar gap between progress on political reform and collaboration with the
150 This translates as: ‘Is the Union a stillborn child?’ (author’s translation).
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EU could be noted in the case of Egypt. In the ENP progress report on the country it
was posited without further comment that:
Discussions between the EU and Egypt on counter-terrorism took place in
March 2009, concluding with a call for further cooperation of a
concrete/operational nature. The UN Special Rapporteur on the protection of
human rights while countering terrorism made his first ever visit to Egypt in
April 2009, albeit under a limited mandate (only to discuss Egypt's draft anti-
terror law). A request to make a follow-up visit to Egypt was not accepted.
(European Commission, 2009e, p. 7, emphasis added)151
What this (as well as other reviews of the ENP; see European Commission, 2010a;
2010e) clearly illustrates is how the dynamic observed in Chapter IV was continued. As
is evident in the statements cited above, there was a degree of tension between JHA
activities and the EU’s prior goals with regards to human rights and democracy. This
demonstrates how our ideational independent variable somewhat diminished in
importance during the time period considered here.
When Spain took over the EU Presidency from Sweden in January 2010, its
intention was to boost EU foreign policy and to take the lead in reviving the Union for
the Mediterranean.152 Plans were accordingly made for two summits to be held in
151 Notably ambiguous was also the following set of remarks: “The number of court actions against
internet bloggers and activists increased in 2009, with several tried under emergency rather than civil law
and sentenced to prison” (European Commission, 2009e, p. 5); viz.:  “Egypt seeks EU and international
backing for its initiative to combat the use of internet for terrorist purposes” (ibid. p. 7).
152 As the Spanish Presidency’s political programme stated: “The prosperity and stability of Europe and
the neighbouring regions are intertwined. Spain will especially emphasise the defence of the unitary
nature of the European neighbourhood policy and boost the balanced progress of its Mediterranean and
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Barcelona: the 4th Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference on water management,
and the second major summit for the heads of state and government (planned for 7
June). Despite the gradual revival of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2009 – proving
that it was “not dead”, in the words of German State Secretary for European Affairs
Günter Gloser (MEDEA, 2009) – holding the planned meetings proved more difficult
than expected. As for the water management meeting, albeit supposedly a technical
field, it was ultimately announced in a press release that “discrepancies regarding the
naming of the occupied Palestinian territories” had prevented the signing of an
agreement: the Israelis refused to accept the term ‘occupied territories’ to describe the
West Bank and Gaza and no compromise was reached (Union for the Mediterranean,
2010a). To make matters worse, the scheduled high-level summit was cancelled
entirely. Ostensibly this was to prevent it from intervening with Israeli-Palestinian
peace talks, but in the Spanish media it was suggested that a more important reason had
been the tensions between Israel (and especially its FM Lieberman) and the Arab states
(El Periódico Mediterraneo, 2010). This dynamic persisted and prevented two further
meetings (7 June and 21 November), as Syria continued to refuse to meet with
Lieberman, Turkey shunned Israel in light of its deadly commando raid on the Gaza-
bound flotilla, and the Palestinian Authority objected to continued settlement
construction in the West Bank (Haaretz, 2010a; 2010b). In response to these difficulties
the biennial summits were postponed sine die – according to official Spanish sources
this decision had been reached “in light of the evidence indicating that the currently
stalled peace process in the Near East would make it impossible … to enjoy satisfactory
Eastern dimensions … [A]ll the efforts to achieve a global solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict will
continue to be actively pursued. The consolidation of the Euro-Mediterranean relation will be promoted
by developing the large projects of the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as by implementing its
institutional structures” (Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2009, pp. 12-13).
255
participation” (La Moncloa, 2010). Capturing the point of view of many in the Arab
world, one Egyptian commentator argued that:
If you ask me, we're just fooling ourselves. We cannot, now or ever, be partners
to an economic and political drive that promotes Israel's interests while the
Palestinians are left behind. (Salama, 2010)
To conclude this section; what does the evidence tell us about the ‘causal beliefs as
roadmaps’ aspect of our hypothesis and the status of principled beliefs as a driver of
EFP? As to the former, given that the causal beliefs that lay at the basis of the UfM
were rather ambiguous – the programme was characterised more by the lack of a
strategy than by an explicit set of ideas on causal relationships – the UfM is best
understood in light of our findings in Chapter IV. As we proposed there, some of the
EU’s policies suggested that there was a partial retreat from the pursuit of wide-ranging
reform and economic integration vis-à-vis the MENA, with increased emphasis placed
on short-term initiatives in e.g. the field of JHA. The UfM’s limited focus and
functionalist structure serve as good examples of this approach, eschewing more distant
strategic goals in favour of concrete gains. In this light it is possible to argue that the
European Union gradually moved away from what had been a regional strategy towards
a more ad-hoc approach for dealing with its southern neighbours. The causal beliefs
underpinning this move were less clearly formulated than what had driven the EMP and
ENP, which serves to underscore that a crisis of sorts existed in light of the lack of real
achievements after almost 15 years of the Barcelona Process. Whilst the evidence does
not conclusively falsify the idea that causal beliefs provide roadmaps, the absence of a
clearly defined set of causal beliefs as well as the downscaling of ambitions suggest that
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a qualitative shift had taken place with regards to the type of causal beliefs drawn upon
by the EU. The clearest evidence that we have found exists in the form of beliefs on
what does not work, but it has been harder to trace the formulation of an explicitly
formulated set of alternative causal beliefs. In this regard the evidence mostly points
towards the idea that region-wide intergovernmental collaboration would succour the
EU’s wider policies by increasing the MENA states’ sense of co-ownership over Euro-
Med relations. In comparison to earlier causal beliefs, this was a more ambiguous and
less clearly formulated roadmap for action than e.g. the theory of economic
modernisation that had animated the EMP and ENP.
With regards to our third test, which seeks to find out whether a causal
relationship can be traced from behaviour through causal beliefs to independent
variables, we have chosen to focus in this section on human rights/democracy given its
potential significance on the intergovernmental political level. With regards to the UfM,
however, it has not been possible to find evidence to suggest that principled beliefs
played a necessary role in the formulation of the programme. As we have mentioned
previously various explanations for the UfM can be envisioned, but principled beliefs
do not feature prominently in any of them. Furthermore, if we imagine
(counterfactually) that the EU did not have a principled belief in human rights and
democracy, there is no reason why the UfM could not have looked very much the same
as it did. After all, no substantive components of the programme were focused on the
promotion of principled beliefs. Thus, the evidence does not allow us to posit with
confidence that principled beliefs were a necessary driving variable for the Union for
the Mediterranean.
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Table 18: The UfM’s Intergovernmental Dimension and Principled Beliefs
EU problem definition No progress in regional sphere EMP, lack of co-ownership,
wider lack of progress EMP/ENP
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Involve MENA states through co-Presidency, high-level
regional summits and conferences
Expected outcomes Pertain mainly to agreements on specific issues, including anti-
terror guidelines and water policy, ambiguous on wider
strategic goals
Evidence in support of
hypothesis
Straw in the wind evidence for causal beliefs as a roadmap for
action, no evidence to support the necessary role of principled
beliefs
Challenges Tense political climate acts as spoiler, working with MENA
governments complicates push to promote human
rights/democracy
Actual outcomes No tangible results achieved
Conclusion Human rights and democracy not of proven significance
In a 2012 report, the Economic and Social Committee provided a good summary of the
situation outlined in the above table: “The complete absence, with a few exceptions, of a
democratic environment has obliged the EU to adapt its policies on pragmatic grounds
and to accept as interlocutors figures that could by no means be described as democratic
representatives of their peoples” (2012, §2.1.1). Clearly, this raises questions on what
the further implications are for our theoretical approach, particularly in terms of the
significance of ideational variables. These questions will be discussed in the final
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section of this chapter as well as in Chapter VI. Before engaging in this discussion we
turn to the UfM’s projects and funding to investigate the role of material variables.
Projects and Funding
The second key dimension of the UfM was its more ‘practical’ side, where common
projects would be undertaken within the six areas that had been defined. Closely related
to this aspect of the programme was the Secretariat that would be in charge of
overseeing the execution of the projects, in turn linked to the issue of funding. Since the
EU budget was decided for a set number of years, no significant allocations could be
made to the UfM when it was initiated in 2008. Thus, whereas the projects were
supposed to be the engine of the new framework there was a significant degree of
insecurity over the extent to which this would be possible. In this section we trace
developments in this field with a view to our second and third tests, focusing especially
on the role of material variables.
To move things forward during the period of deadlock between 2008 and 2010,
the Commission was able to provide or earmark funding for the priority projects of the
UfM. This amount stood at just below €90m (with an added €50m EIB funding)
(European Commission, 2009b). Projects were undertaken outside the UfM Secretariat
framework (which had not been set up yet), and they consisted of inter alia: €22m for
de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; €7.5m for maritime and land highways; €4.5m
for maritime safety; and €1m for the Euro-Med University in Portoroz (Slovenia)
(ibid.).153 Though the Commission took the UfM’s focus as a blueprint for enhanced
153 Furthermore, FEMIP monies (80% of the total) were directed towards UfM priority areas, including a
sanitation scheme in Lebanon (€70m); the construction of a wind farm in Gabal El-Zeit in Egypt (€50m);
widening the Rabat-Casablanca road in Morocco (€225m); and a venture capital fund for Palestinian
private enterprises (€5m) (UfM Secretariat & EIB, 2010). 2010 also saw the creation of the Inframed
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projects under the ENP, this did little to strengthen the UfM itself. And in private,
European officials had argued from the start that it would be difficult to find sufficient
funds: “now with the financial crisis it is more difficult if not impossible” (cited in Al-
Ahram, 2008). Thus, the UfM’s principles provided a roadmap for EU action, but this
was undertaken outside the UfM’s institutions, which had not yet been set up.
Progress was made with the adoption of the UfM Secretariat’s statutes on 3
March 2010 by Euro-Mediterranean senior officials (Union for the Mediterranean,
2010b). Commissioner for enlargement and the ENP Štefan Füle made the following
comments to mark the occasion:
The setting-up of the Secretariat represents both an opportunity and a hope for
the whole region. It represents an opportunity and a hope for all Mediterranean
partners that wish to work together in the promotion and realisation of common
projects. It represents also an opportunity and a hope for Europe keen to see a
vast economic area in the south of the Mediterranean, free from fragmentation,
becoming a major trade and economic player in the region. (Füle, 2010,
emphasis added)
Two things stand out in this statement. First is the absence of any mention of human
rights or democracy, which had been characteristic of official discourse on Euro-Med
relations since the Barcelona Declaration. Second, though the Commission was
primarily an external supporter rather than an integral party to the UfM (it had provided
€3m and seconded one official to the Secretariat [ibid.]), the European interest in
Infrastructure Fund by a grouping of investment banks, holding companies and financial institutions, with
an initial budget of €385m (Caisse des Dépôts et. al., 2010).
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economic expansion and becoming ‘a major player’ was explicitly connected to the
Secretariat’s operations. The impression is thus given that, at least from the
Commission’s standpoint, the Secretariat was to complement the Union’s interest in
economic expansion towards the south. Evidently, this provides support for our
hypothesis’ emphasis on the importance of economic interests in driving EFP.
After the adoption of its statutes there was also the inauguration of the
Secretariat’s first Secretary General: former Jordanian ambassador to the EU Ahmad
Masa’deh.154 This was an important step, given that, as stated in the UfM’s founding
Declaration, the initiative’s added value would reside in “its capacity to attract more
financial resources for regional projects” (Union for the Mediterranean, 2008a, §31).
The ‘real meat’ of the UfM – and perhaps the most important criterion for reviewing its
performance – thus lay with the projects that would be undertaken and the extra
injection of funds that was to accompany it. A properly functioning Secretariat was
imperative for fulfilling this goal – Masa’deh described its mission as being a “driver of
Mediterranean unity" (Al-Ahram, 2010).
In this light the role of the Secretariat was to serve as a liaison for the co-
Presidencies and other decision making bodies as well as to draw up proposals for joint
initiatives, which would then be approved by the political bodies (senior officials). After
approval of a project it would furthermore be the Secretariat’s job to promote it and to
serve as a focal point for funding (Union for the Mediterranean, 2010b). In other words,
154 Though originally only one Deputy Secretary General was envisioned, no less than six were appointed
after a difficult process of diplomatic bargaining (Johansson-Nogués, 2011, pp. 28-29). Their
responsibilities were divided as follows: 1) Italy – project funding, co-ordination and SMEs; 2) Turkey –
transport; 3) Greece – energy; 4) Palestinian Authority – environment and water; 5) Israel – higher
education and research 6) Malta – social and civil affairs (Union for the Mediterranean, 2010b, XII). This
complex structure can be seen as posing a bureaucratic hurdle of sorts, much in contradiction to the idea
that the Secretariat “will have a lean structure” (Union for the Mediterranean, 2010b., III.1).
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within the UfM the Secretariat was to play a role similar to the European Commission’s
role in the EMP, acting as the practical coordinator of the directions and initiatives
mandated by the senior officials and the ministerial meetings, though drawing primarily
on external financial sources. Further contrary to the European Commission’s strategy
of relatively clear financial planning, the earlier ambiguities regarding the UfM’s budget
were not entirely resolved in the Secretariat’s statute. The document envisioned a
combination of voluntary contributions from participating states and EU funding
through the ENPI, stating that “any funding by the European Union will come from
existing resources” (ibid., §VIII.1).
The full extent of the problem came to the fore when, one year after he had
taken office, Secretary General Masa’deh stepped down from his position. The main
reason he gave to motivate his decision was a lack of commitment and funding,
primarily from northern EU member states (CNA, 2011; ABC, 2011). The available
budget for 2011 was reduced by 60% to €6.2m (viz. an estimated requirement of €16m)
and many of the participating states did not send their national experts as required,
leaving many of the Secretariat’s desks empty (Ayadi & Gadi, 2011, p. 18; Schumacher,
2011; CNA, 2010). One source suggested that the UfM ‘dream’ had turned into a
‘nightmare’ (Deutschlandradio, 2011). What is clearly illustrated by these dynamics is
that the member states were unwilling to sacrifice resources in light of the uncertain
benefits of the UfM, preferring instead the existing channels and financial commitments
of the ENP. Despite the earlier language of extending the EU’s economic reach, there
did not seem to be much conviction amongst the member states that the UfM was a
useful vehicle to realise this goal. This was described by high-level officials involved
with the process as one the greatest challenges in getting the UfM up to speed
(Interviews with EEAS Officials, 3 & 16 June 2014, telephone).
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As a result of the difficult situation there was much delay in starting up the first
projects. Given that these projects were meant to form the backbone of the UfM, it is
possible to say that rather than adding value up until now the initiative had
problematised more than it had resolved. Mr. Masa’deh’s successor was the Moroccan
diplomat Youssef Amrani – referred to as ‘the face of gridlock’ in one publication
(Zenith, 2011) – and in 2011 the first projects were finally ‘labelled’ (as it is called in
UfM parlance, referring to the fact that projects are neither funded nor executed by the
UfM infrastructure itself, but mostly endorsed to rally funding). The first of these
projects was focused on a 100 million cubic meters desalination facility and distribution
system in the Gaza Strip, referred to as “the largest single facility to be built in Gaza”
(UfM Secretariat, 2012, p. 1). Due to funding problems, however, the project seems to
have been gradually abandoned (inquiries with the UfM Secretariat in May 2014
revealed that funding is still being sought). In parallel, in 2013 it was announced that a
desalination initiative for Gaza will be implemented by UNICEF with a €10 million EU
grant (UNICEF, 2013). What is remarkable is that the total cost was initially estimated
by the UfM Secretariat at $230 million, excluding related costs such as power supply
(UfM Secretariat, 2012, p. 3). When asked, UNICEF explained that in contrast to the
UfM initiative the desalination facility to be constructed would serve only a small
portion of Gaza, though it is not clear to what extent this accounts for the significant
difference between $230 million and €10 million (UNICEF refused to provide a budget
for the plan in email correspondence with author, May 2014). What is unambiguously
clear, though, is that the ambitious original plan has not been realised as a result of
severe financial aporiae and remains in a state of limbo.
Other projects that have been labelled include entrepreneurship days for female
students in Jordan, Morocco, Palestine and Spain; a series of Master’s and PhD study
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programmes; the creation of a network of Euro-Mediterranean logistics platforms; and
the construction of a Euro-Med university in Fez (Morocco). At the time of writing, the
most recent projects include business skills trainings; depollution of the Lake of Bizerte
in Tunisia; women empowerment; and educational activities related to food security.155
Given the relative novelty of the projects (most have not been started yet) it is too early
to provide an evaluation of their operation and/or effectiveness. Yet reviewing the scope
and focus of the selected projects, it is clear that they are all relatively low level.
Moreover, they are much less explicitly integrated with a wider strategy than
comparable activities in the EMP/ENP had been, appearing instead as relatively ad-hoc.
The UfM, in other words, has extremely little concrete achievement to boast of.
Where does this leave us in terms of the validity and explanatory value of our
hypothesis? As to our second test, which assesses the role of causal beliefs as a roadmap
for EU foreign policy, despite the relatively narrow evidential basis (due to the UfM’s
short period of operation) our analysis points towards a technical implementation in line
with the functionalist causal beliefs espoused earlier. Yet given the many complications
that were experienced, it is difficult to provide a full analysis of the dynamics in
question. In this regard it can be reiterated that the UfM symbolises the wider crisis that
existed in Euro-Med relations, representing the gradual departure from the wide-ranging
strategic causal beliefs adopted in earlier EU policies towards the south. Principal
efforts continued to be undertaken within the EMP/ENP framework, but here too it was
clear that the causal beliefs that had been formulated in the 1990s were to some extent
being questioned. Thus, Euro-Mediterranean relations lacked much of the sense of
purpose that we have seen earlier; the UfM is a useful if somewhat extreme
representative of this state of affairs.
155 See [http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/projects], accessed 14 May 2014.
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Table 19: Economic Interests and the UfM
EU problem definition Issues across six functional fields, greater collaboration needed
for addressing common challenges
Policy Methods and
Instruments
Secretariat leverages funding for common projects
Expected outcomes Diverse; achievements in six functional areas but little wider
strategic purview
Evidence in support of
hypothesis
Common projects linked to EU economic interests
Challenges Lack of funding, disinterest from participants
Actual outcomes Small number of projects labelled, but overall no tangible
results achieved
Conclusion Some indication of pursuit of economic interests, but progress
is too limited
In the table above we can see that, as far as the role of economic gains is concerned,
there is some evidence to indicate that the UfM’s projects were viewed as
complementary to wider efforts at expanding the EU’s economic purview. However, the
strength of this evidence is ameliorated by the scarcity of projects, the lack of funding
and the limited breadth of the projects, which evinces a lack of interest from the EU’s
member states. Simply put, the UfM has not been a significant policy arena for the
pursuit of economic goals in the MENA. It has operated mostly on an ad-hoc basis
without a clear underlying strategy, other than a generally defined functionalist
perspective. Altogether it has been unclear what the envisioned end-results have been.
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In this context it has proven difficult to find strong evidence in support of our
hypothesis.
Conclusion
We have traced the development of the Union for the Mediterranean through its two
stages to determine what causal beliefs lay at the basis of the initiative. Whilst the initial
stage (in which the plan was proffered within the French domestic arena) contained too
great a degree of ambiguity to be able to determine with clarity what the relevant causal
beliefs were, the linking of the UfM to the EMP’s shortcomings by the European
Commission evinced an improved understanding of what the purpose of the UfM was
meant to be: to address gaps and problems in the EMP and thereby to increase the
visibility of the Barcelona Process. The UfM’s most striking characteristic in this regard
has been its eschewal of a ‘grand’ vision – i.e. an integrated set of causal beliefs, such as
the modernisation theory of economic development. Instead, the focus has been on
incremental, short-term and ad-hoc issues in an explicit downscaling of ambitions.
Whereas the EMP and the ENP had had a relatively clear roadmap for action based on
an explicitly defined set of goals and related policy measures, the UfM was both more
ambiguous and more pragmatic. Whilst this can be partially explained with reference to
the fact that it was always meant to be merely supplementary to existing framework and
did not come forward in the context of a significant critical juncture, we have argued
that the UfM can also be considered as symbolic for the wider crisis in Europe’s
Mediterranean policy. Simply put, after about 15 years of intensive Euro-Med relations
there were very few concrete achievements to speak of, which eroded faith in the causal
beliefs that had been constitutive of the status quo. Particularly in the JHA dimension of
the ENP this has been observable, and the UfM’s unambitious framing can be
considered as consistent with this trend. In this light the European Parliament was
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justified in its complaint about “the absence of a clear definition of the EU’s
Mediterranean policy … despite the creation of the UfM” (2010c, §2). In our interviews
it was often said that after the Arab Spring it was realised that a clearer vision with a
more integrated set of tools was needed, which could perhaps be seen as an indirect
admission of some of the problems observed (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 2 & 16
June 2014, telephone). Interestingly enough, this provides some contrast with Tony
Blair’s characteristically unremorseful statement that “the West should [not] be the
slightest bit embarrassed about the fact that it’s been working with Mubarak over the
peace process but at the same time it’s been urging change in Egypt” (The Guardian,
2011). Further discussion of these issues will follow in Chapter VI.
This leads to our second and third tests, which seek to assess the role of causal
beliefs and material/ideational variables as drivers of the EU’s policies. Given the
programme’s scaled-down nature and the many remaining ambiguities, it is more
difficult to find strong support for our second test. Whilst the evidence does not falsify
the notion that causal beliefs provide a roadmap of sorts, beyond the functionalist
approach there is less evidence of exactly what the EU expected to get out of the UfM,
with a strong sense primarily given of what would not work. The UfM thus appears as a
second best option in light of wider failures, and in this regard it was symbolic for the
progressive questioning of the European Union’s earlier ideas regarding the best way to
address problems related to or shared with the MENA states. What had been tried in the
past had simply not worked, but the reformative, integrative vision of before was not
replaced with an equivalent set of strategic causal beliefs on how to move forward. The
result was an ‘unstrategic’, ambiguous policy, complicated all the more by the difficult
regional situation. The outcomes of our second test are therefore somewhat
inconclusive, pointing primarily to the notion that the EU appeared at a loss as to how it
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could best interact with the MENA. Important to note here is that due to the more
limited timeframe considered in this chapter it is more difficult to assess the overall
significance of this period. There were some very tense circumstances which made
things difficult for the EU, so whether EU policy will recover in the long run remains to
be seen. In the light of especially Chapter IV, however, the UfM appears as the
culmination of an initially hopeful but progressively challenging trajectory.
For our third test we have attempted to find evidence that would either support
or challenge our hypothesis that principled beliefs and economic interests are necessary
variables for explaining EU policies. Unfortunately, the Union for the Mediterranean
provides little evidence on both counts. As far as human rights and democracy are
concerned, the UfM simply did not address the topic at all. This could be considered as
failing a hoop test, given that even rhetorical emphasis was largely absent in the
evidence considered. Generally speaking, failing a hoop test falsifies a hypothesis, but
given the amount of supporting data found in the other two empirical chapters, the more
limited timeframe considered, and the supplemental nature of the UfM we consider this
finding to be a strong challenge rather than a decisive blow. However, the challenge is
underlined by the concurrence of the UfM’s dynamics with wider developments in the
EU’s policies, as argued throughout the current and foregoing chapters. We will return
to this point in Chapter VI.
Challenges of a similar nature were encountered in the field of economic
interests. Even though the hoop test that we conducted was not failed given the
possibility to envision a degree of consistency between the UfM and the EU’s material
interests, it could not be said that the data provides a strong basis to support our
conceptualisation of EFP. Simply put: the hypothesis tested in this thesis does not
appear as a good fit with the dynamics observed in the Union for the Mediterranean
268
framework. In part this may be due to the fact that the regional political situation had
made it extremely difficult for the EU to pursue any kind of objectives, but even outside
this fact it is apparent that explanations for the UfM must be sought primarily beyond
principled beliefs and shared economic interests. In this regard, on the basis of our
theoretical model the UfM can be viewed chiefly as a testament to the intra-European
division and strategic confusion that gradually took hold of Euro-Med relations as the
results of more than a decade of the Barcelona Process bore little fruit. Given this state
of affairs, it is clear that in this instance our fourth test/question must be answered in the
negative. Once again, given the limited size of the UfM and its lack of prioritisation and
results we must be cautious in attaching far-reaching significance to these findings. That
said, they are symbolic for what we have regarded as a wider crisis in EU policy, in
which earlier causal beliefs were increasingly questioned and strategic goals (both
normative and material) seemed more difficult to attain.
Looking at the relevant literature, it is remarkable that in comparison to other
EU initiatives less effort at wider theorisation of the UfM has been undertaken. The
most substantial contributions have come from authors who had earlier challenged
Europe’s normativity and/or who had adopted a relatively nuanced perspective vis-à-vis
the split between realist and constructivist approaches. Federica Bicchi, for example,
wrote that “the political project of ‘constructing a Mediterranean region’ based on
democracy and human rights has been largely abandoned amid a progressive
fragmentation of efforts” (2011, p. 14), while Patrick Holden has referred to the UfM as
“a kind of smorgasbord of policies and institutions” (2011, p. 167). Perhaps the
strongest criticism of the UfM and the tendencies in EFP which it seemed to embody
was expressed by Kristina Kausch and Richard Youngs (2009). For them the Union for
the Mediterranean was “not a new lease of life but another nail in the coffin of the
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vision that infused the inception of the EMP in 1995” (p. 963). They further argued that
the UfM “clearly dilutes the political character and thrust of the EMP vision” (p. 963)
and “is curiously divorced from the world around it” (p. 964). Or as Rosemary Hollis
argues: “The UfM largely dispenses with the normative agenda that characterized EU
aspirations for the EMP in its early years” (2011, p. 102).
In this vein it is clear that our analysis is consistent with the main tenor of
academic studies on the UfM, where it is largely argued that the programme has made a
negative contribution to the EU’s Mediterranean policy (and especially the ideational
aspects of it). Similar criticisms have been expressed in the popular media. In an
opinion piece by Al Jazeera’s chief political analyst, the initiative was described as ‘a
victory for realism’: “Unlike its predecessors, the Union for the Mediterranean promised
much and asked little of its partners. There are no preconditions to join and certainly no
demands to improve human rights or establish democratic systems of governance”
(Bishara, 2008). Elsewhere Mr. Bishara argued that in the UfM “geopolitics overrode
human rights, and economics trumped democracy as Western powers closely embraced
Israel and the Arab dictatorships” (2012). In reply to this analysis we must add that
neither geopolitics nor economics really triumphed in the UfM, given that the benefits
of the framework for either of these were ambiguous as well.
In sum, most of the academic and popular commentary has been roundly
negative. Official comments from EU actors have, in fact, echoed some of the
criticisms. As Štefan Füle admitted as early as April 2011: “the Union for the
Mediterranean has the potential to make a real difference – but frankly it has not yet
done so and must be revitalised” (Füle, 2011). The ESC was remarkably honest: “The
Union for the Mediterranean … has so far failed to deliver the expected results. Its role
and objectives therefore need to be radically redefined” (Economic and Social
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Committee, 2012, §5.3). Our analysis does not deviate from this trend, but even though
our independent variables have not satisfactorily explained the UfM we have been able
to offer some added value with our approach by framing the new programme in terms of
the erosion of faith in earlier causal beliefs. In this sense the focus on causal beliefs and
their connection to policy drivers has proven fruitful, as it has allowed us to understand
how important an integrative set of causal beliefs has been for tying together the various
variables that have played a role in the formulation and implementation of EU foreign
policy. If this set of beliefs is absent or is belied by real-world events, as happened in
the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, foreign policy can either follow the existing
path in a foolhardy manner, develop a new set of causal beliefs to integrate various
interests, or focus on functional or ad-hoc issues in a situation of strategic confusion.





This thesis has engaged with an important analytical and empirical conundrum
regarding the European Union’s foreign policy. Our approach was inspired by a critical
reading of the academic literature on the topic, which has been viewed in terms of a
binary between analyses that stress either ideational or material factors. Whilst we
recognise the existence of various more balanced perspectives, in general it appears to
be the case that (despite a widespread acknowledgement of ideational-material
interaction in real-world politics) there have been relatively few theoretically-minded
efforts to delineate more specifically how intermingling takes place. In this light it has
been our aim to advance IR theory and the debate on EFP by testing the hypothesis that
ideas and material self-interests jointly drive the European Union’s foreign policy,
building upon the perspective advanced by Goldstein and Keohane (1993) as well as
several influential perspectives on EFP. The case study that was chosen for this effort is
EU policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, specifically the EMP, ENP and
UfM. The contribution of this thesis thus resides in its assessment of an ambitious
hypothesis through comprehensive empirical research with a unique set of primary and
secondary data.
This chapter provides a discussion of our findings as well as their wider
theoretical and practical implications. We begin with an overview of our approach and
the main findings of our investigation. In this section we provide an answer to our
research question as we dwell upon the validity of the hypothesis formulated in Chapter
II. In view of the cumulative evidence gathered we focus especially on our fourth
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question/test: do principled beliefs and economic interests provide sufficient
explanation for the EU’s Mediterranean policies? As we will see, insufficient evidence
was found to support this claim fully, but we do point to several other conclusions that
can be drawn with more confidence, enabling us to formulate our final answer to the
research question.
The second part of this chapter engages with the wider implications of our study.
As we situate our findings within the existing academic literature, it is stressed that our
integrative perspective has a number of advantages, offering explanatory breadth with
sensitivity to context and change. Attention is subsequently paid to the implications of
our findings for both theory and practice. As to the former, we discuss a number of key
points drawn from our study that could help advance the state of theorising on material-
ideational interaction. Finally, we highlight some of the EU’s recent efforts and discuss
them in light of earlier policies as analysed throughout this thesis.
Overview of Approach and Findings
Research Strategy
We began this research project by drawing attention to the split between ideational and
material approaches to IR, primarily marked by the debate between realism and
liberalism/constructivism. Despite the presence of a wide multiplicity of perspectives, in
resonance with a number of influential authors we have noted that divergence has been
perceptible in studies on the European Union’s foreign policy engagements (see e.g.
Cavatorta & Pace, 2010; Costalli, 2009; Youngs, 2004) – particularly with respect to
Euro-Mediterranean relations (Bechev & Nicolaïdis, 2010; Attinà, 2003). Positioning
ourselves explicitly in the middle ground, it has been our aim to explore the strengths
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and weaknesses of an integrative approach that utilises key assumptions of both
perspectives. To this purpose the following research question was posed:
What drives the EU’s policies towards the MENA; European ideas, the EU’s
material interests, or some combination of both?
A strategy of hypothesis-testing was chosen to verify the benefits of a comprehensive
approach. Two particular theoretical perspectives have served as the building blocks for
our hypothesis, pertaining to ideational and material variables respectively. With respect
to the ideational dimension, we have seen that concepts such as ideas, culture, identity
and norms have been at the forefront of efforts to describe the EU’s distinguishing
features in IR, leading to an emphasis on what makes it unique within the international
domain. This approach is well-represented by the ‘normative power’ thesis (Manners,
2002). It argues that the Union’s actions are ‘different’ because of what it is; i.e. a
supranational organisation founded on the principles of peace, multilateral cooperation
and liberal values. Supporters of the normative view hold that the purpose of common
foreign policy is to transmit this set of values to external actors and thus to ‘normalise’
international relations by regulating the modalities of appropriate behaviour. In this
manner the normative approach suggests close linkage between identity, interests and
actions. This view finds it theoretical justification in a constructivist conceptualisation
of IR, which is primarily interested in how collective cognitions and processes of
socialisation impact upon actors’ interests and their self-understandings. What
constructivists argue is that ideas matter, and this argument has found fertile ground in
studies that have tried to come to grips with the European Union’s contribution to
global affairs. However, NPE scholars have sometimes been somewhat reluctant to
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empirically verify their hypotheses, and this is one of the areas where we aim to make a
contribution to the existing literature. What is more, they have been open to the charge
of being too idealistic or naïve about EFP; we will return to this point below.
What we took from the ideational approach is a focus on what has been referred
to as Europe’s principled beliefs, expressed especially in terms of support for
democracy and human rights. Given that these values are often highlighted in
constructivist/normativist research on the EU, make up a key element of the normative
approach, and touch upon issues of great relevance for the MENA, they constitute an
excellent variable to be included in our research.
On the material side, represented by the realist paradigm of IR, typically there is
emphasis on issues such as relative power, domination and international competition.
Whilst many post-Cold War realists have attempted to escape the overly sterile
approach of neorealism, the ‘brute materialism’ of human nature, anarchy and material
capabilities has remained at the heart of the theory’s explanatory framework. One
example is neoclassical realism, which fuses structural analysis with investigation into
the ideas of key decision makers, as it posits that the inputs from the international
system are ‘filtered’ through interpretations (Rose, 1998). While this is seen as a
welcome step from this thesis’ perspective, the neorealist-inspired focus on structural
forces lends itself less favourably to an in-depth analysis of specific policies. For this
reason we have discussed the broader category of classical realism, which can be
synthesised with a constructivist approach (Barkin, 2003), but gives rise to a very
different view on the EU than what is argued by the normative school: Europe is not
expected to be able to fundamentally transcend the pitfalls of international relations.156
156 To cite one author who made the opposite argument, i.e. that Europe could transcend the traditional
risks of IR: “In the long run, the EU can contribute to the transformation of the international system, by
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As Raymond Aron wrote: “The federation of Western Europe will contribute to peace
or to international tension, but in any case, it will not modify the international order”
(1981, p. 755). In this vein it is expected by realists that the risks of anarchy, conflict
and competition will be shifted towards the borders of the European zone of peace and
prosperity and placed at the feet of a new ‘them’ (Costalli, 2009).
On the basis of these assumptions realists have stressed that the EU’s chief
purpose is to advance the economic interests of its members (Hyde-Price, 2008;
Zimmermann, 2007). Similar to our engagement with principled beliefs, this assertion
was reconceptualised as a necessary but not sufficient way to account for EFP (drawing
on the terminology found in Mahoney, 2012; van Evera, 1997). Thus, utilising the
perspective outlined by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), which has as its key
distinguishing feature an emphasis on the coexistence of material and ideational drivers,
we have hypothesised that principled beliefs and economic interests are each necessary
but not sufficient to account for EU policies towards the MENA. We also hypothesised
that when fused these two dimensions might provide an explanation that captures the
core dynamics of EFP towards the MENA to a sufficient extent.
In order to explain EU policy it has been necessary to identify a causal
mechanism, for, as Mahoney writes, “to explain a phenomenon is to identify the causal
mechanisms that permit and/or generate the phenomenon” (2012, p. 586). As a causal
mechanism to connect our independent variables to the dependent variable (EU policy),
we have followed Goldstein and Keohane in focusing on causal beliefs, defined as
consensus amongst elites regarding cause-effect relationships relevant to foreign policy.
Such beliefs are theorised as providing a roadmap for action, given that they provide the
reinforcing elements of international society such as international law and inter-state cooperation, and
minimizing those of power politics” (Smith, 2003, pp. 107-108).
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‘theory’ used by policy makers to diagnose problems and to predict the results of their
actions. Policy change could accordingly be explained in terms of changes to the
independent variables (less likely due to their typically lasting nature), as a result of
altered causal beliefs on the basis of experience (defined as a learning process), and/or
as being enabled by significant contextual shifts defined as critical junctures. At heart,
therefore, our approach places a rationalist logic within a world that is socially
constructed, highlighting the continued search for improved policies within a generally
restrictive but sometimes permissive political environment. Such an outlook has been
outlined by various authors as a viable approach to fusing realist and constructivist ideas
(Youngs, 2004; Adler, 2002; Katzenstein et. al., 1998).
Altogether this has generated the following model to underpin our hypothesis and its
operationalisation:
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Table 20: Extended Hypothetical Model for Drivers of EFP (revisited)
Given the above model, the hypothesis that was formulated in reply to our research
question is: the EU’s belief in democracy and human rights and its interest in economic
gains operate jointly through causal beliefs, thus driving the EU’s policies towards the
MENA. A process-tracing methodology was chosen in light of its suitability for
hypothesis-testing and its ability to deal with complex causal relationships, utilising a
wide range of textual sources as our core dataset with in-depth interviews with key
officials and other relevant individuals added for the purpose of triangulating findings.
Furthermore, in reflection of our ambition to take heed of the types of tests and
evidential support available (hoop, smoking gun or straw in the wind), four tests –
formulated as questions – were drawn up to assess the various components of our
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hypothesis (drawing especially on the methodological steps outlined in Mahoney,
2012). The four questions were:
1. What were the EU’s causal beliefs?
2. What were the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean; did causal beliefs
provide a roadmap for action?
3. Were economic gains and principled beliefs necessary variables for the EU’s
roadmap/actions?
4. Do economic gains and principled beliefs jointly provide sufficient explanation
for the EU’s policies?
For each of the three sub-case studies chosen – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; the
European Neighbourhood Policy; and the Union for the Mediterranean – we have
endeavoured to answer these questions. Yet the fourth question has until now been
emphasised to a lesser extent given its need for an especially broad evidential basis.
Below we will therefore discuss our key findings in terms of how they support or
challenge our hypothesis with the purpose of undertaking our final test, thereby
providing an answer to our overarching research question.
Findings
With respect to the EU’s causal beliefs and their status as a roadmap for policy
(questions one and two), we have been able to find strong evidence in support of our
hypothesis. The best example is perhaps that of the Euro-Med Partnership in its earliest
forms. Here, particularly within the Barcelona Declaration and the Euro-Med
Association Agreements, a comprehensive and clearly defined set of causal beliefs was
in evidence. The key hallmarks of the EU’s approach were to rely on structural
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adjustment, FDI and the private sector in order to generate a more prosperous and
therefore more stable Mediterranean regional environment. In this regard the EU
conformed to the reigning orthodoxy of the 1990s, as Western governments largely
organised their policies around the market-oriented Washington Consensus in
collaboration with the IMF and the World Bank. The EU’s approach to the
Mediterranean was accordingly chiefly focused on helping MENA partners to progress
in their IMF-promoted structural reform programmes, as it was expected that this type
of ‘modernisation’ would engender a range of benefits for both north and south. We
have considered the more cynical interpretation that a form of exploitation (by stripping
protective barriers to domestic markets) had always been the goal, as critics of
neoliberal economics are wont to assert, but it has proved difficult to support this claim
given the recognised interdependence between MENA stability and various European
interests. The suggestion of economic exploitation was widely rejected by EU officials
interviewed (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 2, 6 & 16 June 2014, telephone), even in
the case of individuals who openly expressed other criticisms of the EU (Interview with
EEAS Official, 3 June 2014, telephone). For these reasons we deem it most likely that it
was actually believed that structural reform would provide the best avenue towards
regional progress (also given that similar reforms were undertaken inside the EU itself),
though (as discussed below) we must add that this was by no means a purely altruistic
stance. In fact, what is especially characteristic about the EU’s causal beliefs was that
they reflected a conviction in the possibility of a win-win scenario in which both sides
to the EMP would benefit.
We have observed a high degree of consistency between the identified causal
beliefs and subsequent actions in the EMP (we have been extremely cautious not to
reverse this order in order to retain our ability to falsify our hypothesis). On this basis
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we have argued that our hypothesis passes the first and second tests. Yet this does not
mean that causal beliefs have been fixed, as in fact there have been various important
(though partial) shifts over time. Crucially, change was observed in the European
Neighbourhood Policy. Though this programme retained most of the core principles of
the EMP, there is evidence to suggest that the challenges experienced in the Barcelona
Process gave rise to a modified set of causal beliefs to serve as the roadmap for EU
policy. Simply put, reality did not match earlier expectations, and as both the IMF and
the World Bank relaxed some of the more stringent principles of structural adjustment,
reflecting a changing Zeitgeist, the EU took a slightly more hands-on approach with an
extended set of benefits to be enjoyed by the MENA partners. Most importantly, though
it was already clear that the 2010 deadline for the Euro-Mediterranean FTZ would likely
be missed, the southern partners were offered a so-called stake in the common market,
signalling the EU’s desire for far-going economic integration and qualitatively
‘different’ relations with neighbouring states. The political dimension was strengthened
as well, with increased attention for the democratic deficit that continued to characterise
political realities across the Maghreb and Mashriq. The causal belief underpinning these
shifts was that political and economic reform towards what could be described as a
more market-based and more democratic model of governance would benefit stability
and prosperity in the south as well as European trade and investment interests. In
addition, it was believed that more European assistance and guidance were required
than what had been provided previously. As we have seen, these shifts were driven by
the lessons learned through both the EMP as well as the EU’s enlargement process, and
they were iterated at the juncture created by enlargement and the Iraq war. In this
manner we have identified a complex set of dynamics, consistent with our model, to
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explain shifts in the EU’s policies. This has provided support for the hypothesised role
of causal beliefs as roadmaps.
At this point we must admit that the story was somewhat complicated by
developments observed within the ENP and particularly the UfM. In the increased
emphasis on JHA that was gradually placed within the Neighbourhood Policy, the
European Union appeared to go somewhat ‘off script’ as regards its reformative stance
vis-à-vis the Mediterranean. Further dilution was observed in the UfM, where the core
principles of especially the EMP seemed to have been abandoned altogether – one
official we interviewed even called the UfM a ‘sideshow’ due to its perceived distance
from the chief objectives of Euro-Med cooperation (Interview with EEAS Official, 3
June 2014, telephone). Whilst the overall weight of the evidence appears to be in
support of our hypothesis, in our view these developments do signal that the earlier
causal beliefs suffered a degree of erosion, as they were replaced with a more short-term
or even ad-hoc approach towards the MENA. Perhaps this is not surprising if we
consider that real-world events have largely belied the expectations inherent in EU
policy, as political oppression, authoritarianism, poverty and instability remained
prevalent across the MENA in spite of significant economic reforms. The explosions of
the ‘Arab Spring’ testify to this conclusion, and it is interesting to note that our analysis
points towards a degree of what might be called strategic confusion within the EU some
time before these events took place. Of course it is always easier to make sense of
political events retrospectively, but what is clear is that the failure of extant approaches
was a known fact, exemplified by the UfM’s lack of a well-defined strategic
component. In this light interviewees were keen to stress that the Arab Spring held some
valuable lessons in light of which EU policy has now been improved (Interviews with
EEAS Officials, 2 & 16 June 2014, telephone; also discussed below).
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In sum, our hypothesis has passed the first and second tests, but the evidence is
stronger for the earlier stages of Euro-Med relations than for more recent initiatives.
This has had important ‘knock on’ effects for the outcomes of our third test. Within the
EMP, EU economic interests were clearly represented in the emphasis that was placed
on foreign investment. After all, structural adjustment in the MENA would offer EU-
based investors the opportunity to explore new markets and thereby to increase
European wealth, as argued by realist observers of the EU. We have been able to
pinpoint several explicit admissions of how expansive economic interests played a key
role in the problem definitions inherent to the EU’s causal beliefs in both the EMP and
ENP, showing how the independent variable of economic interests was causally linked
to EU policy through the mechanism of causal beliefs as roadmaps. Crucial examples
include the Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone as well as the wider push towards
market integration in the ENP, the costs of which were very heavy for the MENA
partners whilst significant benefits were expected for EU businesses.
Thus, we can conclude with a high degree of certainty that economic interests
are a necessary variable to account for the EU’s actions towards its southern neighbours.
The most significant challenge to our hypothesis that we encountered pertained to
divisions within the EU, characterised as tensions between absolute and relative gains.
Examples include the struggle over the idea of an investment bank for the MENA and
the difficulties experienced in liberalisation of agricultural goods and services. In view
of these issues we have argued that far-going analyses of the EU as an imperial or
hegemonic actor (see Sepos, 2013) struggle to recognise its limitations as an actor
(further discussed below). Sensitivity to the scope and nature of the EU’s economic
interests thus remains important, despite the steps taken towards an increasingly
extensive common foreign policy, which serves as an important reminder for theorists
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regarding the difficulty of making generalisations about foreign policy interests. This is
reflected in the table below:
Table 21: EU Economic Interests and Euro-Med Institutional Frameworks





No substantial common policy
 situation deemed















for MENA partners; no
member state support for EU
market liberalisation or
investment bank investment
remained suppressed and Euro-















Internal divisions in EU
weaken bargaining position
moderate impacts: progress for











Lack of substantive interest
from member states too
early for full evaluation, but
results unsatisfactory until now
An important element of our hypothesis was that material interests are necessary but not
sufficient to explain EU policy. This was corroborated by the evidence considered, as a
wide range of actions do not appear to pertain in a direct manner to a European interest
in market expansion. This is especially true for activities within the purview of the
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EMP’s first basket, where support was given for initiatives related to the promotion of
human rights and democracy across the MENA. This has allowed us to find support for
the hypothesised role of principled beliefs, particularly within the EU’s various relevant
programmes on political reform and its strong (rhetorical) commitments in this sphere.
Put differently; within the problem definitions present in the identified causal beliefs
(and the EU’s accordant actions), democracy and human rights have played a distinct
role. While realists might dismiss such dynamics as mere posturing, we have found it
difficult to account for EU behaviour entirely in terms of self-interest. The most
plausible explanation, in our view, is that principled beliefs have been a key (joint)
driving variable in EFP, and this was emphasised time and time again by officials
working on EU foreign policy (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 2, 6 & 16 June 2014,
telephone). Of course we are aware of the potential realist argument that the will and
ability to pursue ideational goals are a product of relative power, even if actors are
unaware of it, but we think that greater explanatory power can be gained by considering
principled beliefs as a separate category. After all, this allows us to be more precise in
our analysis and more sensitive to the reality of policymaking.
It must be added here that the challenges to this part of our hypothesis have been
greater than those that were identified in the material realm. This was most evidently the
case with the UfM, which could be envisioned as consistent (or at least not inconsistent)
with economic interests but where a connection to principled beliefs was almost entirely
absent. Moreover, the growing focus on JHA over the course of Euro-Med relations as
considered in this thesis clashed primarily with the human rights and democracy
dimension, as strengthened cooperation with incumbent regimes on anti-terrorism and
immigration appeared at best as unhelpful in promoting a more tolerant political
climate. Finally, in all three of our case studies the political dimension was less
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prevalent than the economic side of EFP. This was true for the EMP, and with some
corrections it persisted in the ENP. In both cases we did not find smoking gun evidence
to support the hypothesised necessary role of principled beliefs, but we did find hoop
and straw in the wind evidence to do so. Only in the case of the UfM did we fail to find
hoop evidence, leading to a partial rejection of this element of our hypothesis. The
overall conclusion as regards principled beliefs is therefore that evidence can be found
to support the argument that they are a necessary variable, allowing our hypothesis to
pass the third test, but it is a narrow pass as a number of challenges coalesce to weaken
the overall strength of the supporting evidence.
The normative approach to EFP thus appears to explain a more limited range
than the materialist approach – notably this is exactly opposite to the conclusion reached
by Attinà (2003). Yet more importantly, our findings clearly indicate that in isolation
neither variable explains things fully. This allows us to consider the fourth question/test
that was posited: do principled beliefs and economic interests jointly account
sufficiently for the EU’s policies towards the MENA? At the outset we must
acknowledge that this is a highly ambitious question given the general difficulty in
finding ‘sufficient’ explanations in social science research (Mahoney, 2012). Owing to
the complexity of the topic and the wide variety of potentially relevant variables, it
seems almost impossible to reach a confident conclusion on this score. This is why we
have argued that we will at best be able to present straw in the wind evidence in support
of our hypothesis. Such evidence would point to a hypothesis’ general likelihood or
feasibility, but it would not prove it. In the case of this research this is all the more so
given the breadth of our hypothesis as well as its ‘staggered’ nature, as it is built on
various constitutive elements drawn from differing theoretical perspectives. So where
does this leave us?
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Taking a bird’s eye perspective on the 15 years of EU policies considered in this
thesis, our conclusion is that the hypothesis that was tested was highly applicable to the
EU’s earlier policies but lost some of its explanatory force as time passed. In other
words, the sufficiency of principled beliefs and economic interests to jointly account for
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the earlier forms of the European
Neighbourhood Policy is greater than for more recent behaviour. We found that there
was strong coexistence as well as a degree of interplay between the two variables, with
each setting broad limits for the scope and content of EU policy. Economic interests
determined much of what the EU did and wanted, but we did not see a heedless pursuit
of economic interests without regard for democracy and human rights. Conversely, it
was noticed that although principled beliefs drove the creation of various European
initiatives, the strength of the EU’s emphasis on political change was in some cases
clearly delimited by economic interests. Thus, the main conclusion that can be drawn
from our research is that EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean was neither an
example of how norms and values lead to the transcendence of self-interests nor a case
of disingenuous normative packaging. Instead EU engagement with the MENA has
been much more complex; what it represents is a marriage of differing objectives under
the explicit belief that they can be pursued in conjunction with one another. This
reciprocally facilitative logic can be said to undermine a bifurcation between
theoretically polarised accounts of Euro-Med relations. By focusing on manifestations
of one or the other dynamic, they overlook the very pivot upon which the EMP and the
ENP were founded: the nexus between economic interests and principled beliefs found
in the causal beliefs that have served as the EU’s roadmap.
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Table 22: Hypothesis fit and challenges
What our hypothesis explains Key challenges
EMP Accounts for the integration of economic
policies with the spread of European
ideals in the Barcelona Process; clarifies
how the EU believed in a win-win
scenario for north and south.
Challenged by disagreement
between EU member states on
deeper-going measures to pursue
collective economic interests
ENP Explains the rebalancing of measures in
the ENP, including the greater
prominence of political reform as well as
the prospects offered for deeper
economic integration.
Emergent practices in the JHA
domain could not be traced directly
to independent variables.
UfM Explains emergence of the UfM in light
of difficulties with achieving earlier
goals.
As above; UfM more distant to both
economic and ideational goals;
strategic dilution.
Whilst our findings provide substantive support for the hypothesis, as indicated in table
22 some important ‘spoilers’ were uncovered. Perhaps most important is the rising
importance of JHA-related policies, particularly with regards to anti-terrorism and
immigration. It would go too far to say that these topics have overshadowed the entire
field of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, which is why we do not think our hypothesis
ought to be rejected, but clearly the more reactive nature of decision making seen
particularly since 2008 poses some challenges to our approach. In essence this can be
related to the fact that our hypothesis builds upon existing work in which the EU is
presumed to have, at least to some extent, a purposive, pro-active foreign policy (this is
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inherent to both the realist pursuit of self-interest as well as the idealist transmission of
normative values). As our hypothesis states, a prerequisite for this to be possible is a
clearly defined set of causal beliefs to serve as a transmitting (causal) mechanism. Yet
what this thesis has found is that the EU’s transmission belt has slowly corroded,
hampering its ability to take strategic action and leading to a focus on less far-reaching
objectives that deal with problems such as immigration on a more immediate level. In
other words; whereas it was expected that the Barcelona Process would promote
prosperity and thereby reduce migratory pressures and political instability, the negative
results inevitably reduced faith in the EU’s abilities and impelled a more immediate
solution to some of the worsening problems. In this regard our model for EU policy is
very helpful to explain what happened, even though the hypothesised drivers did not
cover the inputs into the process fully.
A further obstacle has been encountered in intra-EU divisions, which have
affected primarily the EU’s ability to pursue economic interests in a strong manner. In
this sense we have drawn attention to the divergence between absolute and relative
gains; traces of both were clearly present in the evidence, but the mix was often
unproductive. Whilst the European Commission typically highlighted the absolute gains
of e.g. a Mediterranean investment bank as a full subsidiary of the EIB or a relaxation of
visa policies, member states could not agree and focused on their relative gains vis-à-vis
competing objectives and actors. Another example was found in agricultural and
services liberalisation, for despite the potential of mutual benefits there were particular
vested interests within the EU that made it extremely difficult to move forward. As a
result, the EU has been unable to pursue ‘offensive’ economic interests to the fullest
extent, resulting in a sometimes unhappy mix with ‘defensive’ interests. This does not
undermine our hypothesis as such, but it raises questions on the particulars of our
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independent variable of economic interests, which does not appear as especially
‘independent’ in this light. In addition we have seen that in our interviews with EU
officials disagreement between member states was often highlighted as a key challenge
to greater European effectiveness in the Mediterranean region (see above). The upshot
is that if we wish to explain EU policy, a blanket reference to ‘economic interests’ does
not fully suffice. Though the EU’s behaviour in the economic realm has been fairly
consistently in line with a broad interest in economic expansion, many of the details
have proven to be contingent upon political circumstances.
Returning to our fourth test, in many ways the issue of ‘sufficiency’ appears to
be one of focus or level of analysis. At a higher and thus more abstract level the
feasibility of our hypothesis is greater than at a more zoomed-in level, where endless
variations and intervening variables can be observed. This leads to the observation that
sufficiency in social science research is somewhat of an arbitrary concept, given the
amount of judgement required in determining what level of explanation is satisfactorily
comprehensive. In the case of the hypothesis reviewed here, we do not think that our
evidence allows for a strong claim in support. Yet we do not believe that our hypothesis
ought to be rejected either; rather we point to the substantive benefits enjoyed by our
comprehensive approach and suggest further refining and research as the best way
forward.
In conclusion, to answer our research question – What drives the EU’s policies
towards the MENA; European ideas, the EU’s material interests, or some combination
of both? – we can say on the basis of strong evidence that neither ideas nor material
interests in isolation provide a good explanation for the behaviour we observed. Instead,
an evolving mix of both has been found to drive the EU’s policies, linked by a set of
causal beliefs that has guided coexistence between differing objectives and interests.
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Thus, what is striking is the combination of drivers rather than the superiority of one
over the other. To this we must add that the lack of efficacy in the EU’s approach has
weakened both the material and ideational elements in EFP, creating a situation
characterised by a lack of strategic clarity. Yet within this murky and highly complex
process, which we have endeavoured as much as possible to unravel, material interests
and principled beliefs have held enduring relevance, running through EU policies as a
red thread of sorts. The ups and downs that were witnessed notwithstanding, it is most
likely that the EU’s engagement with the MENA will continue to be marked by efforts
to find mutually facilitative arrangements between the two dimensions.
Wider Implications
Theoretical Implications
In view of the above it can be said that this study speaks to a number of debates within
the fields of EU foreign policy analysis and International Relations. To begin with the
former, the debate on the ‘nature’ of the EU as an international actor has been addressed
head-on, as we have continuously sought to position our findings within the literature
on this topic. It is interesting to note that since work on this thesis was first undertaken
several studies have been published that support our call for a wider theoretical view on
EU foreign policy. A representative example is a special issue of the European Foreign
Affairs Review that proposes a ‘post-normative’ perspective on European policy towards
the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on the pragmatic mediation between
values and interests. Its argument is that “… the debate about the EU as an international
actor has to move beyond the simplistic notion of normative power and arguments about
its theoretical validity to the premise that the EU does not possess per se a specific
nature or ethos” (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010, p. 582). Another example can be found in a
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special issue of the Journal of Contemporary European Research, edited by Kerremans
and Orbie (2013), which seeks to facilitate debate between different paradigmatic
perspectives on EU trade policy.
This thesis adds support to the exploration of broadened perspectives and
exhibits one way of achieving theoretical synthesis. One of our most important
contributions has been to demonstrate, on the basis of extensive empirical research, that
characterising the EU as a particular ‘kind’ of actor almost inevitably leads to a reduced
ability to account for the various complexities seen in its real-world behaviour. The EU
has consistently defied characterisation, and it is not evident that continued efforts to
this purpose will yield explanatory advances. This points to the need for a more
pragmatic view on how the EU manifests itself in international affairs – Steve Wood’s
discussion of ‘pragmatic power Europe’ (2011) is a recent example that resonates with
this argument (see also Youngs, 2010). A useful way to undertake studies of the kind
referred to here would be to focus on the interconnections between differing functional
fields (such as the EMP’s baskets, as considered in this thesis), rather than to analyse
only e.g. economic or human rights policies. In isolation, consideration of such fields
might lend support to a specific characterisation of EFP, but if charges of selection bias
or inconsistencies between expectations and outcomes are to be avoided it will be
highly useful to adopt a thematically inclusive perspective on how the EU’s various
actions fit together.
One significant contemporary debate that is worth mentioning in this place
revolves around the suggestion of ‘normative power as hegemony’, which has been
proposed as a resolution to some of the problems inherent to the normative power
conceptualisation – especially the entanglement of prescription and description as well
as the perceived inconsistency of the EU (Diez, 2013). This can be seen in parallel with
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efforts to analyse the EU in terms of imperial power (Zielonka, 2013; Sepos, 2013).
These works can be seen as theorisations seeking to define a more nuanced view on the
relationship between different kinds of power in EFP, and as argued in this thesis this
could be highly useful in providing thoughtful explanations of EU policy. Yet while it is
clear that several characteristics of a hegemonic or imperial situation exist in the case of
EU-MENA relations (particularly in terms of the EU’s economic weight), we have
found that an imperial perspective overestimates, at least in the case of the MENA, the
challenges encountered in EU foreign policy making. These challenges have hampered
the scope, depth and impact of EU policy. Resultantly, it seems a slight overstatement to
term the EU as a hegemonic or imperial actor, as the EU has been unable to force or
persuade actors towards a specific model of governance in Euro-Med relations. This
highlights how an imperial/hegemonic perspective captures a significant part of the
analytical picture but leaves capability and impact relatively unaccounted for. Thus,
whilst addressing certain theoretical problems, an imperial/hegemonic paradigm does
not appear as a perfect fit with EFP. Once again this underscores the importance of a
relatively pragmatic application of theoretical concepts, given the EU’s persistent
tendency to defy neat characterisation. Moreover, our findings provide a platform from
which to urge scholars to pay careful attention to the ways in which EU policies play
out on the ground in their efforts to theorise EFP.
Taking the discussion a bit broader; what are the ‘lessons learned’ from this
study for wider theorising on ideational-material interaction? After all, as we have
repeatedly stressed, the two perspectives taken as the basis for our hypothesis are not
wrong; rather they have been shown to be insufficient to provide a satisfactory
explanation for EFP. Our argument is that rather than asking whether either ideas or
material variables are more important, it is more useful to ask how they coexist. Below
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we present a number of recommendations on how this can be undertaken in future
research.
First of all, if collaboration between ideational and material perspectives is to be
taken further, it is absolutely vital to be clear about the distinction between ideas and
ideals. This touches upon the criticisms expressed by realists as early as E.H. Carr
(1995) on the obfuscation between analysis and normative prescription in ‘idealist’ or
‘utopian’ scholarship. Modern-day constructivists – including NPE scholars (see Diez,
2013) – have at times been vulnerable to similar critiques (see Onuf, 2001). Most
importantly, their analyses are sometimes undertaken in ways that showcase insufficient
acknowledgement of the role played by power in the international realm.157
Furthermore, it is not always made sufficiently clear to what extent constructivist
analysis is informed by a liberal-idealist worldview, as studies of e.g. EU normative
power often appear to favour the type of liberal norms they investigate and exhibit a
Kantian belief that their spread will ultimately benefit international progress and
stability. Whilst there is certainly room for ‘EUtopian’ scholarship (Nicolaïdis &
Howse, 2002), implicit normative investment in liberal ideals and obfuscation between
prescription and description can weaken the analytical prowess of constructivist
research and leave authors vulnerable to charges of naiveté. The clearest illustration of
this problematic is the often expressed prediction that the EU will change the nature of
international relations for the better (Smith, 2003), which evinces a commitment to
liberal norms in very much the same vein as the Wilsonian utopians that were the focus
157 In addition to the realist critique, postmodern and feminist authors have expressed similar concerns
about constructivism. See Locher & Prugl, 2001.
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of criticism from e.g. Carr (1995) and Morgenthau (1985). As a result constructivist
approaches sometimes appear as idealist rather than ideational.158
In this light, a core prerequisite for further study on the coexistence between
material and ideational variables is to be reflective and explicit about normative
commitments and to make a clear distinction between ideas and ideals. The upshot is
that analysts who aim to explore interconnections must strive as much as possible to
forego adjudging the ideational dynamics they study as desirable or good, or at a
minimum make it explicit whenever they do so. This does not mean that research on the
potentially transformational powers of ideas should be given up altogether, but it does
imply that if material and ideational forces are to be studied in conjunction judgment
must be withhold as to whether transformations occur towards a morally improved state
of international conduct.159 In other words: it should not be assumed that the spread of
liberal norms will diminish the role of power in international affairs, as has sometimes
been argued in research on the EU.
A second point that can be drawn from our analysis of ideational and material
variables in EFP is the need for clarity on the degree to which the study of material
158 Barkin’s discussion (2003) of the distinction to be made between ‘idealist constructivism’ and ‘realist
constructivism’ resonates neatly with this argument.
159 It may be added here that, in our view, a particularly interesting area of research on ideas concerns the
systems and processes that produce consensus amongst policy makers, e.g. the ‘Washington Consensus’
noted in this thesis. In this light, Judith Goldstein has argued that “continued support for the liberal
economic regime is a function of the acceptance by the policymaking community of a set of rules and
norms” (1986, p. 180), but there is still room to determine what specific mechanisms facilitate such
convergence. In this respect critical works (e.g. inspired by Gramsci) could play a useful role (see
Scherrer, 2001). In addition, work on epistemic communities – argued to be the “the transmission belts by
which new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-makers” (Haas, 2004, p. 587) – could
continue to make a contribution to academic understanding of the topic, especially if they can foster
greater cognisance of the interlinkage between epistemic communities and pre-existing material interests
(Naomi Klein’s analysis [2007] of neoliberalism and the Chicago School of economics is a prominent
non-academic example).
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power incorporates positivist or empiricist assumptions. Particularly neorealism has
been vulnerable to charges of being too reliant on positivism (Ashley, 1984), especially
in view of its abstract rationalism as evinced in game-theoretic modelling and a
disinterest in agency (vis-à-vis structure). Evidently this clashes with the study of ideas
as well as the constructivist (and postpositivist) arguments that knowledge does not
exist independent from observation and that there is no objective rationalism that can be
generalised for all circumstances (this also pertains to the ‘logic of consequence’ vs.
‘logic of appropriateness’ debate [see Müller, 2004]). In this thesis the dilemma has
been resolved with what has been termed a ‘soft rationalist’ approach, which does not
rely on a strict adherence to rational choice theory but instead takes a more context-
sensitive view on how strategies are decided (placing, as we have said in Chapter II,
rational actors in a socially constructed world).
Thus, whereas the interlinkage between liberal ideals and the study of ideas must
necessarily be suspended to enable theorising on ideational-material coexistence, it is
also necessary to interrupt the association of positivism and abstract rational choice with
the study of material forces. This implies that assumptions regarding the ‘independent’
effects of material forces should be treated with a high degree of suspicion.
This leads us to our third and final recommendation. In view of the theoretical
framework applied in this study and the empirical findings that were generated, it
appears that the greatest value can be gained from research on ideas and material forces
if consideration of the latter is applied as a corrective to analysis of the former. That is
to say: the beliefs and aspirations of actors should not be taken at face value, and
consideration of material forces can serve as a highly useful way to prevent falling into
some of the ‘naiveté traps’ that were identified previously. A balanced theoretical view
should thus recognise the importance of ideas in shaping actors’ behaviour, but it should
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also remain vigilant about the ‘tragic’ consequences that material forces might have on
even the best of intentions. It is not necessary to assume that all actors are always self-
interested, but the fact that some actors might sometimes be is sufficient to warrant
continual awareness of material interests. Explicit acknowledgement and theoretical
incorporation of material dynamics could thus act as a significant corrective force in
analyses of the role of ideas in IR.
It is worth noting that the perspective outlined above comes very close to what
classical realists like Carr (1995), Morgenthau (1985) and Niebuhr (2005) have argued,
as they have often emphasised the tragic nature of international relations (see Chapter
II). Niebuhr, for example, insisted that a responsible view “must know the power of
self-interest in human society without giving it moral justification” (2005, p. 41). Thus,
in our view a fruitful approach towards the study of ideational and material dynamics
will recognise the vital role played by ideas in directing action and informing the
formation of interests in international relations, but consideration of material forces and
self-interest remains a necessary, corrective part of theorising. If this complex balancing
act can be successfully performed, analysts will be able to continue to advance
fundamental theoretical and empirical understandings of one of the most important and
persistent topics in the discipline of IR.
Practical Implications of this Study
Now that we have considered our findings and the theoretical ‘lessons learned’, it is
important to discuss what the practical implications of our research are. In this regard
perhaps our most important finding has been the ‘strategic confusion’ observed in the
more recent manifestations of EU policy towards the MENA. It is interesting to note a
degree of alignment between our conclusions and Federica Bicchi’s argument regarding
the amount of uncertainty historically present in the EU with regards to the southern
297
neighbourhood (2007). As we have shown, none of the answers given by the EU to the
problems of poverty, instability and oppression in the MENA produced the desired
outcomes, leading to a progressively increasing amount of uncertainty about what
should be done. As we have said, this affected the causal beliefs that served as the
connectors between the inputs and outputs of the policy process; leading to a somewhat
disjointed overall image towards the end of the 2000s. It can be said that this somewhat
undermines e.g. Dannreuther’s argument for considering the EU’s MENA policies as a
‘regime building’ exercise (2007).160 Elements of this characterisation have certainly
been present, but the gradual loss of a perspective towards a recognisable end-goal does
not suggest that a fleshed out, conscious effort at constructing a comprehensive regime
could be identified.
As we have seen in our chapter on the UfM, critics of EU policy have been quite
vocal in expressing their disappointments with recent developments. As one observer
states: “In practice, the Union has frequently preferred immediate stability in the south,
and thus authoritarian rule and repression, to slow and possibly messy regime
transformation” (Kienle, 2009, p. 10). Similarly, Richard Youngs has spoken of
‘pragmatic cosmopolitanism’ to define the EU’s policies (2010), suggesting that there
has been a retreat from liberal internationalism towards a more pragmatic stance (see
also Wood, 2011). This certainly coincides with the findings of our research, and one of
the factors that we have highlighted to explain this situation has been the uncertainty
that existed over the policy measures and instruments that would enable progress in the
160 As he writes, the “particular ‘Middle East regime’ which Europe seeks to develop is one where
international behavior, including most notably that of the US, converges on the need for a multilateral and
institutionalized approach”; such a regime “must be the core foundation block for breeding the mutual
respect and trust in the Middle East required for a long-lasting peace and prosperity” (Dannreuther, 2007,
p. 52).
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MENA. Somewhat provocatively put, what we have seen in this thesis is that the
neoliberal approach to the relationship between economics and politics, since its
moment of glory in the 1990s, has not fulfilled the promise of bringing more prosperity
and freedom. But what is to serve in its place? As the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj
Žižek has argued, although Fukuyama’s thesis on the ‘end of history’ (1992) is
nowadays mostly ignored, there was a certain element of truth to it, as there are
currently no substantial alternatives to the politico-economic view that was
implemented in many countries, the MENA included, after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union (Žižek, 2001). Euro-Mediterranean relations seem to be a good illustration
of this analysis.
Against this backdrop the Arab Spring appears as an almost natural eruption of
the tensions that had built up over many years of politico-economic stagnation and
regression. While some actors were unrepentant – such as Tony Blair, as cited in
Chapter V – others called for European ‘humility’ (Štefan Füle, cited in EU Observer,
2011) and argued that the choice between short-term stability and deeper reform had
proven to be false. UK Prime Minister David Cameron thus argued: “As recent events
have confirmed, denying people their basic rights does not preserve stability, rather the
reverse” (cited in Financial Times, 2011). This illustrates that, whilst the lack of
positive results in the EMP and ENP had facilitated a gradual drift towards a mostly
status quo-ist disposition, the Arab Spring appears to have provided a significant
counterincentive for a recalibration in EFP towards transformational efforts. Many of
the officials interviewed for this thesis argued that exactly this had been the lesson of
the Arab Spring, as it revealed the importance of deeper reforms across the political and
economic spectrum (Interviews with EEAS Officials, 2, 6 & 16 June 2014, telephone).
However, in view of recent developments it is not clear to what extent the EU has been
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able to give expression to this insight by formulating a genuinely new approach that
would allow it to sidestep the internal and external problems experienced previously
(despite the creation of the EEAS to spearhead foreign policy [see van Hoonacker &
Pomorska, 2013]).
The Commission’s latest major documents – the proposed ‘Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ and the ‘New Response to a Changing
Neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2011d; 2011e; see also European Parliament,
2011c) – take some steps in this direction, as they currently serve as the chief guiding
documents on engagement with the MENA (they were reportedly formulated in
“absolute record time”, as one of our interviewees said [Interview with EEAS Official,
3 June 2014, telephone]). Most importantly, the EU has promised to give ‘more for
more’: i.e. more assistance and enhanced mobility in return for more reform, with as a
concrete manifestation the Union’s SPRING programme (Support for Partnership
Reform and Inclusive Growth). The programme’s intention is to signal Europe’s
support to Mediterranean countries “that show a true commitment to democratic
reforms” (European Union, 2012, p. 54), with so-called mobility partnerships (visas)
and free trade as the flagship features (ibid.). Ambiguity persists regarding the extent to
which this would be realisable given prior challenges, and despite increased European
financing progress has been regarded as unsatisfactory (Interview with EEAS Official, 3
June 2014, telephone). Overall the EU’s recent efforts have been almost entirely
dependent on the willingness of MENA partners to cooperate, which explains why
currently only Morocco has made ‘good progress’, while further steps are in the works
with Jordan, Tunisia and potentially Egypt (ibid.). This makes it difficult to evaluate the
concrete successes and failures of EU policy following the Arab Spring,
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Beyond these observations, our findings urge caution regarding the expectation
of a European volte-face. Throughout the recent history of Euro-Med relations there
have been several Commission proposals for enhancements of European support, but
many of them were later downscaled owing to member state disagreements. As shown
in this thesis, high-level declarations of common interests between north and south
necessarily ignore the many more substantial areas of competition as well as the
sacrifices that are required to follow a genuinely transformational line, thus raising
doubt over their operational value. Financial constraints and intra-European divergences
generally prevent a truly radical departure from past practice, and though we would like
to recommend an opening up of GATS Mode 4 exchanges (presence of natural
persons), deeper European liberalisation of agricultural trade, or the creation of a
subsidiary of the EIB for the Mediterranean, domestic trends in the member states pose
a considerable barrier against such measures, despite their inclusion in the SPRING
programme.
Broadly speaking, however, it is possible to identify a number of areas where
improvement could and should be made. First is the absence, since the 2010 FTZ goal
was given up, of a clear strategic horizon. The introduction of the UfM seems to have
further fragmented Europe’s approach, and though it was perhaps overly ambitious the
initial Barcelona Process did contain a clear strategic, long-term outlook. Such forward-
looking thinking now seems to have disappeared from view, perhaps understandably so
given the failures of earlier efforts and the further uncertainties of the Arab Spring. Yet
the current situation also offers a good opportunity to respond to the necessity of
defining more specifically what Europe’s vision for the region is. The Commission’s
latest proposals in terms of ‘more for more’ falls short of doing so, and the ‘advanced
partnership’ status of Morocco and Jordan also does not seem to be a particularly well-
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defined concept. Thus, improved strategic thinking – striking a more realistic balance
between the EMP’s original ambitions, the EU’s actual abilities, and concerns shared
with the MENA states – will be indispensable for the future of Euro-Med relations. (We
may recall here Martin Wight’s useful insight that “realism can be a very good thing, it
all depends whether it means the abandonment of high ideals or of foolish expectation”
[1978, p. 294].)
Second, it is worth re-emphasising that there is simply speaking a need for new
ideas. The European Union has been prescribing economic policies inspired by the
neoliberal economic vision for decades, so far with little result. In fact, the two states
where the Arab Spring kicked off, Egypt and Tunisia, were at the forefront of economic
liberalisation and privatisation, to the extent that one Egyptian writer speaks of ‘a
revolution against neoliberalism’ (Al Jazeera, 2011b). For this reason it is absolutely
vital to break away from the orthodoxies that have informed the region’s economic
reform policies, but this is likely to be a difficult task. As we have said, ‘the end of
history’ has not yet been replaced with a new perspective, and the struggle to redefine
the nature of the West’s politico-economic makeup is in full swing within the EU itself
– as evinced by 2014’s European Parliamentary elections. It is expected that the EU’s
approach towards the MENA will follow the tidings of history in a manner similar to
how it reflected economic views prevalent in the 1990s. An important and fascinating
task lies here for scholars in the fields of politics, economics and political philosophy to
imagine alternatives.
A final site of EFP that is relevant from our perspective is the Israeli-Palestinian
situation. A strong and united position is desirable, but here too the indicators point to
the difficulty of breaking free from the confines of past (failed) efforts. After all, it
seems difficult nowadays to speak of a genuine ‘peace process’, and though European
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officials interviewed for this thesis fully admitted the lack of opportunity offered by the
existing status quo – one high-level interviewee even conceded that Edward Said’s
critique of Oslo “was probably correct all along” (Interview in Jerusalem, 21 October
2010) – the European Union has been slow to respond. Altogether there appears to be
little room to manoeuvre. For example, after a confidential European report critical of
Israeli settlement policies was leaked early in 2012, several EU-funded renewable
energy projects in the West Bank were put on the Israeli government’s demolition list
(EurActiv, 2012). As other controversies have shown – most importantly the proposal
for an agreement on ‘Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products’
with Israel161 – it has been extremely difficult for the EU to find a consistent line:
‘declarative condemnations on the one hand, economic rewards on the other’, as one
European diplomat argued (The Guardian, 2012). In a broader sense this could be said
to symbolise Europe’s challenge in remaining both relevant and effective and to fully
utilise its political and economic tools to positively influence the behaviour of external
actors in a highly problematic neighbouring region.
The above also touches upon the challenges experienced in terms of promoting
democracy abroad. Neither the United States’ more forceful approach (e.g. Iraq) nor the
EU’s ‘bottom up’ approach have been proven to be greatly successful, which raises very
serious questions about the extent to which external actors can positively stimulate
democratic development. What primarily emerges from our research is that balanced
use must be made of both leverage and linkage, to use the vocabulary of Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig (2011). But in what specific combinations this should be undertaken
161 In essence the agreement provides for mutual acceptance of certified pharmaceutical products, but it
was not without controversy given that it was argued by some to open the door to the certification of
products from West Bank settlements and thereby to implicitly recognise Israeli jurisdiction over the area
(European Parliament, 2012d).
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depends on a range of contextual factors as well as the overall policy environment,
which is why it would go beyond the scope of this research to seek further specification.
Here, too, the Arab Spring provides a useful juncture to re-examine past efforts and to
imagine future alternatives.
The most confident empirical advice that we can give in this light is to remain
aware of what Hill famously called the European Union’s ‘capabilities-expectations
gap’ (1993) and to adopt a humble perspective on what could be achieved. This may
seem self-evident to many scholars, but in a wider sense it deserves reiteration. For
example, President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy said in response to
the Arab Spring that “without Europe … there will be no Arab summer!” (Van
Rompuy, 2011). Or as the President of the European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, said:
“Europe has become a role model. The universal  appeal of our values can be seen in
our southern and eastern neighbourhoods … This is not only a chance for peace, justice
and a better life for these people – this is also our chance to make Europe shine in the
world” (Buzek, 2011). We should remain wary of hubris, overconfidence and unrealistic
ambitions here (especially in light of past failures), and in that respect we may recall the
Amato Commission’s recommendation for European policy towards the Balkans –
suggesting that the Union must make a choice between “enlargement or empire” if it
wishes to positively shape the regional situation (International Commission on the
Balkans, 2005, p. 11). Enlargement is evidently not on the table for the Middle East and
North Africa, and one the lessons of this thesis is that ‘empire’ is certainly also beyond
the scope of the European Union’s current capabilities or intentions. What we are left
with is oscillation between various drivers, material and ideational, acting sometimes in
concert and sometimes in competition. It is to be hoped that the EU will be able to
define a fruitful synthesis between these dynamics for future policy, both to pursue its
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own goals and to optimally contribute to the social, political and economic advancement
of an important set of neighbouring countries.
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Appendix A – Interview Questions
Given the format that was utilised (semi-structured), the questions provided below
served primarily as a ‘jumping board’ for in-depth interviews with EEAS officials
(lasting between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours). To be clear: not all questions were used in
all cases (in reflection of the specific areas of responsibility and knowledge of the
interviewees).
Part A – Personal Background
1. Please describe your function and its key responsibilities;
2. What, in your experience, are the key opportunities and challenges specific
to your job?
Part B – EMP/ENP/UfM/IFIs
3. In your view, what are the main goals (drivers) of the EMP/ENP/UfM (focus
dependent on responsibilities and experience)? What are the main
challenges/achievements?
4. Do you think there has been progress (or evolution) in Euro-Med relations
since the Barcelona Declaration? (If yes; how do the ENP and UfM fit into
this trajectory?)
5. How do you perceive the role of the IFIs (World Bank, IMF) in the MENA
region; what is their specific added value?
6. Since the first IMF loans to Med countries in the 1980s, what do you think
have been the major changes in the approach to economic reform? (e.g.
departure from ‘Washington consensus’?)
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7. What are your thoughts on some of the criticisms levelled at e.g. the IMF
(for example that structural adjustment enhanced, rather than limited,
authoritarianism)?
8. How, in your view, do the EU and the IFIs complement each other’s work in
the MENA?
9. Are there areas/issues where the EU’s and the IFIs’ approaches diverge?
Part C – Euro-Med relations (big picture)
10. What, in your view, are the most important topics in Euro-Med relations (on
the strategic level)? What are the most important challenges?
11. Do you think there is any tension between the EU’s various objectives? (e.g.
human rights and economic cooperation)
12. Do you think that the different EU institutions and frameworks cooperate
effectively in their MENA policy?
13. What could (or should) the EU do to further improve Euro-Med relations in
the future?
Part D – To conclude
14. Finally, would you like to highlight any areas not yet discussed which you
think are important, or clarify something said previously?
